upon the courses laid to enable them to escape submarines and, largely, upon luck. The Mercantile Marine survived the ordeal amazingly well, but the toll was very heavy.

While the Mercantile Marine had to become, against its will, a fighting force, it was the one force which could not be relieved from service on the conclusion of hostilities. The declaration of war in August 1914 opened an era of tremendous trial for the fighting forces. The signing of the Armistice meant relaxation of effort for the Navy and the Army; it meant for the Mercantile Marine merely a transfer of effort. Just as, during the war, the Mercantile Marine had to adapt itself to novel conditions, so, with the closing of hostilities, it had to re-adapt itself to a new set of conditions. They were not, and are not yet, ordinary peaceful conditions, because British shipping was called upon to take a very large share in effecting the change from war to peace. It had brought millions of men across the oceans to the fighting areas; it was now called upon to take them back again. It had enabled the Allies to prosecute the war, and it was now called upon to enable them, first, to get back to more normal conditions, and secondly, to make commerce between the nations possible. There could be no breathing-space for British shipping.

The position was rendered much more difficult because a very great deal of leeway had to be made up. During the conflict, all the available resources of British shipping were used solely with the object of enabling the allied and associated nations to win the war. No regard was paid to what the effect after the war would be. A substantial proportion of shipping had previously been engaged in carrying for other nations, these services representing an important element of national revenue. Such services were ruthlessly cut down. When the American troops were being poured across the North Atlantic, British ships were diverted from every trade. Ships intended to face the North Atlantic weather are often designed with particular strength for that trade. Considerations such as these were not allowed to weigh. Any liners which were considered sea-worthy for service were put into the North Atlantic. It was sufficient that they were fit to make the voyage;

he fact that their hulls might be strained and that their ew use might affect the length of their life could not e counted. In normal times their owners would not ave employed them in the North Atlantic; their mployment in this service would have been too costly. Questions of cost did not count in the war. A very eavy price had to be paid in lives and treasure for the inning of the war, and British shipping had to make Es share of sacrifice. It was a very full share indeed; recisely how large it was can never be known.

Considering, first, shipping losses, the United Kingdom onnage destroyed, owing to direct war causes, is stated y Lloyd's Register to have been 7,753,000 tons gross. In ddition, there were 1,033,000 tons lost by marine causes. ome of the losses by marine causes were really indirect ar losses, the distinction between the two classes of erils being sometimes very small. Vessels were stranded nd so were accounted to have been lost by marine perils, ecause these were the proxima causa, although the strandng may really have been due indirectly to the removal of he usual aids to navigation or even to the withdrawal of ome of the most efficient officers for the Navy. Similarly, hen the convoy system was in operation, collisions were requent because vessels were moving in close proximity O each other. In any case, the total tonnage of the nited Kingdom lost during the war amounted to 786,000 tons. If the losses of the British Dominions hipping, amounting to 269,000 tons, be added to this, the otal British loss was 9,055,000 tons. The losses of no ther nation could approach these in magnitude. The ext heaviest losses were those of Norway, which mounted to 1,172,000 tons. Italy came third with a oss of 861,000 tons; France fourth with 807,000 tons; and ne United States with a total loss of 531,000 tons. reece lost 415,000 tons. Then there was a long interval. apan lost 270,000 tons, Sweden 264,000 tons, Denmark 45,000 tons, Spain 238,000 tons, and Holland 229,000. he Belgian loss was 105,000 tons and that of Brazil 1,000 tons.

These are the actual figures of tonnage lost, but they aturally do not show the very serious depreciation uffered by the tonnage remaining afloat. This depreciaon was suffered chiefly by the Allies. It was of a very Vol. 232.-No. 461.

2 I

formidable character, as in the case of British passenger liners which were converted into armed cruisers and were often employed while running at high speed for long periods. In the emergency, such considerations as the strain thrown on to the engines could not be taken into account. Further, a very large number of the ships which are still included as active units of the British Mercantile Marine were badly damaged by mine or torpedo. The strain to the hulls has only appeared in many instances when the vessels were put into dry dock. The extent of the actual damage done to British shipping may be gauged by the fact that, taking into account shipping repairing and also fitting after launching, there were 1,500,000 tons out of action in April 1918. This figure remained stationary throughout 1918, but in February 1919 it increased to 1,900,000 tons. The figure now stands at about 1,400,000 tons.

The present is an opportune time for taking stock of British tonnage, in view of the statistics of ownership recently issued by Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The Register sets out the steam tonnage owned by the principal maritime countries in June last and compares it with the corresponding figures for June 1914. It thus shows the net result of five years of war, after taking into account both the losses and new construction. The Register includes in its calculations steamships of 100 tons and upwards, and shows that, as compared with 18,892,000 tons in June 1914, there were in June last 16,345,000 tons owned in the United Kingdom, a net reduc tion of 2,547,000 tons, or 13.5 per cent. If this figure be deducted from that of the tonnage (8,786,000 tons) shown to have been lost from all causes, we get the amount of new construction during the five years, amounting to 6,239,000 tons. This figure included vessels built at home and abroad. Considering these figures of net losses, the next greatest sufferer was Greece, which owned in June last only 291,000 tons, as compared with 821,000 tons in 1914, a loss of 530,000 tons, or 64.6 per cent. Norway owned in June last 1,597,000 tons-a reduction of 350,000 tons, or 18.4 per cent. As her total losses were shown earlier to have been 1,172,000 tons, she appears to have acquired during the quinquennial period some 821,000 tons. Norwegian owners placed a large number of orders

with American shipbuilders, but all these contracts were subsequently requisitioned by the United States. It would seem, therefore, that the additions to her mercantile fleet were, to some extent, secured in Japan. The net loss of Italy was 192,000 tons, or 13.4 per cent., thus reducing her Mercantile Marine in June ast to 1,238,000 tons. Spain lost 175,000 tons, or 19.8 per cent., her Mercantile Marine standing this summer at 709,000 tons. Denmark incurred a net loss of 139,000 cons, or 18.1 per cent. Her Mercantile Marine is now epresented by 631,000 tons.

In these returns the Mercantile Marine of Germany put at 3,247,000 tons, a reduction of 1,888,000 tons, or 36.8 per cent.; but it is pointed out that these figures do not take into account the tonnage which was to be handed over to the Allies under the Peace Treaty. The Oss of Germany is, therefore, in reality very much greater. Similarly, the loss of Austria-Hungary is put at only 339,000 tons, or 32.2 per cent., thereby reducing her Mercantile Marine to 713,000 tons. This figure has since been further diminished by vessels handed over to the Allies. The total tonnage of enemy vessels handed over o the Allies since the Armistice amounts to over ,750,000 tons.

One of the most striking features of the returns is he great increase in the American Mercantile Marine. As already shown, the total loss of the United States due o both war and marine perils was 531,000 tons. The net esult of the five years ended June last was an increase f no less than 7,746,000 tons, or 382.1 per cent., in the eagoing Merchant Fleet of the United States. On une 1914, there were 2,027,000 tons in the ocean-going Merchant Marine of the United States; five years later here were 9,773,000 tons. The total for the United tates, it should be noted, included about 1,300,000 tons of wooden steam shipping. The construction of the wooden hips may have been justified as a war emergency measure-the United States had the carpenters and the imber-but the wooden ships cannot be regarded as a ommercial success. They have been appearing in European waters and have been engaged notably in arrying coals from the United States to Scandinavia, ut their future is obscure. There may, no doubt, be

uses for wooden ships in the coasting trade of the United States. If these were entirely excluded, the American seagoing tonnage would be reduced to 8,426,000 tons, as compared with 16,267,000 tons for the United Kingdom.

Lloyd's Register makes a very striking comparison between the relative positions of the United Kingdom and United States in 1919 and 1914. In the earlier year 41.6 per cent. of the world's tonnage was owned in the United Kingdom, and 4.46 per cent. consisted of the sea. going tonnage of the United States. At the present time, the United Kingdom owns 34.1 per cent. and the United States 24.9 per cent., including 20-4 per cent. of the seagoing tonnage. These United States figures include wooden shipping.

An interesting calculation is made by the Register to show the real effect of the war on the world's Merchant Marine. The calculation is made on the assumption that the percentage of addition to the world's tonnage would have continued at the ratio (a decreasing one) recorded during the last fifteen pre-war years, and that countries in which there had been a large addition of tonnage during the previous quinquennial period might be ex pected to show a reduction in the ratio of increase. The conclusion is reached that the real loss of British tonnage was 5,202,000 tons, and that of foreign tonnage, excluding the United States, 9,000,000 tons, making a total loss for the world of 14,202,000 tons. The net gain to the United States is put at 6,729,000 tons, thus reducing the net world's loss to 7,473,000 tons. It will therefore be seen that by far the largest loss was incurred by the United Kingdom. Excluding enemy countries, the greatest sufferers on this basis after the United Kingdom were Norway, which lost over 1,000,000 tons; Italy to the extent of 677,000 tons; and France, which lost 536,000 tons. Further, there is a hidden loss, through deprecis tion in the efficiency of ships by special strain, and also owing to the fact that a large proportion of the tonnage built during the war was not equal in general efficiency to that completed in the few years previous to the war. The Register does not, however, attempt to estimate the full extent of the depreciation, and considers it reasonable to assume that the world has actually lost through the war 8,500,000 tons gross of shipping,