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Yet such a denial of the State as an independent A willing and acting subject does not hold on closer investhe tigation. Of course there are many kinds of 'States and there are many steps in the ladder between the more arbitrary, mechanical forms of State and those which have grown naturally by a predominantly historical process. I shall, however, confine my attention to the highest of all civil or political forms of State-the national State, i.e. the ethnological, historic, linguistic unit consisting of the people or nation organised as a State. There cannot, in my opinion, be any doubt that the State so conceived is something more than an artificially formed institution, which men could, of their free will, just as well have omitted to form for themselves. This is not the place to th discuss the difficult and disputed questions as to the right with which, or the sense in which, one may designate the State-society an 'organism,' a 'super-organism,' or the like. It is sufficient in the present context to note that we clearly have here to do with a power-centre, whence e not merely conscious but unconscious powers emanate. I regard it therefore as equally indubitable that the nation organised as a State can rightly regard itself as a willing and acting unit, as a link in historic evolution and in the society of mankind, with its own special tasks, rights and duties. And its task, together with the right and the duty therein involved, will first and foremost be self-assertion, in the sense of the right and duty both to live its own independent life and to develop itself in every way which does not invade the interests of others In the national State, conceived as a unit and a historic growth, the centre of gravity lies in the nation organised. as a State. Juridically, of course, every State, quâ legal entity, both wills and acts. But that view which sees in the State a unit historically and morally bearing the responsibility for its will and its actions is materially weakened if it be applied to any sort of conglomerate people or fraction of a people organised as a State. Certain political writers of our day would put the concept of nationality completely out of court, and proclaim the State as a concept elevated high above the nation, having the right to draw around itself all the feelings of piety associated with the fatherland, and the ability to appro priate the historical tasks associated with the race and

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he nation. A protest must be entered against this. Theories of the kind merely form a transparent veil for State-egotism, which, detached from a national basis, ays the yoke of its might on foreign nationalities and eeks power for its own sake. It is the nation, the ndividuality of the people, which has the right of existnce; detached from it, the State becomes only an artificial reation fitted to serve certain human aims, but also fitted o be changed or dissolved according as those aims alter. If we agree in regarding the State-society in this ense, as an historic formation with its independent life nd its own will and power of action, independent of hat inherent in individual members of the society, then follows that that argument fails, according to which he question whether the actions of the State are subject the moral commandments can no longer be said to esolve itself into a question about the subjection of the eting statesman and civil servant to these commandlents. We stand, rather, face to face with a new orally responsible subject-the State itself as different rom the individual; and thus it is not a priori impossible hat a different morality may hold good for the will nd action of the State, or at any rate that the moral ommandments may have a modified application according the condition of the State in question and the circumtances of the particular case.

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It is just this, as we have seen, that is asserted by a de umber of well-known sociological and political writers, hose opinion is crystallised by one of them in the saying hat brotherly kindness has nothing to do with the policy States. This assertion may be met with the observaon that the burden of proof rests with those who make For it holds true for the moral world-order, as it olds true for the higher religions, that, when once that order is recognised, it must be regarded as universal, nbracing the whole life of mankind, human affairs in eneral. The great fundamental law of charity is this: unto others as you would they should do unto you. Ow, if such a moral law is recognised at all, it becomes thecessary, if its universal applicability be denied, to ove that unusual conditions are present which exclude But I have never seen any attempt to establish any

such proof. And it is difficult to see why some of the most important aspects of human intercourse, namely international relations, should lie outside the ordinary moral world-order, and be exempt from the fundamental principles of morality.

The application of these principles may indeed be different for the State and the individual, because in the case of the State there may be a collision of duties, which does not occur in that of the individual, at any rate when he acts in his own concerns. Such collisions of duties do not, however, occur, as I have said, so long as we keep to the negative side of the altruistic law: thou shalt do no wrong. That a foreign policy which leads to encroachments upon other States, acts of violence, oppression, misappropriation of their land, and so forth, must consequently incur a moral censure as severe as in the case of individual acts of violence, illegal misappropriations, etc., appears to me to be beyond a doubt. That so many respected and otherwise upright people in our time can hold the opposite, declaring that might is higher than right and that the policy of States lies outside the range of moral law, is very deplorable. It is impossible to imagine anything more reactionary, more hostile to progress, than these theories which cancel the most precious moral conquests of mankind, and take us back to barbarism and the days of club-law.

If, on the contrary, we turn to the positive aspect of the law of charity, the will to service and sacrifice; if we ask about the relation between self-assertion and selfsacrifice, I take it that we have to confess that State and individual stand in different positions, since such collisions of duty occur for the one but not for the other.

This question of self-assertion versus self-sacrifice belongs to the more difficult points, even where individual morality is alone concerned. How far one can go in this respect cannot be discussed here. But let us suppose that the duty of self-sacrifice is, for the individual, stretched to the utmost limit. If we accept this, we must regard the saying of Jesus about turning the left cheek when one is struck on the right cheek, as excluding all defence against unrighteous aggression; and the commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself must be interpreted as enjoining the extreme of

self-forgetting self-sacrifice to promote the welfare of others. But, even if one may make such stern ethical demands upon the individual, we are not justified in applying them to the national State, because it has duties both within and without. The individual can never sacrifice more than himself. But the nation's self-sacrifice would mean loss of happiness and of the capacity for evolution for unborn generations, treachery to the nation's historic mission, treachery to its duty towards mankind.

For the national State, therefore, it is a right and duty to assert itself, to live its own independent life, and within its own territory to develop freely all its capacities for promoting civilisation. And, whatever an ascetic morality may think concerning the individual's right of self-assertion and self-defence, one must concede the right and duty of the State-society to defend itself by force against unjust violence from without, where this cannot be warded off in some other way without the loss of indispensable ideal or material values.

This accords with the circumstance that, of the State's double function, within and without, the first must take precedence as the more important. The individual is placed in the world to work outwards; and the inner building of personality follows as the result of this outer activity. The State, on the contrary, is first and foremost required to work inwards, for the evolution of the society whereof it forms the organisation; and its significance for humanity at large develops as the result of this inner activity. The aphorism, 'Charity begins at home,' applies exactly to the State. For the individual, the great ethical Commandment is service for others-self-sacrifice. For the State, on the contrary, self-assertion-within the bounds of law and equity-steps into the foreground, because this self-assertion is the condition of the service it has to perform within-of its work for national development and the good of the society. The State may of course have such a surplus of life and power, that it is able within certain limits to help other State-societies in an entirely unselfish way. It may, and ought, according to ts capacity and without any recompense or advantage o itself (alas, how seldom this happens!), to seek to spread the good things of civilisation among uncivilised peoples. It may, without egotistical motives, support another

people in its struggle for freedom, or fight for the common interests of humanity. It may, without recompense, allow economic and other advantages to a neighbour State. 11 But here we already approach the limit of the State's positive external altruism. For, where the choice lies between promoting its own or another people's welfare and development, the State must, in accordance with its position and function, prefer its own.

The result, then, of this investigation is that the State has exactly the same moral duty as the individual not to violate another's right or act inequitably towards any one; but it has not the same moral duty to help foreigners or subserve their interests. It is, however, th quite clear that such general propositions do not qualify an observer to pronounce a moral judgment upon the foreign policy of a State in every concrete case that may occur. There arise in foreign policy a variety of combinations, transitional cases, casus mixti, in which the moral justification of the action taken may be open to doubt. I must here confine myself to indicating only one or two such cases.

Even supposing we could agree-and the preceding pages have shown, of course, that very many do not agree that the appropriation of foreign territory by conquest is, as a rule, a national sin, yet the question may arise, whether the same can be said of the reconquest of lost territory inhabited by a national population which desires reunion with its kindred stock. It is obvious that one cannot surmount this difficulty by merely pointing to the fact that a man has the right to recover stolen goods from a thief either personally or by help of the law. For conquest in our days and among civilised people will doubtless find support in some agreement, really compulsory, but in form voluntary, which gives the conqueror the right to occupy and retain the conquered territory.

I do not believe that it is possible to lay down any general rule for the solution of this question. So much only may be said: that the time sooner or later comes when the historic fact has to be recognised as a fait accompli, which can no longer be revised with any moral right; and when, in consequence, an attempt at