Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Do you mean they did not have any troops down there?

Colonel BURNETT. They had armed forces of some kind, but they did not have these particular type units.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. I was down there at Vargas' inauguration about a year ago and we were tied up for hours waiting for these things to go by in a parade. There were tanks and trucks and everything else.

Now, what were they?

Colonel BURNETT. That, I cannot say exactly, sir, but I do know these particular units were not in existence and that is what we tried to show with our charts.

Mr. PROUTY. You have the same difficulty in the case of Chile,

too.

Mr. JUDD. They are all the same.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. These dictators stay in power with sweetness and light and have no forces at all until we arm them.

Mr. WOOD. What the general is trying to show here are the particular units that we are attempting to assist with and build up. Mr. JUDD. It does not conform with his charts yesterday.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JUDD. There we know how much of their armed forces we are building up, what portions we think is worth building up or needs to be built up.

Mr. WOOD. That is right, Mr. Judd. There is a difference here in degree, if not in kind. Namely, in these other areas we have been talking about, we are giving support to all or a major part of the armed forces of the country concerned. Here we are concerned with small segments that have a hemisphere mission. It didn't seem, I take it, to the general, that it would be as significant since we were building up some special type units to put in the whole story of the military forces in these countries.

I am sure that General Stewart could put into the record the accurate figures as to the total of the Armed Forces which are not involved in this hemisphere operation.

Mr. JUDD. I have no doubt that all the information I have been trying to get out of the Pentagon for years and years and years is there.

Mr. Wood. Let's put that in the record.

General STEWART. I intended for that figure to be in there, and I have no reason for it not being in there.

(The information referred is classified "secret" and is not included in the record.)

Mr. Woop. Would the committee like to go through some other countries or shall we put that into the record for completeness?

Mr. VORYS. The hour is getting late and we would be glad to go on. You State Department political experts, what would happen if we said there was not any purpose at all for putting in a title IV except just to make it come out nice?

Mr. JUDD. And to keep the people down there from feeling bad. Mr. VORYS. And keep the people from feeling bad. We doubt that they know much about it. Suppose we just eliminate title IV. What would happen?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Cale, would you deal with that?

Mr. CALE. I think it would mean we would certainly be back in the position where we were in World War II where we had to do these jobs ourselves.

First, it would reverse a trend toward increased military cooperation between the United States and the Latin American countries, a trend which we wish to promote. The program is designed for the limited and specific purpose of assuring the participation of Latin American countries in collective defense of the Western Hemisphere. This is to be accomplished through the maintenance by the Latin American countries, with our help, of certain Armed Force units that would assume agreed-upon-tasks in defending the hemisphere in the event of an armed attack or other extreme emergency. These tasks relate principally to protecting strategic areas and lines of communication, which are, in general, outside the bounds of the national territory of the countries performing the task. These are tasks which in World War II we, in our own interest as well as in that of the American community, performed largely with our own manpower and

resources.

In the Rio Treaty of 1947 the Latin-American countries and we agreed that an attack upon one of the American states would be regarded as an attack upon all the American states. In the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of American states in Washington in the spring of 1951, we went a step further and agreed that the countries of the hemisphere should orient their defense plans toward collective defense of the hemisphere, rather than exclusively toward defense of the national territory of the individual countries. Under the program, eight of the countries have now signed agreements to help make this undertaking a reality by creating and maintaining, with our assistance, armed forces units which are committed to the performance of specific defense missions upon which they and we have agreed.

Second, discontinuation of the program would be considered a great victory for the Communists and extreme nationalists in Latin America, who have been the principal opponents of the military-aid program and whose opposition has ben responsible for a considerable part of the delay which has occurred, in some countries, in ratification of the military-assistance agreements. Failure of the United States to carry through with a program approved by the Congress on two successive occasions would not only augment this adverse propaganda, but would be taken by those who are anxious to cooperate with us as evidence that the United States is not really interested in helping its neighbors to help themselves in the military field.

Mr. VORYS. Well, I sat in Paris and tried to coax these people down there, please to just send a few soldiers over to Korea, and please to help us out on this problem of our contribution to the U. N., pointing out that they were getting more money from us than the difference would amount to. I did not find any good will when it came to Korea, or to us in the U. N.

What good will would we lose that we have now?

Mr. CALE. Well, I think there is a difference in asking the Latin Americans to enter into the type of commitment that they have with us for certain specific jobs in the defense of this hemisphere, and sending troops to Korea. We would like for them to do both and we have urged them to do both, but they have shown greater inclination to

assume these specific tasks, than they have to participate in the action in Korea.

In my view, failure on the part of the Latin-American countries to provide greater support for the United Nations effort in Korea is not a reason for curtailing or discontinuing the military-aid segment of the Mutual Security Program. I would draw the opposite conclusion. It is a fact, I believe, that many people in Latin America do not at present recognize their full interest in the worldwide struggle which is now raging between the forces of the free world and the slave world. They hold the comfortable illusion that many of us held in this country until the rather recent past, that they are not directly concerned in conflicts between major world powers. It is therefore important to free world security that they be encouraged to develop a greater sense of responsibility for contributing to defense of the continent as well as of their own individual countries. In addition, their armed forces are, in general, not in a sufficient state of readiness to participate effectively in the type of fighting now taking place in Korea. They are willing, however, as their governments have indicated by signing the bilateral agreements with us under the Mutual Security Program, to join with us in protecting this hemisphere in an emergency. We should not, in my view, discontinue this type of cooperative endeavor merely because they are unprepared at present to undertake greater responsibilities outside the hemisphere. Mrs. CHURCH. Is not that understandable and would not our boys rather do the same thing?

Mr. CALE. I think that is correct. However, I am convinced that the principal reason why the Latin-American countries have not taken a larger role in the struggle which is now being waged in Korea lies in the fact that most of the people in Latin America do not live in circumstances that enable them to recognize that they have a stake in that struggle. Average per capita income in Latin America is only about one-eighth that in the United States. Most of the people in Latin America are therefore so preoccupied in obtaining the means of day-to-day subsistence that they have not recognized, and do not now recognize, the extent to which they are threatened by the expansive aims of international communism. Communist propaganda in Latin America is today being most cleverly used to exploit the discontent of the masses of the population with their present economic status and to prey on extreme nationalistic sentiments in the area. Their purpose, of course, is to foster distrust of an antagonism against the United States.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. General, may I say this: I think you understand the purpose of the questioning of this committee. We are after information. But as you complete your work here I want you to know on behalf of the committee that we appreciate the fine job you and the other gentlemen have done in endeavoring to give us the information we wish. We do appreciate it very much.

General STEWART. Thank you very much.

Mr. JUDD. I would like to have them show the chart for Colombia, if they will. Colombia is the one that is giving us help.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JUDD. Coming back to Mr. Vory's question, are our relations good with Colombia?

Mr. SAYRE. Our relations are very good with Colombia, I think. Mr. JUDD. I would be in favor of doing something more for people who are helping us and who ask for help, rather than for people who are not helping us and who do not ask for help.

Mr. VORYS. We have heard during this hearing that Colombia was shocked when they received a bill for their battalion, but at least we know where they stand. There are 125 million people down there in South America, and we have one battalion from there in this United Nations fight. All of them voted like Wimpy. "Let's you and him fight."

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee is adjourned until 10:30

tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4: 50 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene on Tuesday, June 2, 1953.)

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met in room G-3, United States Capital, at 2:40 p. m., Hon. Lawrence H. Smith presiding.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Raymond W. Miller, will you be the first witness here this afternoon?

STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND W. MILLER, LECTURER, HARVARD GRADUATE BUSINESS SCHOOL

Dr. MILLER. This statement was read into the Congressional Record some months ago, but before we start this afternoon, we felt it would be advisable to present to you people really the reason why some of us are interested in this program.

This point 4 program, or technical cooperation, has had a lot of people who have been very much in favor of it. There have been some pleople who understood it and some who did not, but there was probably no one man who better understood the philosophy of taking American assistance abroad to where it could help people to help themselves, than Dr. Henry Bennett. And Dr. Henry Bennett, who was administrator of the point 4 program, shortly before he died (he was killed as many of you know, one one of his trips) made this statement which I would like to read to you. It represents, basically, the thinking of the 11 men who have been on the board of consultants to the Food, Agriculture, and Resources Development Staff of Technical Cooperation Administration.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for a moment to ask if Dr. Miller could give his background for the record?

Dr. MILLER. I am a farmer in California. I was President of the American Institute of Cooperation for 3 years. This is the cooperative educational agency, across the board, of American farm groups; the Farm Bureau, National Grange, Cooperative Council, and so forth.

I happen to be on the faculty of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University and I have been a consultant to the TCA, at the request of Dr. Henry Bennett. Bennett asked me if I would go around the world, visit certain places, and report back to him, and through him to this committee and to other people.

Frankly, I feel today, as I said this morning to my friends, almost as though I were just doing something for a dead man, because Bennett was one of the closest friends I ever had.

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