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MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to call, in room G-3, United States Capitol, at 10: 45 a. m., Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield (chairman) presiding.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order, please. Mr. Halaby, I believe you are going to complete your statement. After you left, Mr. Vorys, we talked about these minesweepers and I have asked Mr. Halaby to go over this just 1 minute because I think you will find it very interesting.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF HON. N. E. HALABY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. HALABY. We ended up yesterday having described the requirements for, and the purposes of these models. We thought after years of hearing about end items you might like to see a couple of samples of them.

We brought out at the beginning of the presentation yesterday that these were triple-duty dollars, that they were pretty hard-working dollars in that they bought end items, they built up a mobilization base in Europe that had some real prospect of becoming self-supporting, and finally they provide economic benefits. Also, this military procurement program is striking at the three threats that confront us in Western Europe. The first is the military threat and with respect to that we brought out the particular importance of some of these samples.

For example, the Soviet naval threat is largely from submarines and from minelaying, as it is estimated at the present time.

We showed you this net tender, this ship that is here on the table. The navy commander pointed out how this net tender lays down antitorpedo and antisubmarine nets. Those of you who were here saw how the typical plan for protecting a harbor works and how the nets that we are buying under this program, the net tenders of which there is a sample on the table, establishes that harbor protection.

I think one of the points that impressed us and perhaps some of you, was that we are getting this net tender at a substantial discount by buying it in Europe.

The average for the Navy vessels that we are buying in Europe is about 20 percent less than the comparable vessels-not identical by any

means, but comparable vessels to those constructed in the United States.

We had the man with the details here yesterday, and he could go into it at much greater length.

With respect to minelaying, the best and most practical antidote at the present time is the minesweeper. We are buying minesweepers in Europe and again we are buying them at less than it would cost to build comparable-not identical-vessels in the United States.

Now the air threat. This program, I think it is fair to say, strikes at the air threat. These two models which sit in the middle of the table, the Hawker-Hunter and the Mystere Mark IV, are to strike at the increasing Russian bomber capability.

There was an inquiry yesterday, since we had put a chart on the table showing the relative capabilities of these British and French fighters capabilities relative to American fighters-would you put that chart up please?

(A classified chart was shown entitled "Comparison-Performance Characteristics.")

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HAIABY. The prices, as you will recall from yesterday's testimony, were fly-away prices. That is without all the supporting equipment.

The fly-away price for the Hawker-Hunter built in the United Kingdom as it was given you yesterday was about $220,000 per plane. The best figure on the current price of the F-86H is $398,000, so there is a substantial saving in money, in addition to the element of time which cannot be measured in money.

We will have fighter production in France, Belgium, Holland, and the United Kingdom. That production is there in case the emergency grows greater than it is at present and obviously the maintenance and replacement, and all the supply factors are very valuable in addition to the saving in money.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?
Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Certainly.

Mr. VORYS. Is that vastly lower weight of the MIG an indication that it is not beefed up for maneuverability?

How could there be such a vast difference in weight? I have heard that they are not as maneuverable and that might be where we have an advantage.

Mr. HALABY. I can only give you a retired naval aviator's view on that. I know a little about this business, because I was out at the naval air-test center during the war and flew some of the German jets and compared them with the American jets.

And you know these MIG's have their source or their parentage in some of the German as well as the Russian development.

The main difference is that they put almost no safety features in, much less armorplate, less electronic equipment and they go down to a safety factor-as they do in everything in the Russian materiel program-to a much lower safety factor than we do.

Now the lower weight provides a lower wing-loading and that usually means a lower turning radius or a shorter turning radius.

I think these planes, it is fair to say, are maneuverable, have a shorter turning radius, but are not as strong.

The second feature which I think we have developed to a greater extent than they is the capability for the pilot and the plane to pull a lot more "G's." We have these complicated anti-G suits, and the third feature is our gunsight.

The Air Force will probably shoot me for making these comparisons, sir, but I am just giving you some general reactions. The gunsight is a highly developed piece of equipment, and it enables our pilots to bring the guns to bear much better than these MIG's can bring it to bear on our fighters.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HALABY. I have not got that figure. I will get it and put it in the record, but I believe the ranges on both of them are on the short side.

You will note that the MIGS almost never come down over U. N. controlled territory. We have to go up and find them. One of the reasons is that they do not have much fuel with which to go back to home base and they do not want to be captured.

The Hawker-Hunter is this decade's Spitfire in many respects. It is a short-range high-climbing, fast-climbing, highly maneuverable airplane.

One of the test pilots who had flown all United States models and all foreign models, one of our foremost test pilots, says it is one of the best airplanes he has ever flown. I would not hold him to that because it was just after he came down and landed but that is what he said.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LUKE W. FINLAY, DEPUTY FOR DEFENSE AFFAIRS, OFFICE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, EUROPE

General FINLAY. The Hunter is the successor to the Hurricane. Mr. HALABY. When I say it is the same as the Spitfire, it would av the job the Spitfire did in 1940 and 1941.

Mr. FULTON. What is the difference in fuel consumption?

Mr. HALABY. Fuel consumption is determined by the speed and thrust that you are using. In all these jets, the fuel consumption is tremendously high.

Mr. FULTON. Does the Hawker-Hunter and the Mystere consume more fuel than the MIG?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FULTON. Could I ask about the armament? What kind of armament are you going to have for these planes?

Mr. HALABY. The gun configuration on the Hawker-Hunter-I am not too familiar with that. Do you have papers on that at the moment? We had the Air Force officer who was primed for that yesterday, Mr. Fulton. We will get it for you and pass it to you.

Mr. FULTON. We would like the comparison with the MIG.

Mr. HALABY. Mr. Chairman, just to pick up a couple of questions I could not answer yesterday:

One of the members inquired as to what this special military support for France was, $177.5 million last year, and $217 million in this fiscal year.

The member wanted to know what France programed for. He wanted to know how much was programed for the French effort in

the NATO, how much in the Mediterranean area, and how much was programed for Indochina.

I have those figures today and will give them to you.

In the army portion, $78.5 million, approximately was programed by the French for France, NATO and the Mediterranean.

One hundred forty-six million dollars was programed by France for Indochina. It is about 2 to 1.

The navy; for France, $51 million for Indochina, $2.6 million. For the air force; France, $113 million, for Indochina, $3.6 million. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. That would not go off, will it Mr. Halaby, that is not loaded, is it?

Mr. HALABY. No, sir; that is inert.

That

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. I did not mean to interrupt you, sir. Mr. HALABY. That is a 3.5 rocket with a shaped charge. rocket is the article designed to disable and stop tanks. It is fired out of a bazooka. In a sense, it is a very lethal skyrocket.

That shaped charge goes against the tank and burns right through à considerable amount of armorplate.

Mr. VORYS. Would you mind repeating the comparative costs on that? If you gave it yesterday, do not bother.

Mr. HALABY. We did give it.

I believe that the price on that one was pretty favorable. We tried to give you an unfavorable one in the 105. We pointed out that the prices on that exceeded United States prices, and then a favorable one-as I remember we were saving 15 to 10 percent on that rocket. Mr. MORANO. How much is the 105?

Mr. HALABY. We are getting that in several countries under negotiated bidding. I believe the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. Mr. MORANO. Does the price ever exceed 110 percent of the United States price?

Mr. HALABY. Yes, sir; it does.

Mr. MORANO. Is that not contrary to the regulations?

Mr. HALABY. The 110 percent that you refer to is a rule, an administrative rule which limits the discretion of the procurement officer in the field, in this new field of European procurement.

The Under Secretary of the Army determined he did not want procurement officers in the field to exceed, on their own discretion, a certain price.

Mr. MORANO. When they get a bid of more than 110 percent they send it back to Washington?

Mr. HALABY. They have to; yes, sir.

Mr. MORANO. And it is decided here?

Mr. HALABY. Yes, sir; and authorization is given them to proceed or hold off.

Mr. MORANO. What factors are used by Washington to determine whether it should be granted above 110 percent ?

Mr. HALABY. First, on 110, it is 117 percent on 3 items. The 105millimeter howitzer shell, the 90-millimeter shell, and the 155 howitzer shell.

The ruling is if you cannot get it for 117 percent or under the current average United States price, refer back to Washington.

Now, how was that ruling developed? It was derived out of our concern that this was a new kind of procurement. Our personnel

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