General BRADLEY. There is no absolute defense against a sneak attack that I know of because there are too many ways that it could be done.

Mrs. KELLY. Are we planning for that?

General BRADLEY. I think we are doing several things to lessen the chances of a sneak attack; yes.

Mrs. KELLY. What are they?

General BRADLEY. Well, I can mention some of them. Some of them I would rather not.

Mrs. KELLY. I am sorry but I would like that phase discussed.
General BRADLEY. May we go off the record again?

(The then following remarks were not reported.)

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. General, along that same line, do the Russians have planes now capable of delivering the bomb over our industrial centers? General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. We believe that their TU-4's can reach any part of the United States on a one-way flight. They cannot come to some of our industrial targets and return to Russia.

Mr. PROUTY. It is thought that they have an adequate supply of that type of plane.

General BRADLEY. They have enough to deliver a considerable attack.

Mr. PROUTY. In some quarters there is speculation as to the reliability in the event of attack of some of our European allies, specifically the French. In other words, some people say, "Well, if we extend this aid program will they be with us? Will the French stay with us in the event of a severe attack?"

Do you have an opinion on that point?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I believe they would fight if they thought they had a chance to win.

May we go off the record?

(The then following remarks were not reported.)

Mr. PROUTY. To what extent in that connection would the relatively high ratio of Communists in the country interfere with the military effort, as you see it?

General BRADLEY. That is hard to estimate. My guess is-and I have stated it before-I think a lot of the Communists in France are people who would not fight against the French.

While there is a 25- or 30-percent Communist vote, I think a lot of those people would actually fight for France in a showdown, unless Russia was able to make it appear that she was the victim in whatever started the war.

May I go off the record?

(The then following remarks were not reported.)

Mr. LECOMPTE. General, I have just one question. In our efforts to attain adequate defense in the event of an attack that would constitute world war III, does it seem to you that we are getting a coordinated effort by the nations of Western Europe so that in the event. of attack the ground forces and the air forces and the naval forces of the several nations would cooperate and coordinate their efforts as well as the forces of one country would?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I don't question that part of the cooperation.

Mr. LECOMPTE. It seems there would be difficulty in troops of several nations in the same command.

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't think that would bother you because the forces that make up that army are in general helping protect their own country.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. LECOMPTE. That is encouraging. Did I understand you awhile ago to say that when we attain our goal of adequate defense-of course, it costs a great deal of money to maintain that goal-that some of those countries would still have to have some help from this country, in your opinion?

General BRADLEY. I would hope that eventually they could take over all of it. I don't know how long that will be, maybe 5 years, 10 years, or 20 years, if we reach this place where we have sufficient troops to make war so unprofitable or doubtful that we think Russia won't start it; but I would hope that, at some point in there, that point would be reached.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. General Bradley, for the record-and I assume this to be proper for the record-the indications are that in an attempt to balance the budget and do other things in connection with our general economy, we are going to reduce somewhat the estimates for preparedness in this country.

Are those estimates based on Western Europe receiving the full amount provided in this bill?

General BRADLEY. It is my understanding that it was decided that we must cut down total expenditures and total appropriations; and, therefore, they reduced not only the appropriations for our own defensive forces but reduced the amount they are asking for military aid.

Mr. BURLESON. Well, the point is, General Bradley: Is it a correct statement to say that funds requested for military purposes in Western Europe are necessary for the defense of this country and that, unless that amount is provided in this legislation, it would be necessary to add a comparable sum or a comparable effort in our home defenses? The two are correlated, I assume?

General BRADLEY. They are correlated, but I don't believe that was involved here, necessarily. We believe that the defense of Western Europe is also the defense of the United States.

If you are going to cut down the amount you are going to spend in any 1 year, we hope they are not forgetting that the requirements are still out there and we hope to attain them sometime, but we are just saying, "We won't go as far this year as we had hoped to go because of economic reasons."

But to say if you are going to cut one you increase the other one, or vice versa, it doesn't necessarily hold.

We think this is a proper relationship between what we are doing at home and what we are helping our friends do abroad, the way it is set up now. If this is a total effort that we can make

Mr. BURLESON. If we didn't make the effort in Western Europe and didn't provide the military assistance proposed in this past legislation, then it would certainly be necessary that we do something here to further defend this country against all comers, would it not?

General BRADLEY. I would like to answer that in a general way. If we were going to give up the defense of Western Europe and just let it go I would say yes; we'd better get busy at home and do a lot of things we are not doing now. I would hope, however, that that is not an alternative. I don't think it is.

I think we must have our security forces at home and we must help defend over there because, as I say, that in itself is a defense of the United States.

Mr. BURLESON. The point of my question is: Selling this program to the American people again and again, as we have had to do year after year. It is becoming more difficult.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I would like to thank the General for coming to our committee. When he says he has confidence in our committee, I would like to say we have confidence in him.

When we have had all these difficult times and when it has looked like the policies haven't been exactly right at home, nevertheless there has been no home destroyed in the United States, Western Europe so far has been safe, Africa has been safe, so that the job of security has been well done. As a citizen I would like to tell you that I think you have done a good job.

On this cut that you speak of in percentage, would you tell us what that percentage cut was from your original estimates?

General BRADLEY. If we originally had $8 billion which we had distributed by service and by country after careful study of the reports coming in and we were told to cut it to $6 billion, what we did was take three-fourths of what was alloted to each service in each country in Europe for this new figure, because we felt our distribution on the $8 billion figure was done after very careful study to try to get each of these countries and each of these services coming along with equal ability to carry out their mission.

If you are going to slow that down by one-fourth and put it off to another year, we felt the most equitable and certainly the quickest way to do it would be just to take three-fourths of it.

That is how we reduced these figures from the original recommendations to this one.

Mr. FULTON. May I point a distinction out to you in certain areas which might have a relevancy on your method of cutting. For example, in Western Europe, according to advices, we have no foreseeable time within which we might expect an attack. With the development of the events in Indochina, however, we can look ahead and have some good reason for expecting that there will be further attack on that point at a certain time, namely, in about a year.

If the cuts have been made across the board, do you think it might be within the realm of the committee's discretion in some areas to restore, when we can see the danger is more, to pinpoint on a weak spot, so that the calculation isn't just on an arithmetic percentage? General BRADLEY. I am sorry. I was talking about NATO countries.

I don't know how the figure was cut down on the titles in these other countries. I am talking about, primarily, the services in these particular countries over here. I don't happen to know how it was done on the others because, you see, the military did not reduce it by titles. Let me check and make sure that that is correct.

General STEWART. We gave you the totals and you broke it down by titles and services but not by countries.

Mrs. KELLY. That question was in line with my questioning. I don't know whether I made it clear that I wanted those original estimates. I had requested that before.

Mr. FULTON. I am trying to determine how broad the base was, over what area is covered, and secondly, the arithmetic method of cutting it. Mrs. KELLY. The general gave us that before.

Mr. FULTON. Not quite.

General BRADLEY. We can get down to the details of this with General Stewart.

Mr. FULTON. All right.

General BRADLEY. When we rebroke this one down, we rebroke it down by titles and service. Now, we didn't actually put in this same bill the breakdown by country in NATO, but that will naturally follow, you see, as we go through the year and find out how they furnish their forces, and so forth, and if they furnish them the way we originally planned it will undoubtedly be done on a permanent basis within the countries.

There is a flexibility in the bill which would permit you to shift some from one country to the other.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Will you yield at that point for one question?

Mr. FULTON. May I ask something on NATO, and then I will be glad to yield.

The question that came up here as to the degree of the integration of the forces of Europe, even though they were separate forces-I had asked questions on that last year.

In addition, I had asked on the correlation and standardization of arms among the various countries.

If you could let us have some short statement on each of those points later, it would be appreciated.

For example, the Dutch wanted to build cruisers and we did not want them to build cruisers because they were not necessary, because the United States already had the ships. We should have the correlation of the forces as they now stand and the integration of the forces into a fighting force as it now stands, for the protection of Europe, and also the standardization of arms programs.

General BRADLEY. Is that a different subject you are getting onto now?

Mr. FULTON. Yes.

General BRADLEY. Could I comment on the one you just asked about because I am not quite sure about it.

As I understand it, you are asking now for a breakdown of the forces of each country, which is a NATO matter, you see, and I would hesitate to give you the forces, a breakdown of all the countries.

Mr. FULTON. I am asking, really, for the degree of how the forces are fitting together.

For example, one country would want a full slice of the division as well as full individual air force, and full sea power. How far are we going toward getting the nations to aim at a total concept of a defensive force rather than toward separate forces in each country with a full slice in each country?

all

General BRADLEY. Well, I think I can answer that. Maybe it is not you want. We look at these forces we are going to support as

those which are actually NATO forces and we are not proposing in here to furnish aid to purely national forces.

They put pressure on us all the time to get national forces included in the NATO goal and we would not stand for it.

Mr. FULTON. That is what I mean. It is a good point.

General BRADLEY. That is why I think I can answer it for the whole committee.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FULTON. And the countries are accepting that position from us?

General BRADLEY. Well, yes, sir. Two or three of them did not like to accept that, but we think you cannot do otherwise.

For example, suppose we threw all our local defenses of the United States, Canada, and Alaska and all the rest of them into this pot and had to list them all. It would be such a long paper and so complicated, no one could make anything out of it.

We feel we must confine these force goals to those that are used for NATO purposes, collective security and those that are needed to defend ports and cities, like antiaircraft, internal security, shore escort, and so forth, that that should be a national responsibility not included in NATO goals and therefore, this aid should not go toward those, but should go only toward NATO goals.

Mr. FULTON. We ran into some backwash of complaint on that policy when we were in Europe.

General BRADLEY. I am sure you did, and it came up with at least three nations in our last military committee meeting.

Mr. FULTON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. General, the military allocation by areas, is that allocation the same now in this bill as it was in your January estimates? The reason I ask it is that it appears to me that there has been a considerable shift from Western Europe to the Far East. This brings up the whole question of global strategy as to whether our original objective to make Europe secure-to lock the back door thereby-and then have a free hand in the rest of the world-a freer. hand in the rest of the world—is not being put overboard for a more generalized approach.

General BRADLEY. I have those figures here in front of me. I have not got them worked out percentagewise, but I have them here by title. This is going to be furnished to you in written form for the record. Mr. ROOSEVELT. Then can I ask you the more general question: Does this bill contemplate a shift in the general strategy approved by the Joint Chiefs which I understood was to hasten the defense of Western Europe to give us a freer hand in meeting the aggressive acts in other parts of the world?

General BRADLEY. As I say, I am speaking a little bit cold on this thing because the Joint Chiefs took this action while I was at the last NATO meeting and while I have studied into it as best I could, I have only been back a couple of days and if I am showing a little confusion, I ask your pardon.

In looking at it here, it looks like the title III was reduced much less than the rest of them and I will read you the figures to illustrate it. You can either take these down or this will be furnished to you anyway and we can put it down later if you want to.

Mr. FULTON. Could we not get a summary of this?