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affair with the Dutch. That nation had hitherto stood loof from the political complications of India; but now ertain of their agents saw in the notorious ill-feeling with which the Nawab regarded English control a leaven-sent opportunity for intervention. Accordingly hey entered into relations with Miran, at first (it seems) o establish him instead of his father; subsequently Mir Jaffar himself was brought in, and the project became he deliverance of the durbar from English thraldom by Dutch aid. After some delay their superiors at Batavia vere brought to share their aims, and an expedition was lespatched, ostensibly to augment the garrisons of eylon and Coromandel, but really to expel the English rom Bengal.

In this the Dutch, like every nation of that age, were uided by what they believed to be their real interests, s the English had been in their conduct towards Dupleix. he Dutch, however, were guilty of the unpardonable in of irresolution and delay. Their fleet lay for some ime at Negapatam and at the mouth of the Hugli before he leaders could make up their minds to proceed. Clive hus had full warning. As usual, the Nawab looked on hile others decided the fate of his province. With xquisite irony the English used his name to forbid the lutch to enter the river; and, when the latter decided ignore the commands of their supposed enemy and ecret friend, they were beaten with the loss of all their hips, and almost all their men, while the faithless liran now surrounded their settlement with his cavalry, reathing fire and slaughter against those Chinsura wards.' There was nothing left for the unfortunate utch but to confess their error and accept the terms hich the English imposed on them in the Nawab's

Came.

·

A system which could only be maintained by such urs-de-force was evidently unworkable except in the ost skilful hands. In January 1760, Clive went home rest on his well-gilded laurels, leaving the government Calcutta in the hands of Holwell and Caillaud, until e newly-appointed President, Vansittart, should arrive om the Coast. Holwell was a man of great intellectual bility; Caillaud was an agreeable man and a good oldier; but both were sadly lacking in Clive's force of

character and honesty of purpose. Behar was invaded by a wandering princelet from Delhi; and, though Caillaud beat the invader whenever he could come up with him, he failed to secure any decisive success because he could not induce Miran and his cavalry to act with vigour. The Nawab, as soon as Clive's influence was removed, again allowed his payments to the English to fall into arrears. Within three months Holwell had resolved that a new revolution was inevitable. Moreover, his acute mind discerned that it would be quite useless to pull down one Nawab only to establish another. More was needed than a mere change of persons. We could never be possessed,' he wrote, 'of a more just or favour able opportunity to carry into execution what must be done, I plainly see, one time or other . . . to wit, take this country into our own hands.' But, however clearly he saw what ought to be done, his want of character led him into conduct which irretrievably ruined his good name. Miran died in the middle of 1760; and at once there stood forth as candidate for the Nawab's succession the most finished politician of his age, the Nawab's son in-law, Mir Kasim. He immediately entered into corre spondence with Holwell, and, as we shall see, converted him from the views which he had at one time entertained

In the following August Vansittart arrived from Madras, and naturally enough consulted Holwell and Caillaud regarding the situation in Bengal. It was de cided to give Mir Kasim the whole power of the Nawab leaving to Mir Jaffar the name only. The maintenance of the English troops was to be assured by the grant of certain districts which were to be entirely under English management; and the Company's immediate necessities were to be provided for by the payment of a considerable sum of money. When the old Nawab refused his consent, declaring that his life would not be worth a week's purchase, he was allowed to retire to Calcutta, and Mir Kasim reigned in his stead.

Although every one concerned in this revolution of 1760 knew perfectly well that Mir Kasim would in due time give solid proof of his gratitude to those who had made him Nawab, it is probable that only one was actuated by corrupt motives. After all, as an acuta observer has said, those who wished to make unlawful

fortunes had many ways open to them, far more convenient than this public method of a revolution. But Holwell was on the point of going home; it was the last chance he had of a considerable coup; and to him Mir Kasim's generosity was swifter than to any one else. There is no other explanation of the change in his views. He had been convinced of the futility of changing one Nawab for another; but, on Vansittart's arrival, he advocated the claims of Mir Kasim to be the Nawab's deputy, knowing full well that Mir Jaffar could not possibly agree to the appointment, and that the proposal Would lead inevitably to the substitution of the former for the latter.

Vansittart doubtless believed that in replacing Mir Jaffar's incompetence by Mir Kasim's energy he was chieving a great stroke of policy; but, from this monent, we can trace a steady, unceasing effort to escape rom English control. Thus the capital was removed rom Murshidabad to the distant city of Monghyr. He ad promised to reduce his troops to 6,000 horse; but nstead set about augmenting the forces, training them fter the European model, and establishing factories for annon and small arms. He had agreed that the English hould assist the wandering Emperor Shah Alam to ecover the throne of Delhi, but intrigued so industriusly that Shah Alam departed without a single EnglishHe insisted that the commanders of the English orces should be placed under his orders; he affected to egard them as mere mercenaries in his pay; and the east hint of independent volition on their part was eclared to be a studied insult to his authority.

nan.

Two matters deserve something more than a passing ention. One was the question of Ram Narayan, whom he English had maintained in Behar ever since 1757. it first Vansittart followed Clive's policy, and repeatedly ssured him of English protection. But Mir Kasim had ong nursed a grudge against the man whom he had wice tried to supplant. In the face of his repeated omplaints, Vansittart and his committee gave way, and t last, after long hesitation, delivered Ram Narayan ato the Nawab's hands. When as much money as ossible had been extorted from him, he was put to eath as a signal proof that English protection availed Vol. 282.-No. 460,

E

little against the Nawab's hostility. None can now tell whether the deputy's conduct had been unusually corrupt; but, in any case, the least that Vansittart could have done was to offer him an asylum in Calcutta.

The other matter was the Inland Trade, which Mir Kasim began to obstruct in December 1761, and to complain of in the following May. A careful examina tion of the facts shows that this matter was not quite as it is usually represented. The old farmans, under which the English had formerly traded in Bengal, had never drawn any distinction between goods intended for export and goods intended for consumption in the country; but, in practice, the former Nawabs had prevented the English from trading in the second sort, and on one occasion had compelled the English chief of Kasimbazar to sign a renunciation of all right to take part in inland trade. To the English this had always appeared a grievance; and in 1757 Clive had been instructed to see that Mir Jaffar's parawana should abrogate the renunciation. The parawana reads: Whatever goods the Company's gumastahs may bring or carry to or from their factories. . . you shall neither ask for nor receive any sum, however trifling, on the same. Whoever acts contrary to these orders, the English have power to punish them.'

At a later date Clive denied that he had allowed the o English to trade in articles of internal consumption during his first government. Be that as it may, they e did so, for at the end of 1759 Mir Jaffar complained of the extent to which the privilege was carried, and was referred by Clive to the Council for an answer. Under Holwell and Vansittart it was certainly allowed; and Mir Kasim not only accepted the nawabship with a full knowledge of this practice, but allowed it to continue without protest for almost two years. This explains an why his attacks on this valued but impolitic privilege to were so bitterly resented by the English.

Another point arises in this connexion. Mir Kasim suddenly objected to the English custom of punishing the revenue-people who invaded their privileges. We have seen that this was expressly authorised by Mir Jaffar's parawana of 1757. More than that, it was an admitted principle of action. Hastings writes in 1759:

To be perpetually complaining to the Nabob renders us too little and mean in his eyes. If you have not a force capable of protecting you and your servants from insults, you should apply for it.' No one can pretend that Mir Kasim was ignorant of this practice. Yet he now affected to regard it as a grievous innovation made by personal enemies resolved upon his overthrow. In short, by the beginning of 1763, it was plain, to all but the optimistic Governor, that the English would either lose their privileges or have to fight for them.

It is needless to detail the prolonged and heated discussions which took place between Vansittart and Hastings on the one side and the remainder of the Council on the other, regarding the policy that should now be followed. The arrangements which the President had made with Mir Kasim were formally disapproved. The Chief of Patna, who had from the first condemned the revolution of 1760 with a violence which damaged his own cause, was authorised to take measures for the security of the factory and garrison if an attack were threatened; and an embassy was sent to make a last effort to dissuade Mir Kasim from hostilities. But he categorically refused every demand. After some delay he permitted the English envoys to depart, but his troops were already moving on Patna. The English thereupon seized that city, but owing to ill-leadership failed to hold it, and in their retreat were surrounded and taken. The embassy was attacked near Murshidabad and massacred.

Thus for the third time within seven years the English came to an open rupture with the Nawab of Bengal. In this case various causes rendered the struggle prolonged and severe. Although Major Adams, by an unbroken series of victories, drove Mir Kasim out of Bengal and Behar, the fugitive succeeded in getting the support of Oudh and thus renewed the struggle by invading Behar in 1764. The military command had now fallen into the weaker hands of Carnac; and the army had been demoralised by promises of a donation, payment of which had been delayed. Little was done beyond defending Patna from the enemy until, in the autumn, the spirit of mutiny was crushed; then the English advanced into Oudh, beat the Nawab at Buxar, and occupied that province as well.

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