'free and secure access to the sea was not to be had without violating the second condition. Indeed, it is not too much to say that if Poland were limited to 'populations indisputably Polish,' it would have no access to the sea at all. Hence the necessity for including a certain number of Germans in the territory of the Polish state.

The southern shore of the Baltic, between Pomerania and the Russian frontier, was occupied heretofore by two Prussian provinces-East Prussia and West Prussia East Prussia had been under German control, as a fief of the Kingdom of Poland, since the 13th century, and an independent portion of the Prussian state since the 17th. It was cut off from Germany by West Prussia, the northernmost portion of the Kingdom of Poland. Hence the first partition (1772), when Frederick the Great linked up East Prussia with the rest of his kingdom by occupying that part of Poland which lay between. Twenty years later, in the second partition, he got possession of Danzig, a German city under Polish suzerainty, but practically autonomous, like other Hanse towns. The population of East Prussia is almost purely German-speaking-whatever the original substratum may racially be-except in the south (the region of the Masurian lakes), where there is a large admixture of Poles. The population of West Prussia is mixed, the Poles being generally in a majority; but in one portion, running unfortunately right across the narrow corridor' between the Vistula and Pomerania, the German element predominates. The large majority of the population of Danzig is German. Such, roughly, are the conditions of this particular problem.

It has been solved, first, by leaving East Prussia in German hands; secondly, by incorporating the greater part of West Prussia in the Polish state; thirdly, by making Danzig, with the territory immediately surrounding it, a free city under the League of Nations; lastly, by the resolution to hold a plebiscite, as between Poland and Germany, in disputable regions, viz. the southern portion of East Prussia and a small area in the eastern part of West Prussia. It was at first proposed to give Danzig to Poland, but this was objected to on the ground of its strongly German character; and the actual

compromise on the whole, the most satisfactory way out of the difficulty-was the result.

The loss of the ancient German city of Danzig is undoubtedly a sore blow to Germany, and is to be regretted as a departure from the principle of selfdetermination. But it appears inevitable, in order to secure for Poland that access to the sea without which an industrial state can hardly live; for the coast of West Prussia is scarcely forty miles long and possesses no harbours. The separation of East Prussia from Germany is also to be regretted, but, for the reason just given, it is inevitable. The importance of the land connexion is chiefly strategic; commerce between East Prussia and Germany goes mainly by sea. The convincing argument is this: There is no use in resuscitating Poland at all unless it is to be a strong, prosperous and-if this is possible-contented Poland; and to this end the control of the Vistula, its great avenue of communication with the outer world, is essential. That outlet might easily be blocked by a German Danzig.

This, however, is only one of the problems which encompassed the formation of the new state. In the rovince of Posen, secured by Prussia in the second and hird partitions, and confirmed to her, though with Posses to Russia, by the Congress of Vienna, there was hot any serious difficulty in drawing the new boundary; or the Poles, in spite of all the efforts to germanise rexpatriate them, have vigorously maintained their ationality; and, except in some of the towns and along the western border, parts of which are left to Germany, the majority of the population is indisputably Polish.' But in the south-west, in the German province of Upper ilesia, the population is so mixed that the principle of ationality is hardly applicable. From a point on the herman frontier, in the latitude of Breslau, to the ontier of Galicia opposite Cracow, this disputable area xtends—a large pear-shaped district, nearly 100 miles om north to south, and some 60 miles across at its idest part. It contains some of the best mines in ermany and much fertile land.

The difficulty is to be solved by a plebiscite, which, ke that in East Prussia mentioned above, will be under e authority of a commission appointed by the Allied

Powers. In both cases, the result of the popular vote is difficult to foresee; and it may very likely be so ambiguous as to leave the ultimate decision to the Allies. Germany, now deprived of the Saar Basin, is largely dependent on the Silesian mines for her industrial prosperity, on which, in turn, depends her capacity to make financial amends for her sins. We may trust that this fact will not be forgotten when the decision is made. It is no doubt an unfortunate feature of the Peace that between two and three million Germans will be incorporated-though of course with rights of emigrationin the Polish state, whose total population will number about 25,000,000. That there are so many is largely due to the policy of colonisation and compulsory purchase, and other methods of forcible eviction, ruthlessly pursued by Germany for a long time past against the native inhabitants of territories that rightfully belonged to them. The Germans have only themselves to thank if this policy has now turned against them. The alterna tive was to leave a still larger number of Poles under the German yoke, and to strangle Poland at its birth.

With regard to the next section of the treaty-that dealing with Schleswig (Arts. 109-114)-there will be no hesitation in approving the decision made. When, after the war of 1866, the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein passed under Prussian control, it was arranged between Austria and Prussia, by Art. 5 of the Treaty of Prague, that the population of North Schleswig should be allowed to decide by plebiscite whether they should belong to Denmark or to Germany. The plebiscite was never taken; and in 1878, when the Austro-German alliance was made, Art. 5 was cancelled by mutual consent of the two Powers. This wrong has now been righted by the agreement that a plebiscite shall be taken in the disputed area. In the interval, in order to guard against intimidation or undue pressure, the area will be governed by an International Commission, on which Sweden and Norway will (if they wish) be represented. The vote will be taken by communes; and in accordance with it the new boundary will be drawn.

Finally, by Arts. 115-158, Germany makes a number of concessions concerning Heligoland, the German colonies, Russia and countries outside Europe. The

naval harbours and fortifications of Heligoland, ceded by us to Germany in 1890 in exchange for Zanzibar, are to be demolished; the island, though rightly belonging to Denmark, remains German. The independence of all the territories forming the Russian Empire at the outset of the war is recognised; and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) and subsequent treaties with the Bolshevik Government are cancelled. By Arts. 119-127 Germany cedes to the Principal Allied Powers all her oversea possessions. She renounces, in favour of China, her existing concessions at Tientsin and Hankow-which are to be opened to international trade-and, in favour of Japan, her claims on the territory of Kiaochow and her rights in the province of Shantung. She renounces also any treaty-rights she may possess in Siam, Liberia and Morocco, and recognises the British Protectorate in Egypt.

Most of these clauses will meet with general approval, but against two of the decisions, expressed or implied, we venture to raise objection. In the first place it will be observed that nothing is said about the retrocession by Japan to China of the German rights over the territory of Kiaochow and the province of Shantung, though this was expressly promised by Japan when she undertook to xpel the Germans. Whatever may be the understanding between Japan and the other Allied Powers regarding the ultimate fate of these possessions, there is nothing in the treaty to ensure that Japan shall redeem her pledges. It is a grave omission. It is true that in a note accomanying the treaty of 1915, between Japan and China, Japan repeated her promise to restore to China the eased territory of Kiaochow Bay.' But it was under conditions that render this restoration to a large extent ugatory; for they include a concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan, to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.' There

nothing to prevent this concession being Tsingtao tself, with its docks and other appliances; and that this s intended seems clear from a subsequent clause, which eserves the disposal of German buildings and properties or arrangement before the restoration takes place.'

The circumstances in which this treaty was concluded hould be briefly recalled. On Jan. 18, 1915, Japan laid efore the Chinese Government a draft treaty containing

what are known as the Twenty-one Demands. After many conferences, which led to some revision, Japan agreed to defer five of these, but extorted China's consent to the rest by an ultimatum (May 7) which but slightly veiled a threat of war. Accordingly, on May 25, two treaties were signed, one dealing with Shantung, the other with Manchuria and Mongolia; and several supplementary notes, dealing with other concessions to be made by China, were exchanged. By these, not only does China bind herself to accept whatever arrangement Japan may make with Germany respecting Shantung, to obtain capital from Japan for the building of a railway connected therewith, and to lease no part of the province to any foreign Power, but also Japan obtains rights in South Manchuria and East Mongolia which give her full control of those vast provinces. All their resources may be exploited by Japanese; the chief railways, built or to be built, are brought under Japanese control; Japanese advisers are to be employed in military, financial and police matters. In short, the provinces become, for all practical purposes, Japanese. Between Shantung and Manchuria Pekin is enclosed as between the jaws of a nutcracker; and the independence of China disappears.

Moreover, the control over enormous supplies of coal and iron which results from these concessions will free Japan from all dependence on foreign countries for these articles; and in the near future she will be able to build a fleet which will dominate the Pacific. It is a heavy price to pay for the temporary abandonment by Japan of her claim to racial equality, and for her adhesion to the League of Nations. The G League has formally recognised the Monroe Doctrine for the Western hemisphere; it now sanctions a sort of Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. The tacit recognition of these arrangements is one of the most grievous blots on the Treaty of Versailles.

Our other objection to the last-mentioned series of articles is of a very different nature, and one which, in the present temper of this country, will, we fear, meet with scant approval. Nevertheless, we feel bound to say that, in our judgment, a grave mistake has been made in depriving Germany of all her colonies. It was not

thus that we dealt with France in 1815.

Our statesmen