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the Soul, was indeed the Subject of what happened to it accidentally, but was not the Caufe. The Will is not active in caufing or determining, but purely the paffive Subject; at least according to their Notion of Action and Paffion. In this Cafe, Contingence does as much prevent the Determination of the Will, as a proper Cause; and as to the Will, it was neceffary, and could be no otherwise. For to suppose that it could have been otherwife, if the Will or Soul had pleased, is to fuppole that the Act is dependent on fome prior Act of Choice or Pleafure; contrary to what is now supposed: It is to fuppofe that it might have been otherwise, if its Caufe had made it or ordered it otherwife. But this don't agree to its having no Cause or Orderer at all. That must be neceffary as to the Soul, which is dependent on no free Act of the Soul: But that which is without a Cause, is dependent on no free Act of the Soul: because, by the Suppofition, it is dependent on Nothing, and is connected with Nothing. In fuch a Cafe, the Soul is neceffarily fubjected to what Accident brings to pass, from Time to Time, as much as the Earth, that is inactive, is neceffarily fubjected to what falls upon it. But this don't confift with the Arminian Notion of Liberty, which is the Will's Power of determining itself in its own Acts, and being wholly active in it, without Paffiveness, and without being fubject to Neceffity. Thus, Contingence belongs to the Arminian Notion of Liberty, and yet is inconfistent with it.

I would here observe, that the Author of the Elay on the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, Page 76, 77. fays as follows, "The Word "Chance always means fomething done without "Defign. Chance and Defign ftand in direct

"Oppo

"Oppofition to each other and Chance can ne❝ver be properly applied to the Acts of the Will, "which is the Spring of all Design, and which "defigns to chufe whatfoever it doth chufe, whe"ther there be any fuperiour Fitnefs in the Thing "which it chufes, or no; and it defigns to de"termine itself to one Thing, where two Things "perfectly equal are propofed, merely because it "will." But herein appears a very great Inadvertence in this Author. For if the Will be the Spring of all Defign, as he fays, then certainly it is not always the Effect of Defign; and the Acts of the Will themselves must sometimes comes to pafs when they don't fpring from Design; and confequently come to pass by Chance, according to his own Definition of Chance. And if the Will defigns to chufe whatfoever it does chufe, and defigns to determine itself, as he says, then it defigns to determine all its Designs. Which carries us back from one Design to a foregoing Defign determining that, and to another determining that; and fo on in infinitum. The very first Design must be the Effect of foregoing Defign, or else it must be by Chance, in his Notion of it.

Here another Alternative may be propofed, relating to the Connection of the Acts of the Will with fomething foregoing that is their Cause, not much unlike to the other; which is this: Either human Liberty is fuch that it may well stand with Volitions being neceffarily connected with the Views of the Understanding, and fo is consistent with Neceffity; or it is inconfiftent with, and contrary to fuch a Connection and Neceffity. The former is directly fubverfive of the Arminian Notion of Liberty, confifting in Freedom from all Neceffity. And if the latter be chosen, and it be faid, that Liberty is inconfiftent with any fuch neceffary

neceffary Connection of Volition with foregoing Views of the Understanding, it confifting in Freedom from any fuch Neceflity of the Will as that would imply; then the Liberty of the Soul confifts (in Part at least) in the Freedom from Restraint, Limitation and Government, in its Actings, by the Understanding, and in Liberty and Liableness to act contrary to the Understanding's Views and Dictates and confequently the more the Soul has of this Difengagednefs, in its acting, the more Liberty. Now let it be confidered what this brings the noble Principle of human Liberty to, particularly, when it is poffeffed and enjoyed in its Perfection, viz. a full and perfect Freedom and Liableness to act altogether at Random, without the leaft Connection with, or Reftraint or Government by, any Dictate of Reason, or any Thing whatsoever apprehended, confidered or viewed by the Underftanding; as being inconfiftent with the full and perfect Sovereignty of the Will over its own Determinations. The Notion Mankind have conceived of Liberty, is fome Dignity or Privilege, fomething worth claiming. But what Dignity or Privilege is there, in being given up to fuch a wild Contingence as this, to be perfectly and conftantly liable to act unintelligently and unreafonably, and as much without the Guidance of Understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of Perception as the Smoke that is driven by the Wind!

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PART III.

Wherein is inquired, whether any fuck Liberty of Will as Arminians bold, be neceffary to MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE and VICE, PRAISE, and DISPRAISE, &c.

SECTION I.

GOD's moral Excellency neceffary, yet virtuous and praise-worthy.

H

AVING confidered the firft Thing that was proposed to be inquired into, relating to that Freedom of Will which Arminians maintain; namely, Whether any fuch Thing does, ever did, or ever can exift, or be conceived of; I come now to the Second Thing proposed to be the Subject of Inquiry, viz. Whether any fuch Kind of Liberty be requifite to moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment, &c.

I shall

I fhall begin with fome Confideration of the Virtue and Agency of the Supreme moral Agent, and Fountain of all Agency and Virtue.

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Dr. Whitby, in his Difcourfe on the five Points, p. 14. fays, "If all human actions are neceffary, Virtue and Vice must be empty Names; we being capable of Nothing that is blame-worthy, or deferveth Praife; For who can blame "a Perfon for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deferveth Praise only for what "he could not avoid?" To the like Purpofe he fpeaks in Places innumerable; especially in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the Will; conftantly maintaining, that a Freedom not only from Coaction, but Neceffity, is abfolutely requifite, in order to Actions being either worthy of Blame, or deferving of Praise. And to this agrees, as is well known, the current Doctrine of Arminian Writers, who in general hold, that there is no Virtue or Vice, Reward or Punishment, nothing to be commended or blamed, without this Freedom. yet Dr. Whitby, p. 300, allows, that God is without this Freedom; and Arminians, fo far as I have had Opportunity to obferve, generally acknowledge, that God is neceffarily holy, and his Will neceffarily determined to that which is good,

1

And

So that, putting thefe Things together, the infinitely holy God, who always used to be esteemed by God's People, not only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all poffible Virtue, and every Virtue in the most abfolute Purity and Perfection, and in infinitely greater Brightnefs and Amiableness than in any Creature; the most perfect Pattern of Virtue, and the Fountain from whom all others Virtue is but as Beams from the Sun; and who has been fuppofed to be, on the Account of his Vir

tue

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