the reunion of Naples, the grip on the two gates of the Pyrenees, Navarre and Roussillon, the reversion, however unintentional, to the priceless Burgundian inheritance, the expulsion of Jews and Moors, and the two institutions, good or bad, of the Inquisition and the government by Council, which to the close of the 18th century mastered a proud and undisciplined nation? Such marvels are all the greater if full weight is given to the ubiquitous anarchy of Castile under Isabella's brother and father, and to the effervescing disorder in the Aragonese States, which Ferdinand's father, resourceful and relentless as he was, could never quite repress. Questions there are, of course, still open for discussion, such as the respective parts played by husband and wife, the real worth of America to Spain, the policy of NorthAfrican settlement and of Neapolitan conquest, the intentions of Ferdinand as to his inheritance. On all these Mr Merriman pronounces with full knowledge of the evidence and with well-considered judgment; he is, perhaps, at his best throughout in the treatment of the wider problems. He can distinguish the essence of Spanish history from the confusion of incidental facts. On the first of these heads Castilian writers have usually given the foremost place to Isabella, while Italian istorians scarcely mention her, but dwell on Ferdinand's European prestige. This is natural enough, for to Castilians the main objects of interest were Granada, merica, the purity of the faith and an orderly government, which were pre-eminently the tasks of their ountry and their queen. Italians regarded Ferdinand s the creator of a Mediterranean Empire, which might tany moment extend from Apulia to the Eastern hey were dazzled by Ferdinand's remarkable victories driatic and thence from Athens to the Chersonese. ver the gigantic power of France, by the skill with hich he brought Emperor, Pope, England, Venice, the wiss and Brittany into one or other of his combinations, his very power of deceit, which in Guicciardini's inion surpassed that of all other men. Machiavelli ore than once declares that prestige was in itself an m for Ferdinand, and holds that, in the conquest of ranada, the African campaign, the attack on Naples, Vol. 231.-No. 459. 2 A even the expulsion of the Moors, his end was not this o that success but the gaining of reputation under th mask of religion, and the keeping the attention of hi subjects on the strain by the multiplicity of unexpected enterprises. Ferdinand's Italian aims were certainly no limited to Naples; all Italy was subject to the infiltration of Spanish troops; they protected Pisa and sacked Prato they were beaten at Bologna and Ravenna only to rou the Venetians near Vicenza; they held the passage a the Po at Piacenza when Francis I's victory of Marignan turned the scale against them. It is hard on Italy the Machiavellism should be fathered on her for all time whereas Machiavelli was impressing on Italians the valu of fierce energy and cant, the very qualities which the lacked, and thus made the Spaniard, Cæsar Borgia, th impersonation of the one and Ferdinand that of the othe In a general sense, Isabella's interest was intensiv government, that of Ferdinand territorial extension His adventurous, expansive nature would have bee cramped in the subordinate position in Castile to whic his wife confined him; it found its vent in the manipula tion of foreign policy. The suppression of a disorder nobility, especially in Galicia and Andalusia, was th Queen's task; so was the conquest of Granada, thoug Ferdinand took an active and valiant part in the militar operations. Annexation in Africa was for Isabella th enlargement of Granada; Ferdinand concurred in he plans, but with a view to Mediterranean expansion rathe than to Spanish security. Aragon, it must be remembere was still a State apart; the monarchical reforms i Castile had little reaction there; the only new institutio common to the two kingdoms was the Inquisition. Th Jews were, indeed, expelled from Aragon; but, whe Isabella drove the unconvertible Moors from Granad Ferdinand did not follow suit, and, after her death, trie to modify the severity of her measures. Isabella hi usually been credited with the support of Columbu tardy and grudging as it was; but Mr Merriman accep the more modern view that Ferdinand was from the fir an eager participant, even though Castile enjoyed th monopoly of trade and settlement. Of Isabella there less to say, because her aims were obvious and straigh forward-unity of faith and of race, promotion of tru religion and justice, the supremacy of Castile, and, within Castile, of herself. Her force lay in stability of will, that of Ferdinand in the astuteness of his restless intellect; Machiavelli, it is true, once called him astute and fortunate rather than wise and farsighted. It is to their credit that, in spite of such diversities, they remained a comparatively harmonious couple. The discovery of America, the conquests in North Africa and Italy, and even the absorption of Navarre and Roussillon have this common tie, that all contributed to the embarrassing wealth of alternative adventures which ultimately bled Spain white. As if this were not mough, the international marriage policy of the Catholic Kings entailed yet further liabilities and complexities. The price paid for America was very high, for it drained astile, a thinly populated State with a peculiarly low irth-rate and a proclivity towards indolence, of its most nergetic manhood. Yet few would disagree with Mr ferriman's conclusion: Had Spain kept out of the New World she would doubtless ave led a more comfortable existence in the Old. She would ot have been so easily induced to attempt impossible tasks. he would not have drawn down on herself the jealousy and atred of neighbouring States. She would probably have oided the fatal trial of strength with England. She might ell have been more powerful to-day. Yet, when all is said ad done, it was the Indies that account for her greatness ring the short period that it lasted. If they were a prinpal cause of her subsequent decay, they were also the imary source of her temporary pre-eminence. Without em she would never have been able to retain the hegemony Europe as long as she did; without them the Spanish pire would scarcely have been worthy of the name.' The chapter on this huge subject is necessarily a etch, but it is valuable as summarising the results of merous recent works, very few of which are availle for the English reader. The sketch, too, is a sufficient minder that before Ferdinand's death settlement on e mainland was very tentative, while by implication corrects the inveterate belief that the mines of America re the cause of the remarkable rise of prices in Europe the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries. They were then in fact quite inadequate for such a result, and n nearly so important as the silver mines of Tirol. It might naturally be urged that Ferdinand shou not have committed himself to the conquest of Naple Yet it is fair to remember that it was his uncle Alfonso choicest possession. The Catholic Kings, so long as t illegitimate line went in direct succession, had made claim, but, when reversion was granted by Alexander to the third king's uncle, they had raised a reasonab protest. The alternative, moreover, was inevitable co quest by France; and where then would be the securi for Sicily? The end was perhaps justifiable, though t less said about the means the better. It is rather North Africa that Ferdinand's policy deserves criticis and this not for doing too much but too little. F Isabella, Granada was a bridge-head for North Afric for Ferdinand North Africa was a jumping-off place f Italy. Ximenes in 1509, after much opposition and his own expense, personally essayed to carry out Isabell scheme. Oran was taken and colonised by six hundr Spanish families; and Ximenes would have followed th up by the conquest of the great kingdom of Tlemçe Navarro, who succeeded, was against inland enterpri and cared chiefly for the pillage of the coast towns. took the old commercial port of Bugia, seized Peñ d'Argel, the islet which commanded Algiers, and captur Tripoli. All this was not worth doing unless occupati were extended far into the interior. Instead of th Ferdinand used these troops, reinforced (it would appe by Askari, as a reserve to be thrown upon Italy, whe they were beaten at Ravenna. Such was the mistaken policy which Spain continu to pursue. Her garrisons held a series of posts, whi had to be provisioned, sometimes even watered, fro Spain and Sicily. Losses by disease and desertion we unceasing. Fanatical tribes would gather as suddenly sand-storms in the desert, and isolate the helpless gar sons of the coast. The peril of Melilla, Spain's fir conquest, in 1909, was the most recent serious warnin but will not be the last. France, much later in the fiel adopted the wiser policy. While Spain nibbled at t coast-line of North Africa, France swallowed the interi It is difficult to accept Mr Merriman's theory th Ferdinand's second marriage with Germaine de Foix was due to a patriotic wish for a son who might exclude the foreigner, the Habsburg, from the Spanish thrones. Castile was the predominant partner; and to her the issue of Ferdinand and Germaine would be doubly foreign, whereas the two sons of Philip of Habsburg— Charles and Ferdinand-were her beloved heroine's grand-children. Ferdinand must have realised from the attitude of Castilian nobles during Philip's visit to Spain, and from his own unpleasant reception by Castilian towns on his retirement to Aragon, that such a dynastic revolution was impossible. On Ferdinand's death Spanish unity was in the scales of fate with the weights gainst it. Castile and Aragon still stood back to back, cornfully shrugging their shoulders at each other. Ferdinand's international policy had at the last moment Francis I's victory at Marignano broke up he combination which Ferdinand had laboriously formed gainst him. Naples would be the next French objective; nd Francis would undoubtedly champion the rights of he house of Albret to Navarre, and use his victorious rmies for the recovery of Roussillon. In Castile Isaella's blows had only scotched, not killed, the snake f noble disaffection, while the cities represented in ortes might raise new pretensions against the absotism so recently established. The Queen Joanna was ad, her son Charles a stranger. On Ferdinand's death would presumably be King of Aragon. This would eserve the formal union of the Spanish States; but did ther Castile or Aragon wish for this? The difficult ture depended on a personality with capacity to attack problem for which the ablest of European kings had und no complete solution. one awry. The Catholic Kings can scarcely be dismissed without ention of the Inquisition. Spain, when it was introced, was in the heyday of the Renaissance; and they a scarcely have foreseen that the persecution of resing Jews and Moors would prove fatal to the tellectual future of the nation. The elimination of ws did probably contribute to the decline of talent the liberal professions, as the expulsion of the Moors 1 to that of agriculture. On the other hand, Spain aped the religious wars of France, the Netherlands |
