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the Reichstag upon the subject of hostile intentions against Germany, which, he said, were likely to be translated into action. Mr Disraeli, speaking as Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, at once took the opportunity of paying a tribute to the magnanimity and prudence which France had displayed; and the Queen wrote to the Emperor a letter, the draft of which has been printed in the 'Life of Lord Granville' (11, 115). She recognised the provocation given by some sections of the clerical press in France, spoke of the patience which was required in dealing with a proud nation after defeat, urged the Emperor to be as magnanimous in peace as he had been invincible in war, and called his attention to the possible effects of another great war upon some of the most dangerous social questions of the day.'

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In the spring of 1875, the German newspapers talked, with suspicious unanimity, of an approaching French attack; how France, wonderful as her recovery had been, could hope to retrieve her fortunes within four years after her downfall, they did not explain. To finish with France,' they said, 'is not only an opportunity to be seized, it is a duty towards Germany and towards the world. . . . Germany is troubled by the consciousness of having only half crushed her foe.' While public opinion in this country was startled by an article in the 'Times,' in which Blowitz exposed the intentions of the German military party, the Queen was urging upon her Ministers the necessity of taking action to prevent the recurrence of war :

'May 6, 1875. Saw Mr Disraeli and talked about the very alarming rumours from Germany as to war. This began by dictatorial and offensive language to Belgium, then by reports of the Germans saying they must attack the French. as these threatened to attack them and a war of revenge was imminent in consequence, which the increase of French armaments proved. I said this was intolerable, that France could not for years make war, and that I thought we ought in concert with the other Powers, to hold the strongest language to both countries, declaring they must not fight, for that Europe would not stand another war.'

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'May 10, 1875. Lord Lyons said it was madness to talk of the French attacking Germany; they were horribly

frightened, and for five years at least they would be unable to do anything-that they wished to be at peace, and that Marshal McMahon and the Duc Decazes were most pacific. If the Emperor of Russia could keep the Germans back by strong remonstrances, then we could perfectly well hold the same language to the French. .. Wrote to the Emperor of Russia to Berlin, appealing to him to use his influence to maintain peace and prevent an attack on France.’*

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The letter to the Tsar (who was then on a visit to Berlin),† written on May 10, with the knowledge of the Prime Minister, contained the following sentences:

'I cannot end this letter without expressing the fervent hope that you will use your great influence in the endeavour to maintain peace and to dissipate the profound alarm that has been aroused throughout Europe by the language held at Berlin. Everything goes to prove that France neither contemplates, nor is in a position to contemplate, another war, and it would be a culpable act on the part of Germany to commence war without provocation. You, my dear Brother, are so disposed towards peace, and the dear Emperor William would himself be so inclined towards it, that I hope Our representations to all will arrive in time to prevent so terrible a calamity.'*

It was in accordance with her sense of fairness that he insisted upon using British influence to restrain any xtravagances in the French press.

'Lord Lyons thinks with the Queen,' she wrote to Mr Disraeli and Lord Derby on May 11, 'that, when we have got 'rince Bismarck to give assurances of Peace, we should trongly warn and advise the French, in whose interest, as well as in that of Peace, we have been acting, also to give eaceful assurances. Lord Lyons thinks they would be

eady to do this.' *

Not content with writing to the Tsar, Queen Victoria so addressed a letter to the Emperor William, implorng him to keep the peace. British and Russian interention succeeded in averting war, and Bismarck was ft to cherish his disappointed malice. Officially, he escribed the incident as a mare's nest. 'I am still norant of the source of these rumours,' he told the mperor William in a letter published in his 'Memoirs,'

†The original is in French.

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'but it must be a very credible one for the exalted lady who has written to your Majesty to have shown so much insistence, and for the English Government to have taken such important and unfriendly measures towards us.' The Queen's Diary shows that the Emperor, in his reply, adopted the same tone of injured innocence:

'June 8, 1875. Had an interesting letter from Vicky, giving an account of Bismarck's anger at what he called our pretended alarm about war, making out I had been set against Germany. I told her simply what had occurred. Also had a letter from the Emperor of Germany, very friendly and pacific, but trying to make out it was all nothing, and that it was very absurd having believed such rumours and taken any notice of them.' *

The letter to which the Queen refers, written to the Crown Princess from Balmoral on June 8, 1875, expresses in clear and unmistakable terms Her Majesty's view of the provocations which the German Empire was giving to Europe.

'I wish just to answer those principal points in your letter, though of course you know how absurd these ideas and notions of Bismarck's are. As regards my being irritated against Germany or anybody else working upon me! It was I alone who, on hearing from all sides from our Ministers abroad of the danger of war, told my Ministers that every thing must be done to prevent it, that it was too intolerable that a war should be got up and brought about by mutual reports between Germany and France that each intended to attack the other, that we must prevent this and join with other Powers in strong remonstrances and warnings as it was not to be tolerated. No one wishes more, as you know than I do for England and Germany to go well together, but Bismarck is so overbearing, violent, grasping and unprincipled that no one can stand it, and all agreed that he was becoming like the first Napoleon whom Europe had to join in putting down. This was the feeling and we were determined to prevent another war. At the same time I said France must be told she must give no cause of anger or suspicion t Germany, and must not let them have any pretext to attac her. France will for many years be quite incapable of going to war and is terrified at the idea of it; I know this to be fact. The Duc Decazes is a sensible prudent man, fully aware of this, and who is doing all he can to act according t this advice.

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'I wrote at that moment a private letter to the Emperor Alexander urging him to do all he could in a pacific sense at Berlin, knowing the anxiety he had to prevent war and how much he loved his Uncle and he him. As for anyone working Lpon me in the sense Bismarck thinks, it is too absurd. I am not worked upon by anyone; . . . but Bismarck is a terrible man, and he makes Germany greatly disliked-indeed no one will stand the overbearing insolent way in which he acts and treats other nations-Belgium for instance.

'You know that the Prussians are not popular unfortunately, and no one will tolerate any Power wishing to dictate to all Europe. This country, with the greatest wish to go hand in hand with Germany, cannot and will not stand it.' *

The closing words might have been written in 1914, and show how little the great Queen's attitude was affected by the family ties that bound her to the German Royal Family.

This letter closes the record of Queen Victoria's active interventions on behalf of France, for similar circumstances did not again arise in her lifetime.† It leaves no doubt as to what her opinion would have been had William II ventured to provoke a European war while she was on the throne of this country. That the French appreciated her sympathy and friendship was shown at he end of 1874, when representative Frenchmen presented to her at Windsor an address of thanks for the haritable services rendered by English men and women during the war, and she made a gracious reply in French. During the later years of her life she was a frequent and

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welcome visitor to France, and was often an unofficial dspectator of reviews of French troops. Not the least ormportant part of Queen Victoria's personal influence apon the history of Europe was her consistent detergmination to bring about happy and cordial relations between her own people and the country which had, in er youth, been regarded as the traditional and natural nemy. The Entente of 1904 owes something to Queen ictoria as well as to King Edward, whose love for rance was in full accord with his mother's feelings and mpathies.

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R. S. RAIT.

The Schnaebele incident (April 1887) was too slight a matter, and was too quickly, to require intervention.

Art. 2.-GERMAN BUSINESS METHODS IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE methods of German commerce in pre-war days are familiar in their general outline; the concrete details have not often come to the light. This article will endeavour to give the story of how the German Dye Combination operated in the United States. The account will be given as far as possible in the words of witnesses taken under oath. These accounts, commented on only for the sake of clarity, should be allowed to speak for themselves.

During the war, the dye industry in Germany was united into one great chemical Verein, so that the gentle methods hitherto used might become universal and gain completeness of organisation and efficiency after the war, when England and the United States should open again their hospitable doors. Before the war, however there were six leading German dye houses, divided into two groups of three each. The first group consisted of the Badische Anilin-und-Soda Fabrik (called for short the Badische Company); the Farbenfabriken vormals Friedrick Bayer & Co. (called the Elberfeld or Farben fabriken Co.); and the Aktiengesellschaft für Anilin fabrikation (known as the Berlin Co.). These three Companies pooled their profits in the respective propor tions of 43 per cent., 43 per cent. and 14 per cent. They were controlled by a cartel and met for fixing prices determining policy, etc. The second group consisted of Farbwerke vormals Meister, Lucius und Brünner (known as the Hoechst Co.); Leopold Cassella & Company and Kalle & Company. These three concerns were knit together rather more loosely than the first com bination; and their unity of action depended mostly or interchange of share capital.

About two years before the war, an internal difference manifested itself, when the accounts for the preceding year were presented to the pool. The Elberfeld Company claimed an allowance of something like $700,000 fo 'graft' payments made in the United States. The othe partners objected to the amount, not because they wer ultra-conscientious, nor because the amount, if reall expended, was excessive, but because vouchers were no

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