Those four. It developed what is called "the Paris plan." Both the so-called Paris plan which was developed in the spring of 1951 and General Eisenhower's plan which was submitted in the fall of 1951 were taken together with the Navy's recommendations—and I may as well round out the picture by giving the naval story. The naval requirements were worked out by five regional planning groups. They got going ahead of the air and the ground, they got going in 1950. Before the establishment of the two commanders, SACEUR and SACLANT, there were 5 regional planning groups, 1 for the Canadians, and the United States, 1 for the Atlantic, 1 for Northern Europe, 1 for Southern Europe and Western Europe.

Those five submitted their total Navy requirements and the total of those was the sea-power element which added to the air requirement developed in this so-called Paris plan and added to General Eisenhower's plan submitted in the fall of 1951, after being analyzed and reviewed by the standing group, and the military committee, came out approved by the military committee as MC 26/1.

MC 26/1 was approved by the Military Committee at Rome in the November meeting of 1951, and was submitted to the Council, the top body, the NATO Council of Ministers in February 1952.

This is a very important point. The ministers accepted MC 26/1 as the advice of their military advisers as to what, in the judgment of the military advisers, would be required to carry out the military

mission.

Namely the defense of Western Europe against aggression.

The task of the ministers was to determine what could be done to accomplish or fill the requirements developed by their military advisers. Their job was to set this concept that we call force goals.

I want to make the distinction between the concept of military requirements and the concept of force goals.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. How could you get hold of the thing? You could not do it all at once. How to make a start to, was the job of the ministers themselves, the representatives of the NATO partners.

So, in Ottawa, the NATO meeting in Ottawa in the last part of September 1951, established a committee which came to be known as the Wise Men, the Three Wise Men, chaired by Mr. Harriman of the United States. The other two countries being the United Kingdom and France.

The technical title of the committee was the Temporary Council Committee, the TCC, but colloquially it came to be known as the Three Wise Men.

Their job was to study the economic and political capabilities of the NATO partners to see how much of these military requirements the countries could undertake to raise, how to distribute these requirements, how many of these divisions is France to raise, how many of these aircraft is the United Kingdom to furnish, and in what increments year by year.

That temporary committee-let me refer to it as TCC, if I may, which is synonymous, or if I slip into it, as the Three Wise Menoperated right through January 1952.

What they did was to analyze the national gross income yield of each one of the NATO countries and to determine as best they could

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and they had a great deal of expert testimony-I appeared before them in November of 1951 to lay out the United States contributionwhat was the maximum defense effort that each of these NATO countries was capable of without unduly burdening its economy, because it would not be useful to go ahead and put on these countries a defense effort that would bankrupt them.

That is the tightrope that NATO has been trying to walk ever since it got legs to walk on.

How far could you go and how fast could you go and I must keep emphasizing the time element in this thing-how far could you go and how fast could you go in building up the defenses of Western Europe without bankrupting the countries or without the United States having to take on an even bigger chunk of the load.

Now the recommendations of the TCC were laid before the NATO Council of Ministers in Lisbon in February 1952, and with modifications were approved as what the countries could be expected to do by the end of calendar year 1952, the so-called firm force goals; and further agreement with respect to what they should shoot for by the end of calendar year 1953, which were called provisional goals, to distinguish them from the firm commitments the countries took with respect to 1952 forces; and further, with respect to 1954, planning goals for those long lead-time items like aircraft, which if you wanted by the end of 1954, you would have to get under contract pretty early in 1952, because it takes 18 months to 24 months to build aircraft in this country and longer, of course, in Europe, where the industry is just beginning to get going again.

Now I come to the chart that shows the comparison of where they were before Lisbon and what they agreed to do at Lisbon.

Let me emphasize this again. What they agreed upon at Lisbon was that they would take on and permit their countries to raise a certain increment of this overall military requirment.

(Discussion off the record.)

(A chart entitled "Build-up of NATO Army Divisions" was referred to.)

Mr. NASH. Now in 1950, they had some forces. I want to point out two things on this chart: If you will note that we go through 1950 and 1951 in two classes of forces: D-day, and D-plus-90. D-day is the day that the fight begins. It is the day the balloon goes up. And forces listed as D-day forces are forces expected to be on the line, guns in hand, ready to shoot.

D-plus-90-day forces are so-called reserve divisions that have their equipment ready and they can be mobilized and brought up to the front line at various times during a total period of 90 days. It would take 90 days to get them all up there.

You will note the 1950 and 1951 are in terms of D-day and D-plus90. But when we move over to the first year the countries made firm commitments on, 1952, they have shortened the time that the reserve divisions have got to get up on the front line and get firing.

D-plus-30. That is a very important qualification. If we were still on a D-plus-90-day basis, that red column, the third one, would be well above the top of the chart.

But, the D-plus-30-day concept is what we are going on in describing NATO forces as agreed on in Lisbon.

The second thing and most important to note in this chart is that there is a qualitative evaluation with respect to the forces that have been attained as of the end of the calendar year 1952. That pink or whatever color you might call it at the top of that red column represents divisions that are in being by which General Ridgway by a personal inspection and evaluation does not regard as being fully effective.

They have not completed all of their training or they have not got all of their equipment or they have not in one way or another got themselves to where he would say they could get on the line in 30 days and be ready to fight.

There is no such qualitative evaluation with respect to either the 1950 or the 1951 forces.

So those two points are important in evaluating this comparison of buildup.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. PROUTY. When you refer to front-line troops, do you refer to the blue?

Mr. NASH. I refer to blue and red, the only difference being that the red ones are inactive divisions. The men are reserves that get called up on D-day and it takes them overall 30 days to get on the front line.

Mr. SMITH. Let us stop at this point. I think there might be questions.

Mr. NASH. I am going on from here to the Air and then to the Navy so I think it would be well to speak to the division picture before we go on to the other two.

Mr. VORYS. Just to refresh my recollection, I got hold of our testimony in the last year.

I asked General Gruenther-now wait a minute. First, are these fiscal years or calendar years?

Mr. NASH. They are calendar years.

Mr. VORYS. In December 1951, a group of us from this committee were in SHAPE and General Eisenhower said to us,

As I stated to General Gruenther, I have 28 divisions, 24 ready to go. Under Montgomery's grading system that would equal 19.

He added that was not enough. Mike Mansfield was there, and Mrs. Kelly was there because she comes into this colloquy.

General Gruenther went on, and I am going to skip some of it. I am just trying to refresh my recollection and refresh my own con

fusion on it.

In the first place, in talking about 1951, without trying to read this over, General Gruenther did not say anything like 24 ready and 30odd at D-plus-90.

Mr. NASH. I thought that is just what you read. He said 24 or 26, which Field Marshal Montgomery evaluated 19 as being fairly effective.

Mr. VORYS. That was in the fall. That was General Eisenhower talking to us in December, I think it was, of 1951, and he said that we have about 24 that equal about 19.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. General Gruenther and General Eisenhower as of December 1951, were not talking about anything like 24 plus 30-odd. divisions; were they?

Mrs. KELLY. No.

Mr. NASH. Mind you, Mr. Vorys, that the red includes also the blue. By that I mean you have not got one on top of the other.

Mr. VORYS. You have not?

Mr. NASH. No, sir. You did not have 25 blue divisions and then 50 red divisions. I think the chart is misleading in that respect. Mr. VORYS. It certainly is to me.

Mr. NASH. That chart is misleading in that respect. The total number of divisions set for Lisbon were 50 divisions. That would come out there at the last column. The effort here was to try to make this important distinction between front-line divisions on the day the battle breaks out, D-day.

Mrs. KELLY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mrs. KELLY. I think the red that you are speaking of there, D-plus-90, in 1951, I believe that was the 25 goal he was speaking of, then, and the D must have represented the actual 19 he was talking of.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. The trouble with all this thing in the previous testimony is failing to make a distinction between a D-day division and a D-plus-30. If I do nothing else this morning I would like to drive that one home so we know what we are talking about.

The 50-division concept at Lisbon was never made clear to the public, that half of those divisions were supposed to be ready to fight right now-active divisions in being right now-and the other half would be able to fight within 30 days of the beginning of war. I am sorry that the chart is misleading and that you thought the blue was added to the red. The red includes that number of divisions and as Mrs. Kelly suggests it would be better if we carried the blue line right across. We will make that change for any future use of the charts. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. They did not break it down into jet aircraft and piston aircraft.

How did they come out at the end of 1952? I pass over July and December 1951 of what aircraft they had. There is no qualitative evaluation of those aircraft and it is just to give you some order of comparison with the buildup in 1952. I think from here on we would do well to see just where we stood at the end of 1952 and prepare to build up from then on, because we do not have any firm data. There was not any SHAPE organization to evaluate what these countries said they had on hand in terms of worthy aircraft really able to fly; did they have the pilots and mechanics to keep them in the air? We do not have that information as of the earlier years, 1950 and 1951. But we do have a critical evaluation of their effectiveness at the end of 1952. We have the same evaluation made for the air as I have just explained to you was made by General Ridgway for the ground forces.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. Do you have handy there a chart of total NATO aircraft against which this aircraft of 2,698 shipped would apply? Mr. NASH. Could I see that chart a minute, Mr. Vorys? The 2,698 represents total Air Force aircraft shipped as of January 31, 1953. It.

includes both piston and jet types, and transport and training aircraft in addition to combat planes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. What I wondered was about the statement of things being shipped there. It is 2,698.

I just wondered whether we could determine what that was a contribution to.

Mr. NASH. This includes all types of planes. C-47's, and the great bulk of them. F-84's.

This speaks of January 31, 1953. It speaks of shipments and we are talking about planes on the front line. I do not have with me. any chart that would show just where all these other planes that have been shipped actually are. They are in various stages of being worked into active forces.

Mr. VORYS. Some of them may be broken up or worn out and everything else.

Mr. NASH. There has been attrition on some.

I would be glad to try to break that down for you. It takes a long time to take a delivered aircraft and have it be a front-line aircraft with a trained crew.

Mr. VORYS. The chart is entitled "Key MDAP Statistics." I thought aircraft shipped was an important item. However, when we go over it here it is of no significance because we cannot find out where it fits in at all.

Mr. NASH. What we are trying to address ourselves to here is what forces we have to meet the enemy if the balloon goes up today. You are talking about apples and pears.

We also have a number of planes that have been shipped to Indochina and Formosa and a small number to Latin-American countries. It can be broken down for you if you want a reconciliation of the figures but what I am addressing myself to this morning is how close we came to effective units not just furnishing the equipment. You have to have bases, men, and equipment in order to have effective forces.

We will turn to the Navy now.

(A chart was shown entitled "NATO Naval Forces Build Up (Less Greece and Turkey)".)

Mr. NASH. The overall total of vessels we spoke of as being the Lisbon goal has to be broken down between major and minor vessels. Otherwise you get into the old story of rabbit stew, 1 horse and 1 rabbit.

What we have here is major vessels, we mean by that everything from aircraft carriers down through destroyer escorts. We classify as a major vessel from a destroyer escort up. Minor vessels includes smaller vessels of the greatest importance, such as mine sweepers, mine layers, motor torpedo boats, and patrol craft. I might underscore the importance of the mine sweepers as being one of the most important parts of our program. The furnishing of mine sweepers. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. You can look over at the earlier columns by way of seeing what has come in in the way of buildups since 1950 and 1951. I want to emphasize that there again there is no qualitative evaluation.