Is there a motion pending before the committee?

Mr. VORYS. I move we adjourn the hearing and go into executive session for members of the committee.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question devoted to finding out what you want next time?

We understand what you want in the way of charts and visual and statistical material on the country-by-country military programs. I think that is clear in the record.

Would you also like us to take the country-by-country figures that are given in the tables in this "Mutual Defense Financing" and put them on charts, or are these tables on the economic side of this satisfactory to you?

We are honestly trying to do what will be most helpful to the committee.

Mrs. BOLTON. Are they comparative tables with last year?

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, it was my thought that the committee could determine the answer to those questions in executive session. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Any requests that we have, we will see that it gets to you, Mr. Wood.

Mr. JUDD. I would like to say, the kind of thing we had yesterday, where we each had a copy and they had it up there in charts to point to and explain, is the most useful way to do it.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. That is right, Dr. Judd.

Mr. JUDD. They can point to the chart and we can follow it on our individual charts and we can make notes, while it is fresh in our minds.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. When they read off billions of dollars one after another, who can absorb it?

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, pursuing this thing a little further, as it was mentioned a little while ago, as to where the money has been spent and for what, Dr. FitzGerald did point out to me that they do have some data on that.

I think perhaps every Member of Congress should have that before him when this bill comes up. If it is not an insurmountable task to prepare such a thing. Not just last year, I repeat, but since the inception of foreign aid of any and all description.

I do not have the disposition to weight you down with a lot of detail, but I think we must have facts to show very graphically where all the money has been spent. It does not make any difference whether it is military, economic, TCA, or anything else. We should know where it has been spent-whether it has been spent in Pittsburgh or in Paris, and where the equipment is and for what purpose.

I can understand that would create a lot of detail if you had to start from scratch.

Mr. WOOD. We have that available now on all the nondirect military items, and we will have copies of each of those before the committee at our next session.

As far as the military is concerned, most of it has been spent in this country for end items.

Mrs. BOLTON. But, we must have it in front of us.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. I agree with the members' views on this thoroughly.

We will go into executive session for members of the committee only.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a. m., the committee proceeded in executive session for the committee members only.)

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

MONDAY, MAY 18, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met in room 1310, House Office Building, at 10:35 a. m., Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield, chairman, presiding.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order. General, we are very happy to have you here.

I understand you have a statement. We will be glad to have you proceed with your statement.

sir.

General RIDGWAY. Thank you, sir. I am very happy to be here,

STATEMENT OF GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE; COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPE

General RIDGWAY. Mr. Chairman, I consider it a great privilege to appear before you. I shall speak in support of the Mutual Security Program, a program which vitally affects the further buildup of the NATO forces and the collective security of the free world. It is my understanding that you wish me to discuss this program in relation to my responsibilities as an allied commander-that is, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe-and as the United States commander in Europe who is responsible for carrying out the military aspects of the Mutual Security Program in that area.

With the committee's permission, I should like to mention a report by Gen. Thomas T. Handy concerning the administration of the military assistance program in Western Europe and the results which have been achieved to date.

General Handy, my deputy commander on the United States side, is responsible to me for the administration of the United States military assistance program. His report is similar to that provided your committee in previous years. It was prepared for insertion in the record, if you so desire.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Without objection the report of General Handy will appear in the record at the conclusion of your general statement.

General RIDGWAY. Let me say before we go further, that I am very happy to see in this committee room, members of the National Security Subcommittee who visited SHAPE last April to study at first hand many of the problems that we shall discuss today. I have always welcomed the opportunity of explaining to the elected representatives

of our people the tasks that face Allied Command Europe, and I have benefited in my own views and experience from the questions that you have raised and the matters we have discussed together.

I plan to review the military situation in Europe, then to discuss those activities of Allied Command Europe which are closely related to the United States Mutual Security Program, and finally to discuss the effect of United States military assistance on the buildup of the military strength of the NATO countries.

I shall now present in the following order:

First, a few basic considerations affecting our operations in the NATO area;

Second, the buildup of forces which has been achieved to date and their readiness;

Third, the further buildup as it is now being planned;
Fourth, the NATO infrastructure program; and

Fifth, military assistance and its effect on our strength.

Of the basic considerations to which I just referred, the first is the military mission given me by my NATO superiors. Simply stated, this is:

In war, to defend NATO's European territories. This mission is not qualified in either space or time. I am not told to defend only certain parts of the NATO European areas and their peoples; nor am I told that this responsibility will only become effective in 1955 or at such time as the means are available. I am told to defend all of it now-today-if war should occur.

The peacetime mission is to develop an integrated effective force capable of accomplishing the wartime mission, if required. But the underlying and fundamental purpose of this mission is the preservation of peace. I wish to emphasize this point. The purpose is the preservation of peace through the deterrent effect on potential aggressors of strong, balanced, combat-ready forces, capable of successfully challenging aggression, or at least of rendering its success doubtful.

Great progress has been made in buildup from the exposed and almost defenseless condition which existed in 1950 at the time of the Communist attack on South Korea. Yet a tremendous amount of constructive work remains to be done and in many ways it will be much more difficult.

The second of the basic considerations, which gives concrete dimensions to the tasks involved in accomplishing the assigned missions, is the enemy threat-its nature and magnitude. I should like to stress two particular points: First, I and my principal commanders, as military men, must concern ourselves with capabilities of potential aggressors. Military planning and recommendations to the civil authorities must not be based upon speculative estimates of Kremlin intentions. If the missions assigned to Allied Command Europe are to be discharged, its commander must be prepared to meet the forces which actually exist and which could attack him.

The commander must reckon with military realities. He must not rely on attempts to fathom the minds of the men in the Kremlin. Second, the commander must be capable of effective reaction within whatever period of warning he may receive. Of all the basic principles of war, none can today have more devastating effects than that of surprise, if this principle is properly applied.

I can scarcely exaggerate the importance of enemy capabilities and of time as two factors of fundamental significance.

Although I am sure your committee has had detailed presentation of the enemy threat, I shall review with you some of the key elements in that threat.

The Soviet Army mounts 175 army divisions. The Soviet air forces. total just over 20,000 front-line aircraft, with a large aircraft reserve. The Navy includes more than 350 submarines of which a number are of the latest type.

Thirty Soviet divisions are located in occupied Europe, of which the 22 in East Germany constitute an ever-present threat to our forward forces. The combat effectiveness of their ground forces is rated high, and their equipment good-in some types, excellent.

In the air, the Soviets have made significant progress in reequipping their forces with high-performance jet aircraft, and in increasing overall combat efficiency. The Soviets well-known disregard for their own casualties further increases their offensive capability.

During the postwar years, army strength of the captive nations has grown from forty-five to seventy-odd divisions. Organization, training, equipment, and tactical doctrine are Russian. The threat to peace, inherent in this particular development, lies in the availability of these forces for use in support of the aggressive foreign policies of the U. S. S. R. These forces have already grown far beyond the task of maintaining Communist power in each country.

This, then, is the threat. It is a combination of a capability and a clearly established pattern of aggression. It leads us to the next of the basic considerations I would like to put before you-the main lines of action within Allied Command Europe to meet this potential threat in a way that would satisfy the assigned missions and responsibilities.

The first of these main lines of action is the establishment of an effective and efficient command structure for Allied Command Europe. (A chart, No. 1, entitled, "Principal Headquarters, Allied Command in Europe," was referred to.)

General RIDGWAY. This chart illustrates the geographical scope and diversity of this command-extending from Norway, 4,000 miles across the plains of Western Europe, through the Mediterranean to the Caucasus border of Turkey. A structure of control has been established, although many problems still remain. The individual headquarters and commands are steadily gaining in cohesiveness, and the system of communications-a key essential in this far-flung structure is being steadily strengthened.

Another major activity of Allied Command Europe is the development of operational plans and requirements in forces, facilities, and matériel. Starting from the estimate of enemy capabilities in each area, and a careful study of terrain conditions, commanders, and staffs have prepared two principal sets of plans.

The first of these is the emergency or availabilities plan, which is a plan for the effective emergency employment of forces available if hostilities should be thrust upon us tomorrow. Our available land, air, and naval forces are still very inadequate. There are not in existence or in sight mobile land forces in general reserve for interregional

use.