Hamet. My own opinion is that General Stewart calculated on the maintenance of his post by Colonel Macleod, till he himself should be able with his entire army to succour him. And had this been attempted judiciously the scheme might have answered. But Colonel Macleod, at the very moment when every other resource had ceased to be attainable, gave up the scheme as beyond his accomplishment. He determined to retreat; and the more to embarrass himself-the more to unfit his troops for resistance, he made his dispositions for this retrograde movement precisely as he ought not to have made them. Let me explain Mohamed Ali's plan, and the truth of the criticism will be demonstrated.

When the detachment of horse, of which I have spoken as moving towards our right, was sent off from the main body, orders were given to the officer in command that he should ford the lake, and take up a position in our rear, so as at once to threaten us on our own ground, and to render our retreat from it eminently perilous. Simultaneously with the execution of that manoeuvre, a few hundred men moved towards the river, in order to amuse Major Vogelsang and his people, and keep him from observing how it fared with others. Meanwhile Mohamed made ready to force the village, against which all the weight of his column was directed; and then proposed to fall in detail upon the wings, of which the destruction would be inevitable. It is of course impossible to say how far the plan would have succeeded, because much would depend upon the obstinacy of the defence at the village and round it. But the arrangements were worthy of all praise; they were the very best which under the circumstances could have been made. How sad is the contrast which our system of defence presents, even though we shut our eyes to the negligence which drove us upon its adoption! Instead of holding the village as the key of his position, and drawing in his detachments from the right and left; instead of desiring us to keep El Hamet to the last man, in order that these detachments might have time to meet and form in our rear, Colonel Macleod commanded us, just as the firing began, to retreat, and so permitted his little army to be broken up into three detachments, against each of which, as it best suited his own convenience, it was competent for the Vizier to direct the whole weight of his multitudes.

We made good our retreat in the order which has just been explained. We gave our fire from the house-top, we saw the Albanians throw themselves down among the bushes, Red Turban disappeared, and then we took to our heels. It was literally devil take the hindmost through the village; and even beyond there was no disposition to linger. But the necessity of keeping the ranks entire, and being prepared for resistance at any moment, was not slow in evincing itself. On came the Turkish horse like the rush of a mighty river. They sprang over the embrasures in the road-they swept down, howling ferociously, into the plain and then in front, in rear, and on either flank, they galloped here and there, waving their scimitars, and making every demonstration of an immediate attack. We preserved our order with great care, halting from time to time to unlimber one or both of the guns, but not firing; for no sooner was the muzzle pointed towards them than the Arabs drew off, and we resumed our march again as steadily as before. We had not proceeded far along the plain, when a body of troops, which we immediately recognised as a portion of De Roll's Regiment,

was seen moving towards us from the left of the position. Whether Macleod had sent orders for this retreat, while he himself proceeded to draw off the detachment on the right-or whether Major Vogelsang, observing that we had fallen back, concluded, of his own accord, that a general retrogression had been determined on, I do not know. I never had an opportunity of inquiring into the facts of the case; but this much is certain, that he left one half of his people to cover the movement, and with the other half obliqued across the plain so as to connect himself with us at a moment when the increase of numbers could not but be acceptable to both detachments. We formed square together, keeping our guns in the centre, and found that we mustered in all about three hundred and seventy or eighty bayonets.

We had nothing now to do except to wait quietly in our ranks till Colonel Macleod, with his division from the right, should arrive. We were threatened perpetually, though no serious attack took place. But, if idle ourselves, it was manifest, from the heavy firing on both flanks of us, that our comrades were not so tenderly dealt with. Neither was it to us the least annoying part of the business, that, except from the sustained roar of cannon and musketry, there were no means of ascertaining how the conflict went; for the country round was one vast sea of sand, broken up, like the ocean in a stiff breeze, into frequent waves, yet in no single spot so far elevated above the others as to give to him who might attain the summit of a mound, any commanding view over the rest. The firing, however, which had for a brief space prevailed with equal fury on the left as on the right, suddenly ceased in the former of these directions. Then came the enemy, both horse and foot, thundering into the plain; and our hearts told us-alas too truly that Major Vogelsang's reserve, after performing prodigies of valour, had died to a man under the scimitars of their assailants.

The evidence of this disaster, which the fierce and rapid advance of the enemy afforded, affected us very deeply. Dismayed we certainly were not; on the contrary, I can answer for myself, that I never doubted as to our ultimate safety, because I saw that the men were steady and resolute; and it was impossible to doubt that assistance would speedily reach us. On this, indeed, I calculated as a matter of course; because a tower, on which General Stewart always kept a sentry, a sort of detached post of communication between his corps and the force at El Hamet, was distinctly visible; and it was just to conclude that he, being informed of our danger, would hazard the very existence of himself and his people to bring us off. In like manner, knowing that Colonel Macleod's division was very nearly as numerous as our own, and that it consisted of troops, than which there were none superior in the British Army, we all felt comparatively at ease concerning him, Yet I confess that my own wishes pointed to a march in his direction, partly because it would be best to complete the junction, at all hazards, speedily; and partly because, if we could once gain the lake, our retreat to Alexandria was secured. But the orders which had been given to me were peremptory, and I did not care to disobey them. Fearing nothing, therefore, though not free from distrust-hoping the best, yet not devoid of anxiety, we kept our ground; a compact square being formed about the guns, and skirmishers lying out in advance of

its several faces, to check the approach of weak parties, and give timely warning when stronger bodies might be about to charge.

There was an incessant but desultory fire in the direction of the lake, which from minute to minute became more close. We strained our eyes in the direction, and in about half an hour, throughout the whole of which we had continued unmolested, clouds of dust and smoke became visible, and the battle rolled towards us. We looked eagerly, and beheld, in due time, a small and compact body of troops marching steadily across the desert, as if it had been moving at a review. Clouds of Arabs were round it,-infantry on three sides, and horsemen on the fourth; to whose unceasing fusilade the column paid no attention, except by levelling its guns from time to time, and by a single discharge driving the assailants to a distance. It would be impossible to conceive any movement more beautiful or more animating than this. "All is right-all is right," cried I, delighted; "we shall make good our junction after all, and Macleod, if he did err in the beginning, will redeem the blunder by the skill and energy with which he conducts the retreat." Alas! I had calculated beyond my host. While I yet spoke our skirmishers came running in with loud cries, "the cavalry are upon us;" and in a moment we, who had heretofore stood neutral, found ourselves in the thick of a fierce and desperate encounter.

There is no task more invidious than that of him who is compelled, in the vindication of historical truth, to throw censure upon the conduct of others. Willingly would I be spared this, the most unpleasant part of my duty; but I do not remember that any just account has yet been given of this affair even in the Gazette, and I cannot bring myself, in obedience to the whispers of a mistaken delicacy, to sanction so grievous an injustice. The affair of El Hamet, though eminently disastrous, was the reverse of discreditable to those who took part in it. It was a contest between a few hundred men on the one side, and as many thousands on the other, which might have ended, and would have ended, gloriously for the British arms, had the General-in-Chief known how to take advantage of the emergency. Never let it be forgotten that, on the night of the 22nd, General Stewart, when endeavouring to make his way to his own rear-guard, was interrupted and driven back by a body of the enemy's horse. As a soldier, he ought to have felt that no trifling detachment would have had the hardihood to interpose itself between two divisions of his army, had there not been support near at hand. Moreover, his own position was at this very time one of imminent hazard. With not more than twelve hundred bayonets he was carrying on the siege, as it was called, of El Raschid; that is to say, he was manning a chain of trenches which extended for nearly two miles from the left bank of the Nile to the fort of St. Julien; and firing from batteries which were here and there erected on that line, and worked with far more of zeal than skill by detachments of seamen from the fleet. Meanwhile his rear-guard was six good miles removed from him; and he had received the most palpable proof, that between him and it the communication was not open. How could any man so circumstanced lie down in peace, or trust even till the morrow for the accomplishment of arrangements, by any failure in which the safety of his entire army might be compromised? Observe, I do not say that the General went

quietly to bed; he may have sat up and fretted sleep away for aught I know to the contrary; but it is certain that till day-light on the 23rd he never thought of moving; and when he did begin to think about it he made all his movements with such deliberation, that two full hours ere he began his march the unfortunate rear-guard was destroyed. What were the battering-guns, and the petty stores of ammunition, in comparison with the lives of five or six hundred men? Yet, though the perilous situation in which we were placed must have been known to him, he would not quit his lines till his guns had all been buried, his magazines blown up, and the other formalities usually attendant on the raising of a siege, gone through. The guns, if left in the batteries, might have fallen in the hands of the Turks for a season; but, had he joined us in time, a great victory would have been gained, and the same evening would have seen us in possession, not only of our lost artillery, but of El Raschid and St. Julien, and the enemy's stores into the bargain. I assert this without scruple, because it is a fact that four hundred men stopped the whole of the Vizier's army for nearly five hours, and so crippled it that General Stewart was enabled to fall back upon Alexandria with comparatively little annoyance, and no loss whatever. But this is not all; he waited, as if his object had been to bring out the garrison of El Raschid in his rear; and, to sum up the whole, took precisely the direction which he ought not to have taken, by marching on Lake Edko. How different the result would have been had he marched early in the day, with his whole force, on the village!

I have said that, just as our hopes of being speedily joined by Colonel Macleod's division were at the highest, our own skirmishers came pouring in, with loud cries that the cavalry were advancing. Instantly the word was given-" Down front ranks, and be steady;" and instantly and nobly the order was obeyed. The first ranks knelt down; those behind them stood, with shouldered arms, and there was silence as deep and unbroken as in the chamber of death. For myself, I will not pretend to say what my feelings were. I beheld three separate masses of cavalry, each equal, in point of numbers, to our little square, moving at a quick pace towards us-one leading; the other two, for a while, in the rear, and then edging off to the right and left, so as to threaten three sides at the same instant. On they all came, till they arrived within, perhaps, three hundred yards of us, when they suddenly pulled up, as if to breathe their horses; then followed a scene of no ordinary interest, when their commanders, either to encourage on their own people, or to strike terror into us, rode forward over the intervening space, and, brandishing their javelins, or waving their swords about, approached, in many instances, within less than half pistol-shot of our bayonets. Several of them, too, more hardy than the rest, discharged both their pistols and carbines at us, while two or three threw their javelins with extraordinary force and precision. But our fellows did not think it necessary to let them have all the amusement to themselves. A dropping fire was given, under which one of the boldest of these cavaliers fell; and then both sides set to their work in real earnest.

NARRATIVE OF THE LATE CARLIST EXPEDITION FROM THE

PROVINCES.

BY AN EX-CARLIST OFFICER.

No. III.

EARLY on the morning of the 24th, the Carlist army was formed in dense columns near the village of Villar, in anxious expectation of battle. About ten o'clock intelligence was received that the enemy was advancing from Herrera; at about eleven Don Carlos and his Court retired to Nogueras under a small escort, and Moreno, the Chief of the Staff, proceeded to take up his position on ground which he had previously minutely reconnoitred. A fertile and uneven valley stretches. from Villar de los Navarros to Herrera, on the north, betwixt two rugged ranges of hills, and is about four miles in length and three in. width. It is the first of any extent between the barren mountains of Higher Arragon, and the wide, luxuriant plains of the "Campo Carinena." Although the soil is in many parts rugged and broken, it is nowhere sufficiently so to impede the action of cavalry; and the undulation of the ground renders it a favourable spot for the exercise of military ingenuity, by affording opportunities of concealing the movements of opposed masses.

Burens, probably surprised at hearing nothing of Oraa, was said to have resolved at last to attack the Carlists single-handed, trusting to his good fortune and the tardy co-operation of his superior. There was, however, still some hesitation in his conduct: his force, which consisted of somewhere above 7000 infantry and 500 cavalry, was moved slowly forward in very broad columns along the eastern side of the valley, until some detachments of light cavalry, which he had pushed forward, discovered the Carlist battalions grouped amidst the deeper undulations of the ground in the very centre of the valley, in numbers about 6000 foot and 700 cavalry. Burens had now no choice but attacking us or retiring, and our superiority of cavalry would not have allowed him to hope for an unmolested retreat. He now marched his columns from the eastern to the western side of the valley, without any object that I could ever discover-unless, indeed, being ignorant of the ground on that side, he imagined that it would admit of his passing us, and that he had made up his mind to await for the approach of Oraa on the bank of the stream Almonacid, before he attacked us, unless forced to fight. As we occupied, however, the centre of the valley, he soon found that he could not on this side, more easily than on the other, ascend it without performing that perilous operation in warfare, a flank march in presence of an enemy, within a most dangerous proximity; and he, therefore, lost no time in forming his troops in battle. The Carlist forces were disposed in a curved line, the right wing being where their centre would have been if Burens had fallen on his enemy by coming directly up the valley, and not, as it were, attacking them sideways. The left wing rested on a hill in the vicinity of the village of Villar, much higher than any of the neighbouring undulations of the ground, although it appeared dwarfish when con by which the val

with the more gigantic children of the Sierras, lo The right wing, which consisted of