professional wielder of naval thunder. Yet with all this, and much more that can be easily advanced, we are quite ready to acknowledge that the Board of Admiralty has been supplied with First-Lords of no mean note in the archives of their country. In the execution of this important and difficult post, neither activity, vigilance, method, nor benevolence have been wanting; and perhaps it is only owing to that bane of society, party-politics, that the principles of honour and impartiality have been debarred a fuller development. Indeed, so useful and splendid a class have these Statesmen formed in themselves, that we have often thought a work, comprising their memoirs and official acts, judiciously drawn up, would be a most acceptable addition to our nautical libraries. They may be distinctly traced from Alfred the Great, who was Lord High Admiral between the years 872 and 900, down to the present commission, by any one who has sufficient time and tact, with zeal and industry to support and prosecute the inquiry. Should this be deemed too formidable an undertaking, we beg to suggest the period between the two "Sailor Kings," as one of intense maritime interest, an assertion which will be clearly illustrated by a mere enumeration of their names and times:

While upon this subject we may as well make the signal for another work, one which would be gladly received by those who study the progress of the greatest maritime power in the world. By this, we allude to the" actes and dictes" of those Secretaries, to whom the Navy is indebted for manifold exertions in their cause, as well as for a large share of the intellectual celebrity attached to the service in general. To enforce our argument, we need only cite such illustrious names as those of Pepys, the proposer and promoter of many useful nautical inventions

of Burchett, the able and exact naval historian-and of our regretted friend, the late William Marsden, one of the most amiable, upright, and learned men of his day.

This topic has led us further than we originally intended to proceed; and as, according to the sarcastic imitator of Johnson, "all things which have a limit must be brought to a conclusion," we hasten to take leave

of Sir John Barrow's very valuable volume. But we cannot close the book without expressing our unfeigned thanks for the pleasure he has afforded us in the opportunity of a naval discussion, in these days of mere galley-yarns and facetious novels; and we hope he will, ere long, yield us an opportunity of breaking another lance.

By the way, we may just hint that, when the work comes to another edition, it would, perhaps, be a little more acceptable to the " thinking" seamen, were the author to add, in enumerating the force of Howe's different expeditions, the names of all the ships and their commanders, especially when in presence of the enemy-an addition which, in small print, will not occupy much space. We may also mention, that there is an error on page 402, where the Alligator, a small frigate, is twice placed for the Arrogant, of 74 guns. We think the term querulous might have been withholden from the judicious Collingwood's name, since it is notorious that he complained, not on his own account, but in justice to those for whom it was his duty both to feel and to intercede. The statement respecting the alterations made by Sir Alexander Hood in the Robust's log-book, after Keppel's action, should be given in greater detail, for the sake of those unacquainted with the circumstances of the case, or entirely omitted; and we are sure that further particulars respecting the introduction of naval signals, and their progressive improvement, would be welcome.

These may appear to be trivial comments, but they constitute the sum of nearly all we can find at fault. Our strictures on the life of ADMIRAL EARL HOWE must, therefore, be concluded by a summary of his character, according to established form; but we have it at hand, in one of the letters of that most excellent man, George III., wherein the writer's discrimination, judgment, and amiability of disposition, are eminently conspicuous. The gracious Monarch, consoling the sister of the deceased Earl, says, "I trust Mrs. Howe knows me better than to suppose my long silence, on the great loss the public has sustained, as well as her family, by the unexpected death of her excellent brother, has been occasioned by any other motive than the desire not to intrude, while she was so fully employed in acts of attentive kindness to her relations, who must have found much comfort from such attention. I trust the example he has set to the Navy will long continue to stimulate, not only the matchless bravery of the officers, but convince them of the necessity to view the profession in a scientific light, by which alone those improvements are to be acquired, which will retain that superiority over other nations, which every Englishman must desire. exemplary conduct in private life must, on the present melancholy occasion, be the only true comfort to those who loved him, as it gives that hope of his having quitted this transient world for eternal happiness, through the mediation of our blessed Redeemer. If I did not feel the propriety of not adding more on so glorious a theme, my pen would but too willingly continue."

His

Here the friendship of Augustus and Agrippa is brought into a pleasing parallel. May our beloved country never want such a Sovereign, nor such an Admiral!

NOTICES OF AN EXPEDITION TO ALEXANDRIA IN THE YEAR 1807.*

NOTHING extraordinary occurred on the 14th; our fire was well supported, producing, however, from the position and construction of the town, little effect. The market in camp was plentifully supplied, and the Arabs brought to us abundance of that sort of intelligence which they knew would be acceptable. Accordingly, the march of the Mamalukes to join us was current in every quarter of the bazaar, and one man affirmed their camp to be as far down the Nile as the village Algam. Some cannonading was kept up at El Hamet across the Nile, and now enemy's parties were observed frequently passing and repassing that post on the right bank: these proved afterwards to be reinforcements for the garrison and troops occupying that side of the river. The enemy's guns on our right became troublesome, for, to a certain degree, they enfiladed the line and occasioned frequent casualties in camp.

It was thought practicable to pass a small party across the river, and either destroy or carry off the guns. But for transport, there was only one or two dgerms afloat, and two or three sunk under the mosque at Abermandour. Captain Hallowell determined to weigh the latter, and with such scanty means provide transport for a party sufficient to carry the enemy's posts. It was incumbent, also, to weigh and repair these boats during the night, for an interference with them in the day would necessarily produce alarm. Accordingly, on the night of the 15th, preparations commenced; the boats were again sunk before day, and it was hoped the plan might be executed on the day following. The enemy this day gave a feu de joie upon being joined by a considerable party of horse, who took post on the right bank.

On the 15th General Frazer and Staff, for the first time, visited the camp. It was stated verbally, what had often been represented before, that all our efforts in the way directed would probably prove unavailing, for it had now become evident that there must be a sufficient combined military and naval force to give us command of the river with both its banks. The General stated that to give another man was out of the question that almost all the British effectives were already before Rosetta-that the composition of the greater portion of the force left at Alexandria could not be relied on. He directed General Stewart to persist in the cannonade and bombardment, not conceiving that, hitherto, it had been sufficiently executed. General Stewart explained that this expenditure of ammunition occasionally exceeded our means of conveyance, which caused a momentary interruption, but that every exertion was made to keep up the necessary supply; at the same time reiterating, that in his opinion the attack would prove a failure.

The General and Admiral left the lines without expressing any satisfaction at the efforts that had been made. In the evening every exertion was called forth to complete the equipment of the boats, and Capt. Hallowell had the satisfaction to provide four, each capable of conveying thirty men across the river-here about 300 yards wide. The first boat carried a warp, with which the remainder were dragged over.

*Continued from No. 110, page 49.

Major Macdonell*, 78th, was ordered for this duty, and had under him 35th Grenadiers, 31st Light Companies, and two ditto 78th regiment. The road to the enemy's battery, from whence it was proposed to cross the Nile, might be about half a mile close upon the path was a solitary house, and further on a mosque and hamlet; the battery itself more in advance, contiguous to a considerable village. Two companies could only be passed at a time, and with these and forty seamen, under Lieut. Robertson, the Major crossed. The Turks had, probably, some Arab on the outlook (a duty they seldom perform themselves), for before the Major could get forward they discharged their guns and fled from the battery; day was breaking, and Macdonell made proper arrangements for removing the guns, &c. They learned from the peasants that an escort of camels had just departed, but upon closer examination found a saddled dromedary and twelve camels laden with the effects of one of the chiefs. These animals, with the guns, stores, &c., were sent to the rear. The Major, having thus handsomely performed the service, was preparing to fall back, when he received an order to stand fast. The before-mentioned village, having trees and bushes intermingled, was in his front unoccupied; had it been intended to halt him for a time on the other side he ought to have been pushed forward, or retired to the hamlet and mosque, where it was open, and the enemy's movements could be observed; at any rate he ought not to have been halted where he was. By this time the alarm had spread to Rosetta, and the force sent over being ascertained from the Minarets, considerable bodies then sallied forth, whose manoeuvres were distinctly observed from our lines, though unperceived by Major Macdonell in the low flat where he was posted. The enemy inclining from the bank of the river to the left, and filing through the woods, endeavoured to envelop our party's right and intercept its retreat. The Turks were prevented from stealing upon it by the bank of the Nile, in consequence of the fire of our guns at the orange garden. It was evident, however, from the mode in which Macdonell was formed that he was ignorant of the enemy's movements, and of his disposition for attack.

When General Stewart saw this, and that there was no longer an object in keeping the party on the other bank, he immediately sent directions for it to commence an orderly retreat, which his anxiety led him personally to superintend. So long as our people kept their ground the enemy was shy in advancing, but the moment the retreat commenced by alternate bodies, the Turks, concluding a retreat must be a flight, pushed on impetuously. A heavy fire, however, from the posted bodies again produced caution. The enemy then threw himself into the bushes and hedges, keeping up a sharp but ineffectual fire. The companies which first re-crossed formed on the left bank, covering the retreat of the rear, with a heavy though not very destructive fusillade. Captain Tarlton's company covered, and Serjeant Wright, with his section, maintained the ground till all embarked, and returned, having none killed and only a few wounded. The surprise was complete; yet the affair would have been more perfect, and made greater impression on an enemy who dreaded night-work, had General Stewart carried through his original plan. Indeed, that candid and gallant

The present Sir James Macdonell, appointed to the command of the Brigade of Guards for Canada.

Officer was the first to express regret at deviating from it, quoting an excellent military maxim of Lord Nelson, "That the plan which was maturely weighed and decided upon in the closet, ought not, at the instant for its accomplishment, to be lightly departed from; for that the resolution of the moment would not, in all probability, be so well calculated and combined as that previously digested; therefore nothing but some certain and unlooked-for advantage could warrant such a departure." In this instance nothing of the kind occurred. It had been considered impracticable with the present force to establish ourselves on the right bank; but the order to stand fast was given solely to witness the sensation produced by the enterprise; and that sensation was to a certain extent destroyed, by affording to the enemy a pretence of having baulked our design, and of ultimately driving us before him. General Stewart returned thanks to the troops engaged in this dash, and the army agreed to give up to the detachment the money arising from the sale of the captured camels and stores. A strong admonition was also given to the troops for having generally left their lines, and run to the spots where a view could be had of the partial engagement—a moment offering a tempting occasion for the enemy to make a sortie from the town, which perhaps a more vigilant one would not have neglected.

This day, two men of De Roll's regiment deserted from the outposts at El Hamet. Our friend Sheik Mahmoud, the Arab chief, who first communicated with Nelson in Egypt, declared he would recover them, and sent two Arabs of his tribe, who brought them back from the village of Dibee. Authorities for the trial of these deserters were sent for. The enemy now daily showed himself upon a high sand-hill on the left of the position, sometimes firing from thence, but at too great a distance for effect; rarely he ventured to show his cavalry in the plain. A 6-pounder was brought to the left of the commanding redoubt, near the 35th; a few shots from whence were sufficient to cause him to retire. As we were now pretty well protected by field-works, it was desirable to draw the enemy into the plain, as with safety a great portion of the troops could be moved against him, consequently only the piquets were now got under arms upon the usual demonstrations.

On the 17th General Stewart directed Colonel Oswald to visit the post of El Hamet, and report its state. He found that Major de Vogelsang had entrenched himself on the left, having his gun well secured, and making the best of a bad position. The Colonel passed along the southern bank of the canal, which he found equal in height to the northern: they were both steep, so that an enemy once at the foot of either was protected from the superior fire. At Major Mohr's, in the centre, he found the gun exposed, and that but little had been done to fortify the village of El Hamet, with which it was connected; but there were here so many chasms in the bank by which the village might be turned, that nothing could render it secure as a defensive position. The right, as formerly described, was quite uncovered; all that could be hoped for was, that as at night, on account of the great fissures in the ground, it would be difficult to pass the plain with cavalry; so in the daytime the enemy might be observed far enough to allow of the troops quitting the extensive and treacherous line, and by concentration with the guns, become formidable to the undisciplined troops they expected to be attacked by. Colonel Oswald reported, that the line U. S. JOURN. No. 114, MAY, 1838.

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