Mrs. BOLTON. It is a small group?

General STEWART. Yes, it is relatively small.

In Iran we have a MAAG, an Army training mission, and a gendarme retraining mission. What they have tried to do through all this difficulty is maintain all the contacts they had. It is about the only thing we had, and we kept it up, although we have not rushed a great deal of equipment over there.

Mr. VORYS. Iran is another country like Greece and Turkey, where our program began far earlier than fiscal year 1950; is that not true? General STEWART. Yes, sir.

Mr. VORYS. We had a training mission, and I think a military mission.

General STEWART. Before this military aid and the MAAG went in there, that is correct, sir.

Mr. JERNEGAN. Since 1943, Mr. Vorys.

Mr. WOOD. This covers only the MDAP period. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. Are any of them in this country?

General STEWART. Yes, sir; some of them have been trained in this country. I probably have the exact figure there.

Our biggest trouble there is, of course, to train technicians. We give them a car or a piece of radio equipment, and our biggest problem is to train them that it has to be greased, that you have to put water in the radiator, and that the battery will run down in a radio, and you have to put a new one in. That is what our training is directed at. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. WOOD. We will take up the economic program for Iran when we come to our presentation on technical assistance and special economic assistance.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that it has been most helpful to have that prognosis of a sort of a dream world that you are dreaming up for those countries. That gives us something to use as a center from which to think. We may not agree with it, but at least we have the sense of having an idea of where your minds are going in the military picture, there.

Mr. VORYS. I suppose right now this is more or less a diplomatic rather than a military proposition.

General STEWART. It is very much so.

Mr. VORYS. That is the case at the moment.

General STEWART. At the moment.

Mr. VORYS. But, if they could be persuaded to join the club, that would be an important link.

General STEWART. Very much so. From the geography of the place, and so forth, it would be extremely important.

Mr. VORYS. How are they in fighting?

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. There are no more questions?

mittee is adjourned until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

The com

Mr. Wood. We will then take up the Far East military end-item and defense-support program.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Wednesday, May 27, 1953.)

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

WEDNESDAY, MAY 27, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met in executive session pursuant to call in room G-3, United States Capitol, at 10:45 a. m., Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield (chairman) presiding.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order.

STATEMENT OF HON. C. TYLER WOOD, DEPUTY TO THE
DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

Mr. Wood, we have a number of witnesses here. Will you indicate how you would like them to proceed?

Mr. WOOD. I will, sir, always subject to the will of the committee. We are now ready, if the committee pleases, to go on to the Far East area. We will first take up, as we have in the other areas the military end-item and training program and, then, the defense-support program in those countries-notably Formosa and Indochina-where we are proposing defense support. We suggest that the committee first hear Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, on the general political background in the area. Therefore, I should like, if the committee please, to call on Mr. Robertson to start off this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER S. ROBERTSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, I have been in my present job exactly 7 weeks today. There are many details about this vast area with which I am unfamiliar, and there are many details of this program with which I am unfamiliar.

We have here, however, economic and military specialists who will answer your questions as to the details.

I think, however, despite my preoccupation during this past 7 weeks with our major immediate problem, the Korean truce and the Chinese Communists, that I am thoroughly familiar with the reasons for this program, why we have a program.

As you know, this Far East area extends all the way from Japan down to India, but not including India. It is an area of 292 million people. It is an area full of trouble. It would be difficult to find a spot in the whole area where the free world does not have problems. The problems vary with the individual countries involved. But,

taking the area as a whole, the troubles are more or less general. There is overpopulation. There is shortage of food. There are dislocated economies. There is the direst proverty. There is illiteracy. There is political unrest.

It would be difficult to imagine a more fertile soil for communism than this area we are discussing today.

Now, of course, this program is trying to keep this vast area, which is rich in raw materials and in manpower, from falling into Communist hands. It is a shaky situation. We have two fighting wars going on in the area, the U. N. war in Korea and the war in Indochina. This program is fighting the same war, except we are using dollars instead of bullets.

Now, our broad objectives, of course, are to stabilize the economies. of these countries by increasing their capacity for self-support, helping them to develop their own resources. We are trying to increase the production of food. We want to strengthen their internal military forces to maintain stability within their own country and resist aggression from without, and we are trying within our limits to encourage representative government.

Now, rather than to take up a great amount of your time talking about things you do not want to hear, maybe you would like to ask me questions about the particular areas in which you are interested. Fortunately, this committee knows a great deal more about this general area than most of us do because you sent out your own mission group to study it at first hand. You have seen what our problems are in Indochina, Thailand, and India-we are not concerned with India here today.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Robertson, we have a Far Eastern subcommittee that includes Pakistan and India. It is a different grouping from the State Department's.

Mr. ROBERTSON. It makes a more logical grouping, too.

I think the order would be more appropriate if I were to ask you questions for my information rather than for me to try to answer questions about an area that you know more about than I do; but, in any event, I should like to try to answer such questions as you may have about the particular areas in which you are interested.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I feel that there will be more questions on the detailed presentation on the areas. While we have a lot of general questions about the Far East, I did not want to disturb our presentation of the items in this bill.

I do not know whether Mr. Robertson would care to discuss those, or whether he would be available to put in comments as items come up. I will pass for the present.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Does any one wish to question Mr. Robertson, or shall we wait until we have the detailed program?

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, first I want to welcome Assistant Secretary Robertson back. I remember so well when you appeared before our committee in March 1948 and advised certain policies that the Congress did not follow and now you are here to try to salvage something out of the situation you tried to prevent.

I think if we got into discussion of general political questions in Asia we will not get on with our major problem here of trying to find out the details of how much we should recommend for specific purposes and areas and countries in this region; and probably our discussion of the political situation out there and the present crisis and so forth, which is still very fluid, would not contribute too much. So, I think probably we are wise not to get into a general discussion here and stick to the specific questions.

I will do as did Mr. Vorys. I will pass.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. We will have to wait just a moment until Mr. Wood returns and then we will determine whom he wishes to speak next on the program.

Thank you very much, Mr. Robertson. We appreciate your being here.

Mr. JUDD. I think, while we are waiting, Mr. Robertson should give the committee his background of experience in Asia. A lot of the members were not on the committee when he was here before. I think he is unusually well qualified to be Assistant Secretary of State for that area. His job in the State Department, in my opinion, is the toughest job down there because Asia is the place where we have been losing ground, and also the most important. If we begin to gain there and the Communists cease to make any further conquests and successes, they will begin to weaken around the world.

If we continue to lose, it will have inevitably the most deleterious effect on other programs which in themselves are succeeding.

I wish, Mr. Chairman, that he might outline his background in the Far East, for the record.

Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Chairman, before he does, will the gentleman yield for me to make a comment ?

Mr. JUDD. Surely.

Mr. HARRISON. We think it is very proper that a distinguished Virginian should occupy such an important position.

I want to congratulate the administration on obtaining his services. Mr. ROBERTSON. During 1943 and 1944 I was chief of the lend-lease mission in Australia. When I returned to Washington in December 1944, I was asked by the Secretary of State to come into the State Department. I was sent out to China as United States Minister and Counselor for Economic Affairs.

When General Hurley came back from China in September 1945, I was made Charge of the Embassy there and was in charge of our embassy until Ambassador Stuart was appointed Ambassador in July

1946.

During 1945, I was concerned with both political and economic affairs in Chungking. But, in January 1946, all of my time from then on through the following October was devoted to what we called the Peiping Executive Headquarters, which was the Marshall Truce Commission. It was organized to hold the lines of battle during the time that General Marshall and the Communist and National Government Commissioners were discussing the political problems of coalition between the National Government and the Communists.

33064-53- -47

I saw a great deal during the 2 years I was there of the leaders of the Communist movement in China. I happen to know Mao Tse-tung very well. I know him as well as I could know a Communist. I know Chou En Lai very well. Also, Chu Teh and Yeh Chin-Ying. I have had long hours of conversation with them. I think I am familiar with the type of Communists they are, and, in my opinion, no one could have known them and ever had any illusions about the kind of Communists they are. They are dedicated, fanatical Marxists and they always have been. They are dedicated to the destruction of everything we are and stand for in this world, and they always have been.

Chou En Lai said to me one day, with a good deal of irritation: Why do American correspondents come over here and go back and say we are just agrarian reformers?

With some indignation he said:

We are not agrarian reformers; we are Communists, and we are proud of it. Mao Tse-tung has blueprinted himself almost as explicitly as Hitler did in Mein Kampf. He has said all down through the years that he was a Marxist dedicated to communizing China and the world under the leadership of Moscow.

All of the confusion in our thinking in America about these Communists and the nature, control, and objectives of their movement has been caused by ourselves. The Communists themselves have been perfectly straightforward and honest about what they are and what they are trying to accomplish.

I have already talked too long.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. We would like to hear some more.

Mr. JUDD. For 2 years he went through this whole business of trucetalks and cease-fires and trying to get accommodation with the Communists in China. It is good to have that kind of man with such experience in charge of our affairs in the present difficulties in Korea. Mr. ROBERTSON. Of course, it is awfully hard to unscramble eggs. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Wood, whom do you wish to present

now?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, if you like, now we can go forward with the presentation of the military end-item training program in Formosa, which will be given by General Stewart. Then I would like Dr. FitzGerald to present the defense-support program in Formosa. Then, if it please the committee, we will go forward with Indochina in the same way.

After that I will ask General Stewart to cover all the other military programs in this area and also in Latin America, so we can finish with the military programs, if possible, this morning.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask if he wants the Democrats on this committee to see any of these charts.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. He certainly would.

Mr. RICHARDS. We sit right under these things and cannot see them. Is there any other arrangement we can make around here so that we can see the charts?