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the money required for this expenditure is raised by & one unit-the United Kingdom. Pending the federation era of the Empire, there would, under the scheme indicated, ve be only two units concerned-Ireland and Great Britain. se Under any scheme of Home Rule for Ireland, just as era much as under the federal scheme under discussion, the Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure will have to be be determined-probably by a Royal Commission, as Lorde sa MacDonnell proposed in the Irish Convention-and the ent balance, pending the federation of the Empire, found by gisl Great Britain. The problem would certainly become per more complicated and more likely to cause friction if pa and when the Dominions send representatives to Weste minster, and become liable for their share of the expendi-p ture; but this is a problem of Imperial Federation which e would arise whether the United Kingdom had been re already federalised or not.* Whether the scheme indicated above-namely, that of two local parliaments in the United Kingdom, one for Great Britain and one for r Ireland, with identical powers-is desirable or not, it seems to negative the idea that the federalisation of the United Kingdom is necessarily incompatible with the grant of a T full measure of self-government to Ireland or vice versa.

Before passing from the federalisation of the United Kingdom to the federalisation of Ireland, it may be worth while to consider, in the light of the views expressed above, how far the actual scheme of self. government framed by the Irish Convention is consistent with federalism in the United Kingdom. Lord Dunraven, the best-known advocate of Federalism in the Convention, declared that they were not incompatible, though he regretted that the Convention did not proceed 'on more definite federal lines. Some well-known supporters of United Kingdom federalism have, however, criticised the Convention's report as anti-federal. There seems to be singularly little foundation for this opinion. In the first place, much of this criticism is based on a fallacy already discussed-that of applying to what can at most

* One fairly simple solution of this problem of Imperial Federation has already been indicated by Mr Lionel Curtis in 'The Problem of the Commonwealth' (cap. xviii).

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e a quasi-federal arrangement the canons of strict ederalism. It is true that the powers proposed by the onvention for the Irish Parliament are greater than ose possessed by a local legislature in any known deration; but any less powers would probably be adequate to secure an Irish settlement. Moreover, as as been pointed out above, there is nothing to prevent he same powers as were proposed for the Irish Parliaent being, now or later, conferred upon one co-ordinate gislature in Great Britain, though there may be inperable difficulties in the way of conferring them on two parate legislatures in England and Scotland. Further, e Convention's scheme definitely reserved to the nperial Parliament control over the matters most ecessary for a central parliament, viz. the Crown, reign relations, peace and war, defence, etc., and it xpressly recognised the liability of Ireland to contribute wards Imperial expenditure. Finally, and most imortant of all, it provided for the continued representaon of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament. It is gnificant to note that the plan recently advocated in The Times' closely follows the Convention's scheme so ar as the place of Ireland in the United Kingdom and he Empire is concerned.

The truth appears to be that the Convention went as r as it could in the federal direction; and it is not pparent what more it could have done, or how it could ave proceeded on more definite federal lines,' unless it ad suggested that a local legislature should be estabshed in Great Britain simultaneously with the Irish arliament. The business of the Convention, however, as to formulate a constitution for Ireland; to have one further and drafted a constitution for Great Britain lso would have been to exceed its function. It may well have been thought that the anomaly of the Imperial arliament continuing to combine purely British work with its Imperial task would soon have brought about ne obvious remedy for that anomaly-the establishment f a local legislature for Great Britain with powers milar to those possessed by the Irish Parliament. The onvention, at any rate, put no obstacle in the way of evelopment; and its plan of self-government for Ireland ithin the Empire may be fairly described as consistent

with and leading up to the larger policy of United h Kingdom federation. After all, federalism is more than m a frame of government, it is an attitude of mind; and t the Convention certainly encouraged the development of leag that mental attitude which is so urgently required, the wo mental attitude which leads men to regard the Empire, the as has been finely said, 'not as a prison house into which they have been thrust by invincible force,' but rather as resp a vantage ground where the pursuit of high Imperial Do ideals may be combined with the fostering of national than pride and patriotism.

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It is a matter for regret that the manifesto of the ver Irish Dominion League shows a marked departure in rel this respect from the spirit of the Convention. Why it should do so is not, at first sight, clear. More than a year ago Sir H. Plunkett, the Chairman of the Convention, who of is now the spokesman of the League, pointed out that isthe Irish constitution agreed upon by all the members sen of the Convention, except the Ulster Unionists, was to characterised by three points of departure from the por normal Dominion status, viz.: (1) lack of control over ee defence matters (except as regards conscription and, in o certain eventualities, territorial forces); (2) representa o tion of Ireland at Westminster; and (3) payment by st Ireland of a contribution to Imperial expenditure, which co was to be, at any rate at first, secured by a Statute of les Imperial Parliament. There was a difference of opinion, which has been already explained, about indirect taxation; and the Report of the Convention suggested some de minor departures, of no great consequence, from full Dominion status. One would have expected that an CO association of moderate men like the members of the th League, who desired a full measure of self-government for st Ireland, would have taken their stand on this 'foundation fe of Irish agreement unprecedented in history'-to use Sir H. Plunkett's own words-modified in the direction of fiscal autonomy, for the reasons explained above, and, if necessary, in other directions for cause shown. The manifesto of the Irish Dominion League, however, proceeds on rather different lines, and practically ignores the agreement reached in the Convention, apparently in order to emphasise its own demand as one for the Dominion status, though it does not seem

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to have got much nearer its ideal. It is not easy to compare the clear-cut scheme propounded by the Convention with the somewhat vague proposals of the League, but the only important difference between the two proposals seems to be that the League insists on the cessation of Irish representation at Westminster.*

Undoubtedly the League's proposals would in this respect more clearly place Ireland in the position of a Dominion than would the Convention's scheme, but the change is hardly an improvement. The Dominion analogy has, of course, but little relevance. The colonies were never represented in the Imperial Parliament, as Ireland has been since 1800. Undoubtedly, however, there is a general, though perhaps not an informed, feeling in Ireland against representation at Westminster, of which the League was not unconscious. This feeling is commonly based on a tendency to identify non-representation with Dominion Home Rule, and representation with Federal Home Rule, which is persistently portrayed as 'gas and water' autonomy-a view that seems wholly erroneous. A prejudice against Federal Home Rule was not unnatural among Repealers and the Young Ireland party over seventy years ago, since the establishment of a subordinate parliament in Dublin, coupled with Irish representation at Westminster, seemed ess desirable to them than their ideal of an Irish Parliament co-ordinate with the Imperial Parliament. Such a prejudice, however, seems meaningless to-day, when the lemand of all constitutional Nationalists is for a parliament which would be in law subordinate, as are all colonial legislatures. It has been already pointed out that the full satisfaction of the demand made by constitutional Nationalists is quite compatible with the federalisation of Great Britain and Ireland, though it may not be with the federalisation of England, Scotland

* The League demands full fiscal autonomy; the attitude of the Convention has been explained. It is not clear how far, if at all, the League's proposals differ from the Convention's as regards defence. The League, ike the Convention, agrees to an Irish contribution to Imperial expendiure, though the League's interpretation of that expression seems to include only the cost of the army, navy and diplomatic services and neither the pharge for the National Debt nor the Civil List. Possibly this was not ntended.

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and Ireland. In any case, the amount of autonomy proposed for Ireland has never depended on whether Ireland was or was not to be represented in the Imperial Parliament. Isaac Butt's scheme of Federal Home Rule o involved a far fuller measure of self-government than did the scheme of 1886, under which Ireland was not to d

be represented at Westminster. Again, though such

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representation was conceded in 1893 and 1914, the powers then given were certainly not less than the powers of 1886. Moreover, if the powers recommended by the Convention and the League are given, they would not become e less because representation at Westminster is also given.f

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The argument, however, against representation that s appeals to thinking men in Ireland is the view which of Parnell advanced in 1886 but withdrew two years later-l that Ireland needs the best brains of her sons, and that the representation in Imperial Parliament would divert the of mind of Ireland from Dublin to Westminster. Exclusion sec from Westminster seems, however, more likely to divert the attention of Irishmen, especially the men of the Irish Parliament, from Irish affairs. If Ireland had no voice in a Parliament which controlled foreign and colonial affairs, peace and war, defence, etc., an Irish Parliament might well feel itself compelled to discuss a these matters, which might vitally affect Ireland, and Ce towards which she would be paying a contribution. The fact that there would be no other way of 'voicing' Irish opinion would almost inevitably lead to discussions in College Green of motions expressing Irish opinion on the policy of the Imperial Parliament; and Irish Ministers would be more than human if they did not sometimes, when the opposition threatened trouble, yield to the temptation thus held out to them to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.' No doubt, the cessation of Irish representation proposed by the Irish Dominion League would be a real concession to Sinn Fein prejudice against the retention by Ireland of her place in the Empire, but it has little else to recommend it. It certainly runs counter to the views of over a quarter of a million Southern Unionists, whose spokesman in the Convention declared that representation at Westminster was a sine qud non to of their acceptance of Home Rule, and to the opinion of most federalists, who regard it as a retrograde proposal.