War Office, administered solely by soldiers, affords another instance. Sir John, however, contends that the Army and Navy are not parallel cases, because the Queen reserves to herself the command of the military forces, but delegates her power over the Navy to a commission. This is rather sound than substance, as we could show were it necessary.

It is true that some sea officers, smarting under the reign of terror, appear to have dreaded a naval First-Lord, and others adopted the same feeling from the overweening suavity of a succeeding day; but the tyranny of one seaman, or the laxity of another, is no argument that some of their cotemporaries did not possess the requisite qualifications for filling the high post with honour and credit. As to the hackneyed objection, that the sailor may be partial to a particular set of followers, it is not borne out by experience; but supposing the allegation to be founded in fact, is not such a professional preference more honest and less injurious than that which results from mere accident, and allows a grand monopoly of patronage to be devoured by family and party favouritism? A seaman must at least know more of the habits, character, impulses, and prejudices of the ocean-host, and the tenor of the respective merits of the candidates for notice, than a landsman possibly can acquire; and the maritime resources of his own and other countries are more likely to have been the study of him who has made it his profession, than of one who suddenly has the situation fitted to him, whether he is adapted for it or not. The seaman might appoint old companions to good commissions; but we have seen cases, not a few, in which the conflicts regarding the justice or injustice of the selection, supposed to haunt a first-lord's mind, seem to be very easily borne with by the landsman.

But with us difference of opinion does not make opposition, and we hope our view of the case is not less recognised by common sense than by professional bias. Yet though, cæteris paribus, we see no reason why those who have been directing the operations of British fleets on the ocean, and whose experience and sea-knowledge give them so substantial a claim, should be excluded from the helm of naval affairs, we entertain no insuperable objection to a president practically unacquainted with maritime matters, provided the other commissioners were ALL able seamen. But he should possess a vigorous understanding, an impartial disposition, a strong desire to promote the welfare and honour of those committed to his charge, and an intimate acquaintance with the naval interests of his country; in fact, we would have him to be all that Sir John Barrow has pictured. And even then, and supposing his mind unwarped and unprejudiced, we still think the public welfare is deeply hazarded in conferring the full and uncontrolled patronage of the naval service to a landsman, and that landsman always a political partisan. Another evil of the system is, the constant liability to change. According to the Spanish proverb, three moves are equal to a fire. If absolutely necessary that the First-Lord be of the Cabinet Council, and liable to be removed upon every passing squall among the Ministry, still the commission ought to be so modelled that his removal should not, by drawing off his associates in his train, turn the Navy and all its vital interests suddenly over to new regulations, to the detriment of the nation. Sir John Barrow thinks that the education of a seaman is not exactly what is suited to fill up an important place in the Ministerial Cabinet; and that his professional career almost precludes the acquisition of that

general knowledge, and of those broad and comprehensive views inseparable from the character of a great statesman. This is a very prevalent fallacy, and one which quite forgets the multifarious and onerous duties by flood and field, in camp and council, in cabin and court, which usually fall to the lot of those who ornament the higher ranks of the Navy. It is thus that it was clamorously demanded respecting the first man of the age-"What does Wellington know about politics? He's only a soldier!" Now, in answer to the inquiry as to what a seaman can know about state affairs, we think it much more probable that habits of business, firmness of conduct, unceasing application, and unflinching integrity of purpose, will be found in the superior grade of naval officers than among the scions of interest, wealth, and faction, who so frequently jump among the loaves and fishes from the forms of schools and colleges, or the Lord knows whence. In that pithy and summary estimate of character-"O! he's only a sailor," it would be implied, that keen intellect and sound judgment evinced in mastering the theory and practice of naval duties, and their consequent obligations among men and matter, necessarily denote a man to be unfit for an active exercise of the mind in any other public department. But wherein have our British seamen been found wanting? They may not have had sufficient party-interest to instal them into the high places, but the grand engine would have worked very badly without them. Lord Spencer was an amiable and upright First Lord, but in the arrangement and distribution of the fleets, the veteran Middleton was his Mentor. The elder Lord Melville, the best friend, perhaps, the Navy ever enjoyed, was benefited by the counsel of Gambier and Neale; and Lord Mulgrave, a soldier, who by the turn of fortune's wheel was thrown to the Admiralty helm, had the good policy-besides his official colleagues at the Board-to secure a practical seaman for his private secretary. Indeed our author feels this himself, for after deciding in favour of the civil Lord, he adds—“ It must be admitted, however, that without the assistance of two or three able, honest, and judicious naval co-adjutors, no landsman, whatever his talents might be, could attempt to carry on the numerous duties of this important office." Here, be it remarked, it is assumed as an equation, that the co-adjutors are always "able, honest, and judicious."

It is a curious part of this problem, that the advocates for land Lords boast of the victories achieved under their administration, as proofs of their fitness for the helm, though a moment's reflection would rather class them among the chances of war. In this argument not a word is uttered about the manifold errors committed. As far as the equipment and stationing of the ships are concerned, it will easily be seen what touch-and-go affairs some of those very conflicts were, from inefficiency of means and appliances. Lord Sandwich was certainly an able man, having, fortunately for the public, remained long enough in office to learn something of his duty,-yet, in 1780, after having presided over the Navy for many years, he allowed the British Channel to be insulted by sixty-six sail of the enemy's line, to which he could oppose but thirty-six. See in our own times how insufficiently the fleets were supplied with attendant vessels-the "eyes" of an armament, as they have aptly been called-insomuch that Nelson in his regrets declared his conviction that the word "frigate" would be found on his heart. The same magnanimous chieftain fought his last grand battle with a

most motley fleet, in which were no fewer than seven different classes of 74-gun ships, each requiring different spars and gear from the other, and some of them so old and weak as rather to be claimants for a dive than for victory. Look again at the preposterous stone expedition to Boulogne, to endeavour to choke a tide-harbour, where, at low water, all the material could be carted away: and it is in fresh remembrance that a land Lord employed another landsman, who was a sort of half-soldier. half-mechanic, to rig and arm ships after a fashion of his own, to the derision of all seamen. In fact, were the matter well probed, it would prove, that Great Britain is more indebted to the indomitable valour and professional skill of her tars, than she is inclined to admit.

The general work of the Admiralty may roll on pretty smoothly, with the aid of able subalterns, in peaceable times; but under the emergencies incident to war and intestine broils, the ninth great officer of the State-the Capitaneus Nautarum et Marinellorum-ought to know well what oar he is pulling. Can the vivid perception of a public duty, which originates from knowledge and experience, be placed in juxtaposition with that derived at second-hand? We have already noticed the manly tone in which that brave old sailor, Lord Hawke, vindicated his selection of Howe for an important appointment, because he had tried him" on service. The best interests of the country may be subjected to ruinous delays by the man who must first consult with advisers before he dare give an order in a critical moment. In the late war, the Curieux arrived at Plymouth with the intelligence that Villeneuve was on his return from the West Indies, with the combined fleet. This vessel anchored on the 7th of July, 1805, and at about 11 P.M. on the following day her Captain arrived at the Admiralty. Lord Barham, who then held the tiller, having retired to rest, the dispatches were not communicated to him until early on the morning of the 9th. At this the worthy old Admiral, seeing at once the vital importance of prompt measures, was extremely angry, averring that seven or eight hours had been most needlessly lost. The point was, to lose no more time. Without waiting to dress himself, he instantly wrote orders for Admiral Cornwallis to detach Rear-Admiral Stirling from off Rochefort to join Sir Robert Calder, who was to take a station off Cape Finisterre, while Cornwallis himself, with the Channel fleet, was to cruize between Ushant and Finisterre. By 9 A.M. the Admiralty messengers were on their way to Portsmouth and Plymouth, and on the 11th Admiral Cornwallis received his orders. Such promptitude, on the part of the British Admiralty, could not be credited by Napoleon. Ce ne fut que le 20 Messidor," (July 8,) says he, in the Précis des Evénemens, "que le brick le Curieux est arrivé en Angleterre. L'Amirauté n'a pu se décider dans les vingt-quatre heures sur les mouvemens de ses escadres: dans ce cas, il n'est pas probable que l'ordre à l'escadre devant Rochefort soit arrivé en trois jours. Je mets donc en fait que cette escadre a levé sa croisière par des ordres antérieurs à l'arrivé du Curieux à Londres." Such are our notions upon the question of a professional or non

*It is well known that at this time" Jupiter Scapin" studied Steel's List of the British Navy, read the Naval Chronicle, and intrigued with the newspaper press of Europe. But in the grand blow which he is said to have plotted against our maritime power by Villeneuve's expedition, he must have arrogated that our statesmen and seamen were all asleep at their posts.

professional wielder of naval thunder. Yet with all this, and much more that can be easily advanced, we are quite ready to acknowledge that the Board of Admiralty has been supplied with First-Lords of no mean note in the archives of their country. In the execution of this important and difficult post, neither activity, vigilance, method, nor benevolence have been wanting; and perhaps it is only owing to that bane of society, party-politics, that the principles of honour and impar tiality have been debarred a fuller development. Indeed, so useful and splendid a class have these Statesmen formed in themselves, that we have often thought a work, comprising their memoirs and official acts, judiciously drawn up, would be a most acceptable addition to our nautical libraries. They may be distinctly traced from Alfred the Great, who was Lord High Admiral between the years 872 and 900, down to the present commission, by any one who has sufficient time and tact, with zeal and industry to support and prosecute the inquiry. Should this be deemed too formidable an undertaking, we beg to suggest the period between the two "Sailor Kings," as one of intense maritime interest, an assertion which will be clearly illustrated by a mere enumeration of their names and times:

While upon this subject we may as well make the signal for another work,-one which would be gladly received by those who study the progress of the greatest maritime power in the world. By this, we allude to the " actes and dictes" of those Secretaries, to whom the Navy is indebted for manifold exertions in their cause, as well as for a large share of the intellectual celebrity attached to the service in general. To enforce our argument, we need only cite such illustrious names as those of Pepys, the proposer and promoter of many useful nautical inventions of Burchett, the able and exact naval historian-and of our regretted friend, the late William Marsden, one of the most amiable, upright, and learned men of his day.

This topic has led us further than we originally intended to proceed; and as, according to the sarcastic imitator of Johnson, "all things which have a limit must be brought to a conclusion," we hasten to take leave

most motley fleet, in which were no fewer than seven different classes of 74-gun ships, each requiring different spars and gear from the other, and some of them so old and weak as rather to be claimants for a dive than for victory. Look again at the preposterous stone expedition to Boulogne, to endeavour to choke a tide-harbour, where, at low water, all the material could be carted away: and it is in fresh remembrance that a land Lord employed another landsman, who was a sort of half-soldier, half-mechanic, to rig and arm ships after a fashion of his own, to the derision of all seamen. In fact, were the matter well probed, it would prove, that Great Britain is more indebted to the indomitable valour and professional skill of her tars, than she is inclined to admit.

The general work of the Admiralty may roll on pretty smoothly, with the aid of able subalterns, in peaceable times; but under the emergencies incident to war and intestine broils, the ninth great officer of the State-the Capitaneus Nautarum et Marinellorum-ought to know well what oar he is pulling. Can the vivid perception of a public duty, which originates from knowledge and experience, be placed in juxtaposition with that derived at second-hand? We have already noticed the manly tone in which that brave old sailor, Lord Hawke, vindicated his selection of Howe for an important appointment, because " he had tried him" on service. The best interests of the country may be subjected to ruinous delays by the man who must first consult with advisers before he dare give an order in a critical moment. In the late war, the Curieux arrived at Plymouth with the intelligence that Villeneuve was on his return from the West Indies, with the combined fleet. This vessel anchored on the 7th of July, 1805, and at about 11 P.M. on the following day her Captain arrived at the Admiralty. Lord Barham, who then held the tiller, having retired to rest, the dispatches were not communicated to him until early on the morning of the 9th. At this the worthy old Admiral, seeing at once the vital importance of prompt measures, was extremely angry, averring that seven or eight hours had been most needlessly lost. The point was, to lose no more time. Without waiting to dress himself, he instantly wrote orders for Admiral Cornwallis to detach Rear-Admiral Stirling from off Rochefort to join Sir Robert Calder, who was to take a station off Cape Finisterre, while Cornwallis himself, with the Channel fleet, was to cruize between Ushant and Finisterre. By 9 A.M. the Admiralty messengers were on their way to Portsmouth and Plymouth, and on the 11th Admiral Cornwallis received his orders. Such promptitude, on the part of the British Admiralty, could not be credited by Napoleon. "Ce ne fut que le 20 Messidor," (July 8,) says he, in the Précis des Evénemens," que le brick le Curieux est arrivé en Angleterre. L'Amirauté n'a pu se décider dans les vingt-quatre heures sur les mouvemens de ses escadres: dans ce cas, il n'est pas probable que l'ordre à l'escadre devant Rochefort soit arrivé en trois jours. Je mets donc en fait que cette escadre a levé sa croisière par des ordres antérieurs à l'arrivé du Curieux à Londres."* Such are our notions upon the question of a professional or non

It is well known that at this time " Jupiter Scapin" studied Steel's List of the British Navy, read the Naval Chronicle, and intrigued with the newspaper press of Europe. But in the grand blow which he is said to have plotted against our maritime power by Villeneuve's expedition, he must have arrogated that our statesmen and seamen were all asleep at their posts.