Art. 12.—SIR H. SMITH-DORRIEN AND THE MONS RETREAT.

1. 1914. By Field-Marshal Viscount French of Ypres. Constable, 1919.

2. The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne, 1914. By Alexander von Kluck, Generaloberst. Arnold, 1920.

3. Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1914 (Official History). By Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. (Retd.), p.s.c. Macmillan, 1922. 4. Operations of War. By General Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Seventh Edition. Blackwood, 1923. 5. Memories of Forty-eight Years' Service. By General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O. Murray, 1925.

THE IInd British Army Corps has now been proved by historical evidence to have borne the brunt of the fighting of the original British Expeditionary Force between Aug. 23 and 26, 1914. Upon the commander of that corps fell the responsibility for the tactical handling of the principal British forces engaged, and to it is therefore due the credit for the results achieved.

'No kind of history,' wrote Sir Edward Hamley, 'so fascinates mankind as the history of wars. No kind of record, other than sacred, appeals at once to the deep sympathies of so wide an audience.' In his 'Operations of War' Hamley follows up this statement with various warnings to readers of war history, and he arrives at the conclusion that many who study it feel that their reading can be most profitable according to the means that they may possess of judging of the events of the past, and deducing from them lessons for the future. A criticism frequently levelled against war histories, when written by soldiers, is that the personal factor-the human touch, which is all-important if we accept the view that by 'history' we mean human history-is often swamped by abstract theory and material science. To correct this, historians of the Great War will fortunately have at their disposal an unprecedented array of personal memoirs and reminiscences which will help them to understand the personalities of the leaders whose names

appear in their writings. Some of these memoirs, affecting the retreat of the British Army in August 1914, are mentioned above. They can be studied from several aspects. Let us approach them from the angle suggested in 'Operations of War.'

Judged by his own test, Hamley himself can be placed high amongst military historians. He left his mark upon two generations of officers of the British Army. His writings exercised a dominating influence upon the mind of the Commander of the original British Expeditionary Force in 1914, and, through him, upon European history. In undertaking his comprehensive review of operations of land war, classified according to the lessons which they taught, Hamley undertook a formidable task. 'If,' he wrote, ' of the many Englishmen who possess the qualities necessary for great soldiers, some few should find that this book has in any degree smoothed the path that leads to honour and achievement, the years passed in studying its subjects, and the many months devoted to its composition, will have been sufficiently fruitful of result.' Hamley wrote for soldiers rather than for a wider public, and he credited his readers with a certain amount of military knowledge. He described situations and drew lessons therefrom, relying upon the practical experience of his readers to enable them to visualise the human environment for themselves. He made one exception. He tried to correct misleading impressions, amongst students of history describing land warfare, by putting his readers in the position of a general who has not studied the problem of supply of food and munitions, upon which the strategy of armies primarily depends. In view of its importance, his passage on this subject is worthy of attention :

'It has been thought necessary to dwell so strongly on this part of the subject, because it is absolutely essential as a foundation to any solid superstructure of military theory, and because its importance is apt to be overlooked by those who form estimates of warlike operations. Armies are not like fencers in an arena, who may shift their ground to all points of the compass. The most unpractised general feels this at once on taking a command in a district where his

Sir John French in 1914.'

troops are no longer supplied by routine; or, if he does not, the loss of a single meal to his army would sufficiently impress it on him. While distant spectators imagine him to be intent only on striking and parrying a blow, he probably directs many glances, many anxious thoughts, to the communications in his rear. Perhaps no situation is more pitiable than that of a commander who has allowed an enemy to sever his communications. He sees the end of his resources at hand, but not the means to replenish them. Is he to spread his troops to find subsistence for themselves? How, then, shall they be assembled to meet the enemy? Shall he combine them for a desperate attack? How, if that attack fails, are they to be fed? He will then have no alternative but to make the best terms he can, or see his army dissolve like snow.'

That passage was written by a soldier to warn his comrades in arms (accustomed to the command of troops 'supplied by routine' in peace quarters) that they must study problems which govern the movement of armies under war conditions. The question of the extent to which this, somewhat technical, aspect should be mastered by all students of war history has sometimes been debated, but it would not be difficult to quote examples of criticism of the conduct of military operations which ignores the essential conditions that render impossible the alternative movements which are advocated by the critics. Charles Kingsley, a contemporary of Sir Edward Hamley, can be quoted as one of the few writers who have taken the part of the soldier, as a man of action, against his critics. The following passage (from 'Westward Ho!') is typical of others by the same author:

'While the literary man is laying down the law at his desk as to how many troops should be moved here, and what river should be crossed there, and where the cavalry should have been brought up, and where the flank should have been turned, the wretched man who has to do the work finds the matter settled for him by pestilence, want of shoes, empty stomachs, bad roads, heavy rains, hot suns, and a thousand other stern warriors who never show on paper.'

In the light of that extract let us approach our subject, the historic retreat of the IInd British Corps from Mons in August 1914, as disclosed by the personal narratives of leaders. We have had for some time at

our disposal those by Sir John French (now Earl of Ypres), by General Lanrezac, commanding the Fifth French Army on his right, and by Generals v. Kluck and v. Bülow commanding the First and Second German Armies in his front. We now have, to complete this unusual record of valuable historical sources, a transparently honest and straightforward account of his own experiences by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorien, who commanded the IInd British Army Corps. That Corps, the Cavalry, 19th Brigade, and the 4th Division (from Aug. 25), were in close contact with Kluck's great turning force, and upon the commander of that IInd British Corps fell the responsibility for using his own judgment in standing at bay in the Le Cateau position on Aug. 26, thus contributing in no small degree to the successful British retirement pour mieux sauter, to the security of the French left flank, and to the subsequent victory of the Allies in the first Battle of the Marne. All these events have now been placed in their true perspective by Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, the official military historian. He had at his disposal, besides the official documents to which he was given access, the personal narratives of Sir John French, of Kluck and of Kuhn his Chief of Staff, and also of Bülow. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's book now fills an important gap in historical evidence, and this has been recognised by the permission accorded to him to reproduce from the 'official' history maps and sketches which add greatly to the value of the narrative.

The earlier chapters of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's book describe his life and environment since he joined the old 95th Foot in 1877. They are of considerable interest both to the general reader and to the student of the historical events in which the author bore a part in various parts of the world, in Zululand, in India, in Egypt and the Soudan, in the South African War, and in home commands. It is beyond our purpose to follow him through a life of varied military experience which, however, enables the reader to form an opinion of the characteristics and general outlook of a leader upon whose shoulders the responsibility for forming one of the most important decisions of the early days of the Great War was destined to fall. On Aug. 18, 1914, when Vol. 244.-No. 484.

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four divisions and the cavalry of the British Expeditionary Force had crossed over to France and were completing their concentration south-west of Maubeuge, he was ordered to take command of its IInd Army Corps (3rd and 5th Divisions) in the vacancy created by the sudden death of Sir James Grierson. Sir John French, immediately he heard of Grierson's death on the 17th, had telegraphed to Lord Kitchener asking that General Plumer might be appointed in his place, and had followed the telegram with a letter containing the words, 'I very much hope you will send me Plumer. . . . Please do as I ask you in this matter.'* Sir Horace SmithDorrien on the 18th saw Lord Kitchener, who expressed grave doubt whether he was wise in making the appointment, 'since the C.-in-C. in France had asked that General Sir Herbert Plumer should be selected to fill the appointment. However, after thinking the matter over, he adhered to his decision. . . .'t This point is also mentioned by the official historian (vol. I, p. 41). It seems important to add the above quotations to make the point clear. The new Commander of the IInd Corps arrived at his headquarters, at Bavai, during the forenoon of Aug. 21. He gathered what was known there about the situation and he then reported himself to the Army Commander at Le Cateau. We read that the fog of war was peculiarly dense at that time.' As this is not an uncommon experience in warfare, both by sea and by land, and a factor seldom allowed for in criticism of military leadership, it will be as well to recall the situation on that day, as it has subsequently been disclosed, together with the information at the disposal of the leaders on both sides and the plans which had been formed thereon, as far as these were known to the subordinate commanders concerned.

The fog of war was most dense on the German side. The German strategic plan was to outflank the left of the French army and to drive the whole of that army eastward, away from Paris, and towards the frontier of Switzerland. The general outflanking movement was to take the form of a great wheel, pivoting on Thionville