Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, in executive session, Foreign Affairs Committee room, United States Capitol, at 10:40 a. m., Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order. Governor, we are glad to have you back, safe and sound. If you care to do so, you may proceed in any way that you like.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD E. STASSEN, DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to respond to your invitation to report to you from the standpoint of the Mutual Security Program, on this meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which has just been held on April 24, 25, and 26, in Paris.

I might make a very brief opening statement and then respond to your questions.

May I say first of all that it is my view that the meeting was a solid success. It marked a significant advance toward the mutual security objectives of our country and it established a sound base for further progress in developing the combined military strength of the free nations of the Atlantic community.

Now, one of the main reasons for its success was the able, affirmative participation of the Secretary of State of the United States, John Foster Dulles, who personally chairmaned the United States delegation and spoke for the delegation in the NATO council meetings. I believe the committee heard his report yesterday and questioned him in that matter.

I will speak today of the specific operations of the Mutual Security Program in relationship to this NATO meeting.

There were six definite results which were obtained in this regard. First-a matter that I believe the Secretary referred to, to some extent of the signing of contracts for the long-term production of the very best type of modern, combat jet aircraft, with substantial participation by a number of NATO members in both their financing and production. The United States commitment is entirely within the previously granted appropriations and previously approved programs of the Congress. That the total group contracts amount to $559 million, of which the United States pays a little bit less than

half. The other participations are by Belgium and the Netherlands which are contributing about $120 million; France, which is putting in around $90 million to $95 million; and Britain, which is undertaking financing to the extent of $70 million to $75 million.

These are contracts for the Hunter-Hawker aircraft of the British, and the Mystere-4, which is the new model of the French plane. The Mystere 2, you may recall, was not considered so satisfactory. The Mystere 4, our Air Force has evaluated as an excellent plane and the Hunter-Hawker, the British model, they have evaluated as being an excellent plane by actual tests of models. They are both swept-back wings, jet planes.

These contracts reflect a part of the new policy we are developing under which we seek to establish a production base in Europe for the multinational production on a sound basis. Our own offshore procurement money joins with money put up by the European countries to get a sound, overall production contract. The United States will obtain specified planes from these contracts in the overall total.

Some parts of some of the Hunter-Hawker's will be produced in Belgium and other parts for the same planes in the Netherlands with, of course, the complete plane being turned out in the United Kingdom. The whole project is fitted together on a basis that production experts say makes a sound program. It is anticipated that additional countries may buy some of these same planes. This means that you have production rolling on an approved plane of this kind.

In undertaking this arrangement, we did have to project the possibility of deliveries all the way up to July 1956.

Mr. MORANO. That is 3 years?

Mr. STASSEN. Three years; that is right, That, of course, means that if anything happens in the interim and this flow of planes cannot go forward to the intended recipients, or used for other MDAP needs, the United States will own these products. We therefore approached our Air Force on the basis of, "Are these planes that you would like to own," and that is the kind of evaluation we got from the Air Force before proceeding.

I will run quickly through the other points.

The second point was an agreement upon a 3-year program subject to the approval of Congress and the other parliaments-and that is right in the agreement-for the construction of essential airfields, communications, and warning networks and related facilities. Such facilities are called infrastructure. The agreement provides for the participation in the financing by everyone of the 14 NATO members. This agreement specifically covers the remainder of what has been referred to earlier as the fourth slice of infrastructure and the entire fifth slice. This is the complete infrastructure job and it involves $770 million worth of construction over this 3-year period.

Our part is forty-two and a fraction percent.

When you consider that we are paying approximately 35 percent of the expense of all of the United Nations-the central expense of the whole United Nations-we feel that it was a reasonable, good transaction, under all the circumstances, to get our NATO share down to about 42 percent.

We were particularly anxious that everyone of the 14 nations should come up with some hard cash, and they have. We feel that that is a

step that will lead to better planning and more economical use of the funds in the infrastructure program.

The third solid accomplishment was the adoption of firm force goals for 1953. You will recall that at the December meeting they did not reach a conclusion on firm goals. We now have firm force goals which are within the capabilities of the members, and are within the potential of United States 1953 military armament deliveries, and which will make up the short-falls of December 1952, and will add substantial military strength beyond the 1952 goals.

The fourth important matter was the development of an understanding by our NATO partners of the general nature of our future Mutual Security Program-of the limitations on future United States programs-and the initial shaping of their own plans accordingly. This involved some of them realizing they were not going to get the levels of aid which they had assumed in their own preliminary plans. We will be going into that in detail next week when we come up with our program.

The fifth important matter was the alerting of the members to and a discussion with them on the study now underway by SHAPE of the effect of new and modern weapons upon the defensive capabilities of Western Europe.

The sixth significant point, as the Secretary undoubtedly emphasized to you yesterday, was the reemphasis to the entire NATO Council of the importance of the European Defense Community Treaty to the defense of every member of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Now I might add, in brief, that the United States delegation also included the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. George Humphrey, who was extremely helpful through his keen analysis of the financial problems involved and who skillfully promoted the understanding by all of the importance of a sound economy for the long-term strength of NATO.

The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Charles Wilson, was a third member of the United States delegation and he demonstrated his unique grasp of the essentials of defense production. He reported on the deliveries of arms which could be expected during 1953 and counseled wisely on the steps which could be taken to obtain more defense for less money. He particularly reported that with respect to a number of the critical items as to which there had been a delivery lag last December, he could now project larger deliveries during 1953-in some instances doubled deliveries-than projected in the forecast that was made in December 1952.

I am also pleased to report to the committee that the United States delegation was unanimous on every position taken in the NATO Conference, with its own position carefully worked out in advance. in delegation meetings and based on thorough staff work by the departments concerned.

It is anticipated that the next meeting of NATO will be in the month of October. I will say very frankly to the committee that there are many difficulties ahead, but much mutual-defense progress has been made and there is a determination and a rising confidence which favorably reflects the effective leadership which President Eisenhower had given in his earlier role in SHAPE and is giving now as exemplified in his April 16, 1953, address, which obviously had been read and studied throughout the NATO membership.

[blocks in formation]

Mr. VORYS. That is certainly a good outline, Mr. Stassen.

On the first matter, the offshore participation in jet-aircraft procurement, you mentioned that the United States will own specified planes in the program.

Then, I did not know whether I understood you correctly, that as to the total delivery at 1956, that the United States could use any or all of the aircraft produced?

Was that two different statements?

Mr. STASSEN. The aircraft that are produced for our share, our $280 million total, we will own as they come off the line.

Now we have in mind a requirement for those airplanes for NATO squadrons, as I indicated, but we are not bound to deliver those aircraft to anyone until we have reached a decision to do so after they are delivered to us from the factory.

Mr. VORYS. You did not mean that the United States could use all of the aircraft produced for the $559 million?

Mr. STASSEN. No. The other countries are committed to use their share for NATO, but they are not committed to turn them over to the United States.

In other words, they turn over to the United States only that portion represented by our approximately 50 percent participation in the total.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. I think I have taken my time.
Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Richards.

Mr. RICHARDS. The generals are not very bashful about asking for a lot of divisions, ammunition, and equipment. They like to have as much as they can get; do they not?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right. Any general that you find anywhere, if you ask what his requirements are to carry out his mission, will set you an amount of forces that would prove, in total, to be beyond the capabilities of any country that is involved. Then you have to go through a process in which you determine how far you can go toward reaching the general's wish for requirements and still keep your country from going broke.

The civilian side of the Government has to take the risks-the risks that are involved in having a force that is very substantial, but not up to the optimum that the military asks for in order to keep the civilian economy in its proper shape. That is the process that you are in now in NATO-of determining between what the military would say was the force that they could be certain would defeat the Soviet in the center of Europe, if they should attack, as compared to a force that you can reach and still have the countries with an economy behind those forces that can hold them up and sustain them.

Mr. RICHARDS. Well now, Governor, there is $700 million, plus, that you have agreed on for this 3-year plan, and there is about $100 million a year to be our contribution.

That agreement of course depended on what the different parliaments decided to do about that.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right. We put that qualification right in the agreement, that the agreement was subject to the parliaments of the

countries.

Mr. RICHARDS. Do you have money now, or do you propose to get that?

Mr. STASSEN. That will be in our program that comes before you this year.

Mr. RICHARDS. Now in the program for the first year, you will have to get agreements, let contracts and all that.

When do you think you will get the use of those items, following commitment of funds?

Mr. STASSEN. Some of them, 1 year, some 2 years, and some 3 years. The construction will move forward step by step.

Mr. RICHARDS. Of course, you understand the philosophy here in Congress and you are right up against it regardless of the kind of program you bring up here.

You have money now and as long as you have money in the Treasury to carry these things out, you are all right and do not need any more money. But that is an illustration of what the pipeline really is and how long it takes to get the stuff on the line after you have ordered it. Suppose you say, "No; we will only give you 1 year here. We will give you $100 million, or half of what you ask this year to carry out this tentative agreement."

Then you have the proposition where the top lines will be chopped off without some of that money and you will have to determine whether the investment you have over there is good.

Was this agreement made with the 100-percent endorsement of our military people?

Is this product a good product to do the job that other plans would do?

Mr. STASSEN. It was not only recommended by our military, but it was conditioned on the requirement that each specific project within the 3 years would have to have a military O. K. before it came up to us for payment. We have not only gotten military approval on the present outline of the 3-year plan, but we have a condition in it. that there must be the military approval on the step-by-step implementation.

Mr. RICHARDS. Do you think it will cost the United States more money to provide the items offshore than to get them here? I am talking now about the planes.

Mr. STASSEN. It will cost us less under this transaction than it would to get them here.

Mr. MORANO. Will the gentleman yield at that point, please?
Mr. RICHARDS. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. As I understand it, the plane appropriation has already been approved and granted. We have already given them money for that, $559 million for the airplanes.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDS. Not for this contribution that the Governor is talking about now.

Mr. STASSEN. Not for the infrastructure.

Mr. MORANO. Of course, those things mean airfields in other countries.

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »