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Mr. WOOD. This is in addition to that. It is not $200 million, it is $100 million.

Mr. CARNAHAN. It is $100 million plus the $100 million worth of defense support to allow them to make the airplanes.

Mr. WOOD. The defense support is not directly tied to the production of any specific kinds of military end items. The $100 million of defense support does have the effect, as I explained, of making it possible for them to devote more resources to military production, but we do not specify, and relate defense support directly to, the items of a military nature which they otherwise would be unable to produce.

The $100 million for special defense financing is directly tied to their production of aircraft, but is not offshore procurement in the usual sense. It is not carried out by our own procurement officers. It is paid to the British in consideration of their undertaking to produce these aircraft which otherwise they would be unable to finance. It is over and above the offshore procurement.

Mr. CARNAHAN. What is to happen to the airplane production under this program? Where will it go? Will it go into Britain's own national defense, or be committed to NATO, or will it be items for sale under offshore procurement?

Mr. Wood. On this particular $100 million?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Yes.

Mr. Woop. It will go to the British forces for use in the defense of the North Atlantic area.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And, of course, indirectly will contribute to the fact that they can produce items for sale in the offshore procurement program.

Mr. WOOD. That is correct, sir. It will contribute to the total defense production of the British.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The $100 million on the status chart for the special aircraft program, then represents the $100 million special defense financing?

Mr. WOOD. That is correct, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. That is the last item there in the right-hand corner? Mr. WOOD. That is correct.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It is difficult to coordinate these charts.

Mr. Wood. It is a complicated program I admit, but we have tried to make it as clear as we can.

Mrs. KELLY. The $100 million to England is for purchase of aircraft in England?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mrs. KELLY. What about the $100 million earmarked for France? Mr. WOOD. That is for other military end items; not, in this case, for aircraft.

The $100 million shown for France is special defense financing. In the case of France, it will not be for aircraft; it will be for ammunition and artillery and I believe, for some other items. However, they will all be military end items.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then we might say that we are extending to the British $100 million with which to build airplanes; we are also extending $100 million to give them supplies so that they can build the airplanes, and then we are going to buy the airplanes through offshore procurement?

Mr. WOOD. We are going to pay them, in the case of $100 million, Mr. Carnahan, for their performance in manufacturing $100 million worth of these airplanes.

We do not call that offshore procurement because it is differently handled from the regular offshore procurement program in which our own procurement officers place the orders we take title to the airplanes produced.

Mr. CARNAHAN. They perhaps would not have been able to fill their offshore procurement orders unless this aid had been extended? Mr. Wood. It is not quite that. They would not be able to finance the production of this particular $100 million of equipment if we do not finance this particular $100 million in this form.

That is about as accurately as I can state it.

Mrs. KELLY. In addition, then, is there an offshore procurement schedule for England?

Mr. WOOD. There is.

Mrs. KELLY. Then Mr. Carnahan is correct?

Mr. WOOD. This is over and above the regular offshore procurement planned for the United Kingdom. However let me say this: If we did not make this $100 million available in this form for this special aircraft production, it is still probable that the British would be able to produce the other airplanes which we plan to buy from them with our offshore procurement money.

I am trying to make it clear that those two are not directly linked. The British have the facilities and the capability of producing these aircraft. The British would be able, we believe, to produce the aircraft that we will purchase from them through the offshore procurement program, whether or not we financed this additional aircraft production with this $100 million.

The purpose of that $100 million is to get another $100 million of aircraft production financed, production which otherwise could not be financed by the British.

Mr. CARNAHAN. So you think this extra aircraft in the hands of the British is worth the investment?

Mr. WOOD. There is no question about it. As General Ridgway told you, I think, the thing that worries him most in the defense of western Europe is the shortage of air strength-of the modern, upto-date, effective jet fighters. These are jet fighters and perhaps some few short-range jet bombers.

Mr. HARRISON. In all events, it makes an interesting application of Mr. Attlee's complaint about our isolationism.

Mr. WOOD. I cannot understand how Mr. Attlee, in the light of what we are doing and have done, would imply that this country is isolationist. I did not, however, read his speech very carefully, I am sorry to say. The work on this testimony has kept me so busy that my reading has fallen far behind.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We have very helpful charts on the status of the present and proposed MSA Programs.

I notice there are some countries missing. For example, Formosa, Indochina, Spain, and Thailand.

Mr. Wood. On those charts, Mr. Zablocki, we have not included all the countries yet. They will be up here when we come to those areas. This morning we wanted to lay before you, chiefly, the European

countries.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Spain is in here. It is in a different form. Mr. Wood. I hope, Mr. Chairman, when we come to France, that I may be able simply to refer to this testimony about special defense financing, and unless the committee wishes, not go over the purpose and nature of it in full again.

I have tried to cover its purpose, nature, and effect for both countries.

Mr. MERROW (presiding). I will make an announcement:

The chairman of the committee is still in conference and he requests that there be no full committee meeting this afternoon.

There is a subcommittee meeting at 3 o'clock, on Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Cabot is going to appear. Will you proceed, Mr. Wood?

Mr. WOOD. May I now ask General Stewart, if he will, to turn to the French military end item program and lay that before the committee in whatever detail it may wish?

He has charts on France which are exactly similar to those he presented yesterday afternoon on Britain.

Mr. FULTON. In order that there will be advance notice, as chairman of the European Subcommittee, I intend to make a later request that there be a briefing before our subcommittee for general membership of Congress in an executive session on the floor, at some time shortly before the bill comes up for debate on the floor.

For myself, I am tired of going down there with all the secret knowledge and then battling people who are well-intentioned but floundering in a sea of ignorance.

Under those circumstances, I am going to ask through the chairman of our full committee-and I am simply saying it here so there will be knowledge of it otherwise-for General Ridgway to appear at that briefing.

Mr. Javits is interested in such a session for the Economic Subcommittee, too.

I do not know who Mr. Javits would ask, for his subcommittee, to appear at the briefing. Invitations should be on a basis of the people who are for the bill, and understand the legislation. Of course, such briefing cannot have all the details we are going into here. There is no intention of doing it on this level, but it is to make the general policy decisions available and the various urgencies available in secret session. The second point is to exclude the administration problems and administrative details which we are getting here.

I am formally stating this matter this morning through our current temporary chairman because I had previously called Mr. Boyd Crawford and the chairman and they have been out at a conference all morning. That is the plan, both for the European Subcommittee and the Economic Subcommittee, to have a future briefing for general Members of Congress on this program.

I am going to request for myself, General Ridgway on the European angle for the European Subcommittee though I cannot speak for Mr. Javits, who he wants to request.

Mr. MERROW. It will be transmitted to the chairman and you will talk to Boyd about it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. This is a departure from procedure. I do not think we want to discuss it at this time.

Mr. FULTON. I am just making note of it.

Mr. HARRISON. That has been a similar request made of the committee, but I think if it is in the name of a subcommittee, I think we should at least discuss it at a meeting.

Mr. FULTON. This is not a request. This is a notice that we would like to do something of this type.

Mr. HARRISON. If it is a notice of a subcommittee of which I am a member going to do something, I would at least like to be present at a meeting when the subcommittee does it.

Now, if it is a notice that Mr. Javits is going to do something, that is entirely different.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I think it is an excellent idea, but why do you not have the leadership invite the general to brief the Members of Congress in executive session, Mr. Fulton?

Mr. FULTON. This statement is simply notice of what some of us are talking about. There is no official action on it, either by the subcommittee or by the committee. But at this particular time, because I am leaving the first thing in the morning for the atom bomb tests, I think that previous notice should be given of the idea.

Mr. MERROW. You have made an announcement of your intentions. Mr. FULTON. That is strictly a notice and it is restricted only to that and it is not bypassing either the committee, the chairman, the subcommittee or anybody and there is no intention to do it.

It is so the members will have in mind whether they think it is a good idea and when we come to the question of decision, I will be bound both by the subcommittee and by the committee.

I think it is something you should have in mind and I want Colonel Wood to know of it and the general.

I did not want to go into a discussion of the merits of it now.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE C. STEWART, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. MERROW (presiding). General Stewart-

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of the committee to a chart which I have displayed here which is chart No. 1, in your classified group of military charts.

(A classified chart was referred to entitled "Statistical Summary, Proposed Fiscal Year 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Program.") General STEWART. There is a change in this from the original mimeographed sheet we gave you. There is no change in the totals. I can give you the details of the change.

In the mimeographed sheet showing the distribution of funds there was included under "countries," certain funds as being allotted to that country for aircraft, or air force. The totals included the amounts we were buying and we thought that a more accurate presentation would be to show the recipient countries as credited with those particular funds.

I am very sorry to have to make a change, but I did not feel that the other-while there was no error in it-was a correct statement. You have the corrected sheet and I can give you the exact details if you want them. This is sheet No. 1, in the group that I have given you. It applies to title I, only, and the only change, if I may repeat, is that we now show the money value to the countries who were actu

ally going to receive certain aircraft, where before that same money value was put in the countries where they were being procured. There is no change in total fund involved in any way. May I proceed with the other charts?

Mr. MERROW (presiding). Proceed.

General STEWART. We come now to the French program.

(A classified chart was shown entitled "Status of Materiel and Training Programs, France, Materiel Program (Millions of Dollars) Fiscal Year 1950-53 Programs, Status March 31, 1953.")

General STEWART. We start with the explanation of what we are doing and what we have done with the money previously voted to us by the Congress.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. KELLY. In that 109, that $100 million?

General STEWART. The $100 million is not in this. This is the military side. The $100 million that you were just discussing is not. Mrs. KELLY. Offshore procurements?

General STEWART. Yes, offshore procurements is included in these figures. What we buy outside of the United States from these figures, will be off-shore procurement.

Now the same type of material, in response to the committee's question, is shown in a statement showing major categories of items.

In the column entitled "shipped"-and this incidentally is chart No. 17, in your book-in this column, we show what items we have shipped of these particular types of items.

We show in the column "To be shipped" the items already funded and appearing on approved programs that we still have to ship.

We are in the process of trying to ship those at the present time. We propose in 1954 to procure this number of the same items for the French program.

Now to round out the story of the use of previous funds, we have shown here our training activities in France. This column shows the number of spaces that has been allocated by us to the MAAG in France the Military Assistance Advisory Group. The next column shows the number who have completed the course.

Next we have the number who are now in training in one of the

courses.

The last column shows the number that we propose to train from fiscal year 1954 funds.

(A classified chart was referred to entitled "France.")

(Discussion off the record.)

General STEWART. I have the companion chart here, in response to the committee's question, as to the status of forces.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. WOOD. I would like to ask General Stewart about something General Ridgway covered. I think it can be on the record except for numbers.

If a certain number of divisions are combat effective, nevertheless we may need further financing for the items required by the support units for those divisions. I think it was made thoroughly clear that a division is combat effective if it has its men trained and its initial equipment. However, in order to fight for any length of time, many other things are necessary, including ammunition reserves and the various support units required. It is not enough in terms of adequate

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