the renewal of the struggle was due to the refusal of the Military Governor at Barcelona to release certain working men who had been arrested under martial law long before Romanones' agreement with the syndi calists was made. The fact remains that the strikes continued. At the same time, Romanones could not venture to summon the Cortes, though this was the only way of obtaining from the deputies an approval of the budget. The unwillingness of all parliamentary groups to unite in support of the Government thereupon became evident.

According to Señor Lerroux, in a document published without the permission of the Press Censor, a pretext for resigning, in these difficult circumstances, was supplied to Count Romanones by General Milano del Bosch, the Military Governor referred to above. This General, without authority from the. Central Government, expelled, or threatened with immediate expulsion from Barcelona the Civil Governor and the Chief of Police. Romanones thought that to maintain these two officials in their places would mean a serious conflict with the military; and for this reason he resigned, advising the King to call Señor Maura in his stead, and thus to satisfy the wish and choice of the Army.

and

On April 17 and 18 a notable change in the Ministry took place. To the general surprise, the King appointed Señor Maura President of the Council of Ministers; Maura chose for his Ministry those who, more or less directly, had worked in his administration in 1909, the one exception being the Minister of State, Señor Gonzalez Hontoria, a member of Count Romanones' party, and a mild friend of the Allies during the war. Señor la Cierva, who in 1909 was Minister of the Interior, and is generally accused of being mainly responsible for Ferrer's execution, was appointed Minister of Finance. The news was received with great indignation by the Liberals. Moreover, the announcement was made that the King had granted to Señor Maura the coveted Decreto dissolving the Cortes; and a few days thereafter, the Cortes were summoned, and the fact of their dissolution was made known to them. Maura called for new elections. Those for the Chamber were fixed for

une 1, those of Senators for June 15, and the meeting f the new Cortes for the 24th.

A general strike of telegraphic operators now took lace throughout Spain, as a protest against the new Fovernment, especially against Señor la Cierva. But he Government soon re-established the service, and unished the principal strikers with the loss of their ositions. The Liberal leaders, Monarchists and Repubcans (or Chiefs of the izquierdas) then endeavoured to rrive at some decision, in case the Government should old the elections without restoring constitutional ights and the liberty of the press. Both had been uppressed by Romanones, on account of the socialistic roubles; and the press censorship was continued in all force by Maura, who refused the demand of the quierdas to restore the Constitution. In reply, they esolved to consider the forthcoming Cortes as facciosas chat is, unlawful, and revolutionary), as they were to e elected under Government pressure.

Meanwhile, in Catalonia, new political enemies arose gainst the Lliga regionalista. The 'Monarchical Union' Unión Monárquica) was founded at Barcelona, with the vident purpose of providing a standing force against the ome rulers. That Union was composed principally of atalonians, intimately connected by business and friendhip with certain Castilian elements. It advocated beral measures for Catalonia, but, at the same time, trengthened her union with the Spanish Monarchy. "he Lliga energetically opposed the Unionists. Cambó nd Puig de Cadafalch were again to be heard speaking f the Catalonian nation' and of Catalonia's rights to ome rule,' while, whenever the Monarchical Union was eferred to, enthusiastic audiences shouted 'Down with le traitors.'

6

The elections eventually took place. The definite sults are as yet (June 10) unknown, but it is evident at the proportions of parties, with small and unimortant variations, is similar to that existing in the ortes before the dissolution. Although serious charges ere made against Señor Maura, his Minister of the terior, Señor Goicoechea, has not been guilty of any ross abuses. Perhaps the only real error made by the overnment was that, two days before the elections

took place, a solemn religious festival was held. This was interpreted generally as a political act, and irritated the Liberals of the extreme parties. It was the inauguration at Cerro de los Angeles, not far from Madrid, of a monument erected to the Heart of Jesus Christ.' The Government attended; and the King read a warm message (which, according to La Acción, Señor Maura's organ in the press, the King wrote himself), enthusiastically praising the Catholic religion, and declaring, as the monument also declares, that Spain is 'devoted' to the faith. The Pope sent his blessing, formally bestowed by the Bishop of Madrid, to all persons attending the ceremony.

Señor Maura's religious ideas are well known; he is strongly Roman Catholic, and so is a large majority of his followers. But Spain, although a Catholic country, is not a religious one. The Spaniards are Clericals or Anticlericals; and ecclesiastical divisions are wider and deeper than the political. Among the Liberal Monarchists, like Romanones, Alhucemas, Alba, etc., the so-called Catholics-Clericals in fact-are in a large majority; while among the Republicans and Socialists, all are rabid Anti-clericals. The ceremony at Cerro de los Angeles made them so indignant, that on the 1st of June they went in a body to the polls, and elected six deputies in Madrid. Under the electoral law, the majority cannot have in that city more than six of the eight deputies. The other two are allotted to the minority; in this case one of the two was a Maurista and the other a Monarchical Liberal.

In the rest of Spain the results of the elections, so far as they are known, indicate but a slight difference between this Cortes and its predecessor. Maura and la Cierva have no majority of their own, and are in a situation very like that of Romanones in the preceding Cortes. They are followed by about 112 deputies, a very small number in a Parliament of 409. But, since they are united with Señor Dato's representatives, numbering perhaps 110, they are able to count on a small majority. Besides, for approving the budget (which, as already explained, is an urgent necessity) the Government may have other assistance even from the supporters of Romanones (about 50 in number), and those of the

Marquis de Alhucemas (75 or less); and this in spite of the declaration made by them both, as members of the izquierdas, that the present Cortes are facciosas.

The Catalonian home-rulers have lost some two or three deputies to the Monarchical Union, but have still, when united with the deputies of the Basque provinces, twenty or twenty-one representatives. In fine, no party has an absolute majority; and the Government depends on the support of Señor Dato. Both the Marquis de Alhucemas and Count Romanones have governed under similar conditions. In Spain, the Cortes, after all, are not necessary. We have seen that, when a Government does not find the Cortes easy to deal with, it can suspend the sessions for an unlimited time-a measure called, in the political slang of Madrid, el cerrojazo, or the lockout. The problems which face it are those which Romanones had to deal with. There is no budget approved by Parliament; the working classes are excited, mainly by the extremely high price of food-stuffs; and in some places, such as Catalonia, Labour organisations are threatening. Everybody recognises that the situation is grave, and that some great trouble must happen Boon; yet nothing comes of it. One Government succeeds another, always with the same negative result. The situation is grave, and it does not concern Barcelona alone. It extends to all Spain, to Castile, to Galicia, to Asturias, to Andalusia. The people are in terrible poverty, and, even where they can get work, frequently lo not earn enough to live upon. The question is not For them one of law, or justice, or right, or country, or political ideals, but merely one of food. At Barceona, where they can join, and collect funds, and even yrannise over their employers, they are like princes, and to a certain extent happy; but in other parts of Spain they are driven by famine to revolt. Since the ime of Cato the Censor, we know that stomachs do not eason. The Catalonians, who are able politicians and ead the signs of the times, have good cause, therefore, o be silent for the moment.

What Señor Maura will now do it is easy to foresee. He will try, in a few sittings of the Cortes, to have the udget approved. Immediately after this, he will close he Cortes, because a summer vacation is required to

allow of the Royal trip to San Sebastian and Santander. Until the end of September or the middle of October the Parliament will be dispensed with, and so it does not matter in the least whether the Government has a majority or not. The life of the Ministry is assured until next winter. What more is wanted? The Catalonians, the Socialists, the Sindicalistas, the country labourers in Andalusia, can wait. The Spanish method of eliminating political disputes is to let them grow until they are forgotten. And, if one day there comes a national disaster, as in 1898, the Spaniards accept it by simply declaring that its time had arrived.

old

After having ruled Spain for many years and restored the Bourbon dynasty, Canovas del Castillo, who was & great student of Spanish history, concluded that the best Government this country ever had was that of Philip IV and his Minister, the Duke of Olivares. The King and his Minister were very unlucky, and had powerful enemies to contend with-Richelieu at the beginning, Cromwell at the end. But neither Philip nor his favourite did anything to provoke France or England. If only they had been more fortunate, Philip IV would have left to his son, Don Carlos II el hechizado, a prosperous nation. But the King devoted his time to pleasure, to hunting, to love intrigues, to conversations with artists and poets. The Minister succeeded in making himself rich. For the great problems threatening the nation they cared as little as possible. Olivares thought that their solution consisted in winning time. All those problems he put off, and if, in consequence, time brought disaster instead of success, the fault was, of course, neither his, nor that of his master!

JOSÉ DE ARMAS.