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As was to be expected, Obradović's efforts were directed towards education, schools and literature. He founded a college, the so-called Great School, from which In due time grew the University of Belgrade. He founded a public library, mostly with his own books. He tried hard to establish a printing office, and it was his wish chat his last book should be printed there.

For he was at work upon his last book--his swan song, as he calls it-slowly, like an old man, utilising such leisure as remained to him after transacting affairs of State. All around him was warfare-the formation of regiments, the transport of ammunition, an atmophere laden with danger and anxiety. The streets of Belgrade were resounding with the tramp of horses paded with military equipment and led by some sunurnt warrior, or the clatter of waggons, laden with ags of powder secretly imported from Peterwardein; while the call of the bugle or the beat of the drum were Leard from afar. And there we can picture him, in a white, rough-cast cottage, modest but roomy and comortable in the old Serbian style-which still exists, and n whose high chimney there is a stork's nest from which every spring you may hear the merry noise the corks make with their beaks-there, beside the window hich looks out on the Danube and is framed by the lustering vines in his 'large and pretty garden,' sits the ray-haired venerable old man, a sheet of paper spread efore him, goose-quill in hand, writing the last chapter f his last book. And it is pleasant to think that at at moment Obradović had a volume of Addison or r Johnson before him.

PAVLE POPOVIĆ.

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Art. 6-LORD FRENCH'S 1914.'

No man, it has been well said, was ever written down except by himself; and we wish that Lord French had pondered this aphorism before he sat down to write this book. The Field-Marshal at the opening of the war enjoyed a military reputation which was second only to Lord Kitchener's in this country; and he had worthily earned it. The memories of South Africa are swamped in those of the past five terrible years; yet there are some who have not yet forgotten the name of Colesberg and the excellent and audacious service of General French which is associated with that name. At the close of the Boer War no one was surprised to see him rise successively to the command of the First Army Corps at Aldershot, to the Inspectorship-General of the Forces, and to the supreme post of Chief of the General Staff. Lord Haldane has testified to the valuable assistance which he received from Sir John French in preparing the forces of the Empire for the great struggle which has so recently been brought to a successful end; and this is a thing which we must never forget. The time will come when the country will set aside old political prejudices and acknowledge the vast debt which it owes to Lord Haldane; and then the names of the officers who were associated with him in his reorganisation of the forces of the Empire will likewise be remembered with

honour.

The country therefore heard with confidence and satisfaction of the appointment of Sir John French to command the British Expeditionary Force in August, 1914. People hardly realised that his army was, though small in numbers, incomparably the best trained, the best equipped, the best organised and the best disciplined that Britain had ever put into the field. It was (we say it after mature consideration) certainly superior to that which Wellington led from Portugal to the campaign of Vitoria in 1813, and from the battlefield of Vitoria through the Pyrenees to Toulouse. This is no small praise, but it is the truth. It was felt in 1914 that Sir John French was the right man to command such

an army.

By Aug. 20 the British force-four infantry divisions

and one cavalry division-was assembled; the infantry south-east of Landrecies, the cavalry north-east of it about Maubeuge, seeking touch with the French Fifth Army under General Lanrezac, on the left of which the British were appointed to stand. A great advance of the French and British line along the whole length of the French frontier from Longwy north-westward to Landrecies was, so Lord French tells us, in immediate prospect; and all ranks were in the highest spirits. So far only one misfortune had overtaken the British, namely the sudden death of Sir James Grierson, who commanded the II Corps, on Aug. 17. Sir John French asked chat Sir Herbert Plumer might take General Grierson's place. Lord Kitchener preferred to send Sir Horace Smith Dorrien; and thereby hangs a very sorry tale.

On the 21st the British began their movement northward; and at the close of the day the cavalry reached the line of the Mons Canal on either flank of Mons, while the four divisions of infantry, according to Sir John French's account, radiated forth (so to speak) rom Maubeuge, the I Corps north-eastward to Givry, nd the II Corps north-westward to Sars-la-Bruyère. "his, if correct, would be rather a curious disposition; ut it is not correct. Lord French cannot describe even is first day's march with accuracy. On the 22nd

ne Field-Marshal motored eastward to visit General anrezac, and came upon the French Army in retreat. What had happened was obscure to him then and is ill somewhat obscure to us now; but the fact of the etirement was certain. Unable to find General Lanrezac, Ir John French returned to his own troops, but did not rest their further advance, which had gone forward in ccordance with his previous orders. Nightfall found e II Corps on the Mons Canal, upon a line running om Obourg (three miles east of Mons) westward, with e cavalry moving away westward to prolong the left the II Corps, and the I Corps thrown back on the ght from Mons south-eastward.

Concerning the object of these dispositions Sir John ench is silent, but it is certain from his own confession at he had some idea of an offensive movement. Early the morning of the 23rd the Germans opened an tack between Obourg and Mons, which gradually spread

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westward until the whole line of the II Corps was engaged. This was the action of Mons, which the FieldMarshal airily dismisses as mere 'heavy pressure upon our outposts.' General Smith-Dorrien, he says, was nowhere threatened by anything more than cavalry supported by small bodies of infantry.' Unfortunately German as well as British accounts show that large bodies of German infantry were engaged, and that they suffered very heavily. But the Field-Marshal cares nothing for facts so long as he can say something unpleasant about General Smith-Dorrien. He implicitly blames Sir Horace for evacuating the untenable salient of Obourg, and drawing back the whole of his line slightly to conform with the movement; and he sneers at his subordinate for feeling anxious when he, the august chief, was calm.

The sequel showed that the subordinate was right. At 5 p.m. Sir John received 'a most unexpected telegram' from General Joffre, saying that Lanrezac's army was in full retreat, and that three German corps were moving against the British front and a fourth round their left. As the Field-Marshal had seen the French retirement with his own eyes and had been warned, by his own admission, on the 22nd that at least three German corps were opposed to him, it is difficult to understand why this telegram was 'most unexpected.' However, he still waited for yet another telegram, which reached him at 11.30 p.m., before he gave his orders for retreat. Thus, on his own showing, Sir John French wasted from six to seven precious hours until he decided to extricate his army from a position of the utmost peril.

On the 24th the retreat began. The Field-Marshal would have us believe that the I Corps covered the retreat of the II. This is ludicrously incorrect. The II Corps was heavily engaged all along the line, and fought a desperate flank action on the extreme left with brilliant success; whereas the I Corps was not pressed in the least. Lord French gives the whole of the credit for the flank action to the cavalry, though the brunt was borne by the 1st Norfolks and 1st Cheshires, and to the 19th Brigade, which had no share in it at all. The II Corps was commanded by General Smith-Dorrien and therefore could do nothing right. Even a clever little movement,

by which Sir Horace made the 3rd and 5th Divisions change places, is set down as "confusion," and is described, quite unwarrantably, as having hampered the retreat of the I Corps. By a singular irony, however, Lord French does blunder into commendation of the 8th Brigade which, though he forgot it for the moment, belonged to the II Corps, but was commanded by Doran and not by Davies, as he inaccurately says.

An awkward

On the 25th the retreat was continued. obstacle, the Forest of Mormal, lay in the way; and it was necessary for the I Corps to pass to east and the II Corps to west of it. At the day's close the two corps were six miles apart, General Haig's left being at Landrecies, where it ought not to have been, and General Smith-Dorrien's right in its appointed place at Le Cateau. How did this come about? The Field-Marshal talks vaguely about serious German attacks on the I Corps at Maroilles and Landrecies, and assigns as the time of the engagement at Landrecies a varying series of hours from p.m. on the 25th to the early morning of the 26th-all for the purpose of excusing the failure of the I Corps to arrive at its proper halting-ground. This is quite useless. There must have been some grave mistake or neglect on the part of his staff; and we cannot forget that, though Lord French covers Sir Archibald Murray and Sir Henry Wilson with fulsome praise in his book, he did not keep them on his staff till the end of his command. Sir Archibald, being Chief, must, in the absence of further information, be held responsible for the gap between the I and II Corps, and for the action of Le Cateau which followed in consequence.

The Field-Marshal's orders were for the retreat to be continued on the 26th; and General Smith-Dorrien had issued his commands accordingly to the II Corps. It was past midnight, however, before he could ascertain the whereabouts of all his troops; and then he discovered chat the 4th Division, which had joined the army on the 25th, was in isolation in advance of his line, that his croops were greatly exhausted, and that the cavalry was so weary and so much dispersed that it could not be counted on longer to cover the retreat. He therefore sook his memorable decision to stand and fight, in spite of the Field-Marshal's orders. Lord French condemns

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