the Arragonese division, commanded by Quilez, was protected by three 4-pounders and 400 cavalry. The Castilian and Navarrese divisions. (or rather sub-divisions, for it appears ridiculous to talk of the divisions of an army of 8000 men), under Don Bascilio Garcia and Pablo Sanz, occupied the centre, with the 2nd Regiment of Navarrese Lancers, now reduced to 200 horse, and a battalion of Alavese and 100 cavalry were on the left. At about three o'clock P.M., the Queenites having established a battery of four pieces opposite the right of the Carlist centre, commenced the attack. Both armies, as usual with Spaniards, were formed in column, and some heavy masses first moved slowly and steadily forward against the right of the Carlists: clouds of skirmishers preceding them, supported by a body of 200 horse, gallantly advanced, and, driving those of the Carlists before them, separated themselves too far, not only from the main body, but from the protecting horsemen, who, wedged into a solid column, had just found room to nestle in a slight hollow, where they were somewhat protected from the shot, and still near enough to inspire their skirmishers with full confidence. At this moment Colonel Thomas Reyna hastily took the command of Manueline's squadron-a corps which, although then reduced to 60 or 70 men, had been admirably chosen by this partizan chief, and for appearance, courage, and discipline, was probably superior to any in either army-and dashing "en fourrageur" through the intervals of the retiring troops, in an instant had cut off a great part of the enemy's astonished line of tirailleurs. The mass of horse immediately attempted to deploy to charge him, and at that moment the Carlist battery opened. As the Carlists had been possessed of no artillery since the passage of the Arga, the report of their cannon produced a startling effect on the Christinos, particularly as, under the conviction that they were without any, they had advanced thus far; and such an effect had this unexpected salute, that the mass which was endeavouring to deploy was thrown into considerable confusion, and Reyna taking no notice of the isolated skirmishers who were throwing down their arms around him, formed his men in the most beautiful manner in a single line, and boldly charging the two hundred horse, broke and scattered them to the winds, being only driven back by the heavy fire which the front ranks of the column of infantry, on which they took refuge, now opened upon him; he then hastily retired with upwards of a hundred prisoners, whom the Carlist skirmishers had meanwhile re-advanced to secure, and amidst the deafening cheers of the army. This brilliant, if unimportant, achievement, which was performed in half the time it has taken to relate, before the fight had elsewhere began, and within view of both the armies, had, I have always thought, a decided influence on the event of the combat. Manueline, a celebrated guerrilla chief of cavalry in the commencement of the war, and captain of the squadron, together with another officer, was mortally wounded in the charge, and died a day or two afterwards. The infantry of Burens now advanced in masses on the right and centre, and as the columns rolled on, their skirmishers gaining courage, drove back those of the Carlists until these last were reinforced, which was repeatedly done, until at last their battalions had some of them, five or six out of eight companies, engaged as skirmishers, so as at last to form a long, close and continuous but elastic line, against whose deadly fire no column could make head. This, throughout the war, has been the secret of the superiority of the infantry of the provinces over that of the rest of Spain; nothing would, probably, have induced Spanish generals on either side, to fight in line; but thus, unconsciously, the Carlists have long adopted the system, and in most of their actions with the Christinos, two-thirds of their force has been what they call "in guerrilla," and the column, in fact, became a mere reserve in no way engaged. When the broken ground has not admitted of the enemy's cavalry breaking through their army, or when their own cavalry was well able to keep it in check, the columns of the enemy rarely stood a chance against them. In the present instance, neither on the right nor centre could they make any impression, although various attempts, and repeated charges of the horse, which on both sides behaved exceedingly well, were made along the line; in most instances, however, so ill combined with the movements of the infantry, that they led to no result, excepting the momentary dispersion of the vanquished, who immediately formed again under the protection of their infantry, with trifling loss, which is seldom sustained in the charge, but rather in the subsequent pursuit. On the left, however, the Alavese battalion and the hundred cavalry posted there, notwithstanding the favourable nature of the ground, from the feebleness of the force, were several times near giving in; and I have no doubt that with a little more determination these positions (the occupation of which by the enemy would have led to the defeat of the Carlist army) might have been carried by Burens. The arrival of Villareal, and exertion of all the presence of mind and intrepidity which he possesses during the space of one hour, were requisite to maintain this post, which Sopeluna, who had been observing the road to Darsca with the Alavese division of 2000 men, had long been momentarily expected to reinforce. Whatever his deficiencies may be as the General of an Army, or even of a large division, for a task of this kind, Villareal is eminently fitted, and certainly performed wonders, in keeping his ground until Sopeluna's division debouched from behind the hill, which we have mentioned as being on the Carlists' left, and decided the fate of the day at the moment that Moreno was about to detach a reinforcement from his centre. This was a signal for the simultaneous advance of the Carlist line, which, particularly on the right, had long felt its superiority. The second regiment of Navarre, headed by Colonel Martinez, and the whole of the cavalry on the right, now charged that of the enemy opposed to them, about the same time that the right wing of the Christino army gave way, without showing further fight, and was pursued by Villareal, who, with the 5th Alavese battalion, pressed close upon the fugitives, and drove them pell-mell upon the centre. The charge of Martinez was successful, as far as utterly dispersing the cavalry, which alone kept the Navarrese and Castilian Brigades from advancing; but Quilez, at the head of his Arragonese cavalry, not only drove back the horse opposed to him, but burst in amongst the masses of the Christino's infantry, which, endeavouring to form into squares, and executing the movement exceedingly ill, were, as under all circumstances was to be expected, broken and scattered in every direction, and began to throw down their arms by whole companies. Quilez was shot in the abdomen by a prisoner, and fell, unhappily, a victim to his humanity; a quality so rare in Spaniards as to render this unfortunate requital of it in the case of this gallant officer the more to be lamented. Perceiving a knot of prisoners ill-treated by two or three of his Cossac cavalry (very different in point of discipline and appearance from those of Navarre), he advanced upon them, waving his drawn sword with a menacing gesture. One of the prisoners imagining that he was going to cut him down, and resolving to die game, snatched at a musket, which he fired at him with deadly effect: he did not, however, expire till the succeeding day. The space of about ten minutes, from the time they first gave way, sufficed to complete the rout of the Christinos. It is true that when their right wing gave way before the Carlist reserve, the fugitives from it carried terror and confusion into the centre, whose cavalry was driven back, and whose other supporting wing was broken almost at the same moment. Aware that they were in a country where, as in most parts of Spain, the Queen's soldier, if isolated, finds but a cold reception from the inhabitants, none thought of retreating into the Sierra, at the foot of which they had been fighting until the enemy was absolutely at their heels; but all flying down the valley made for the village of Herrera. So that those who fled from the right had to pass over the ground lately occupied by those on the left, and now in possession of the Carlists, who thus cut off two-thirds of the shattered force. Although, as I have said, the cavalry, particularly that which came from the provinces, had behaved exceedingly well during the day, when once the cheer of victory was raised, and they were let loose amongst the broken infantry, they became as irreclaimable, and as much dispersed, as the infantry they were pursuing, whilst the greater part of that of the enemy made a rapid but orderly retreat, and to a certain extent protected the flight of some of the infantry who retired on Herrera. Burens fled with his cavalry, after remaining until in imminent peril, and doing all that a brave man could, short of perishing on the field which had borne witness to the triumph of his enemy. Favoured by the approaching nightfall, the miserable remnant of Burens' force effected its escape in the direction of Carinena, excepting about three hundred of the rear, which had not had time to defile through the village, when some Arragonese horsemen spurred round to the other side, and contented themselves with cutting them off, leaving a mob of some fifteen hundred men to retire in peace through the darkness. It is true their horses were so dead-beat that they could scarcely move a step, having reached the spot after the pursuit of some of the infantry through a rocky wood at the foot of the Sierra, which seemed almost impassable to cavalry, and where many, in the ardour of the chase, had climbed so high, and into such craggy places, that they could not get their horses down again. The three hundred cut off in the village defended, however, themselves till the arrival of a sufficient force of infantry, and then surrendered at discretion. Amongst them was the General of Brigade, Solano, second in command. So complete was the defeat, that the remnant of Burens' column kept entering Carinena and Saragossa for many hours, only by fives, and tens, and scores, and not one corps of two hundred men together. Three pieces of artillery, thirty-three mule-loads of cartridges, the military chest, 4500 muskets, 150 horses, and 2400 prisoners, exclusive of 100 officers, amongst which the Colonel of the Regiment del Principe, and 300 wounded, abandoned. Above three hundred of the enemy killed on the field; but never since the commencement of the war did the Carlists seem animated by so humane a spirit: in fact, perhaps rarely under such circumstances, have any troops evinced similar forbearance; although heated by an action of some hours, and the sufferings of a weary campaign, which had not been hitherto conducted in the same merciful spirit; although after the final dispersion they might have slain some thousands of the enemy, literally not twenty lives were sacrificed in the pursuit, and a universal good humour and hilarity seemed to have taken the place of all the evil passions which, unhappily, too often, after the battle gained, or city won, stand forth in all their hideous colouring. We only witnessed one man endeavouring to take the life of a fugitive, and regret to state that he was an officer. He was, however, deprived of his sword by the Brigadier Cabanas, son of the Minister of War, who, although in all the hurry of pursuit, turned back to give him a chivalrous reprimand. Much, of course, in these cases, always depends on the chiefs, and the example set by them; and, fortunately, those who principally led the cavalry, Cabanas, Reyna, and Martinez, united all the humane, gentlemanlike feeling of educated men, with the impetuous bravery of youth. It would probably have been just as easy to incite their followers to a promiscuous slaughter. The loss of the Carlists amounted to 340 killed and wounded, of whom 150 were in the brigade of Pablo Sanz. Fifteen officers were also killed or mortally wounded, among whom were Quilez, Manueline, Otaiza, Colone of the Battalion of Guides, and nine cavalry officers. Sixty horses were also lost in the action. By midnight the whole army was quartered in Herrera, where it was joined next day by the King, who amused himself by creating Moreno a Captain-General, and distributing honours and rewards. It remained here, and at Villar de los Navarros, in the most complete inaction till the 29th, probably awaiting some movement on the part of Oraa, whose army, reinforced by that of Nogueras, now again amounted to 11,000. He did not, however, find it prudent to attack the Carlists, especially as Daroca was a most convenient point from whence to watch, with all the advantage which his antagonists were far from sharing, of abundant provisions and comfortable quarters. As he was also daily expecting Espartero, there was no earthly reason for his falling on an army flushed with victory, of which its chiefs seemed disposed to let inactivity wither all the fruits. 1500 of the prisoners voluntarily enrolled themselves in the Carlist ranks: the rest were sent to the depôt at Cantaviga. On the 30th of August, the approach of Espartero and intelligence from Cabrera induced Moreno to move southward to effect a junction with him, and run the hazard of a decisive action in a country where the superiority of cavalry would be of little avail. On the 1st of September we reached Calamocha, Espartero being within some leagues' march with 18,000 infantry and 2800 horse; his infantry, however, in miserable plight, whilst the Provincial Army, which was again recruited to 10,000, was full of enthusiasm, and in excellent order. On the 3rd some skirmishing took place between the Carlist rear and the van of the enemy; and in the evening the Royal Army reached Orihuela, a very small town, although an episcopal residence, at the foot of a wide sierra, which you must traverse a few leagues to enter New Castille. Here we turned at bay, in more favourable and magnificent positions than even any part of the Basque provinces afford to an infantry force, and awaited the attack of a more numerous but wholly dispirited army, whose leader, we were well aware, was most unwillingly, and against his better judgment, forced to do battle by the opinion of the impatient democracy he served. By the Madrid mob he had already been cried down as a traitor, whilst insubordination was gaining ground amongst his troops, and the late murders of a host of Generals showed too well its fearful consequences. Moreno reconnoitred his positions minutely, and prepared every thing for the morrow, which all looked forward to with the most perfect confidence. The wild sierra, covered with impenetrable forests, was behind us, and on ground inaccessible to cavalry, which looked far over the barren plain in our front, we had taken up our position occupying all the passages through the mountains into New Castile. All circumstances would allow Espartero to retire without fighting, and it was equally impossible to remain long opposite in an exhausted country, and he would therefore have been forced to attack us under all disadvantages. Towards nightfall, on a rising ground about two miles out in the plain, the enemy's watchfires gradually blazed in a long beautiful line; and the night being cold and misty, and our army bivouacing close to large forests of fir, hundreds of immense roaring bonfires illumined our encampment, and it was not till late that the busy hum, the sound of the guitar, the shrill neighing of the piqueted horses, and the intenseness of the blaze gradually subsided and diminished. TO THOSE AT SEA. HIGH let the goblet now be crown'd, To those whom last we bade adieu. How many noble hearts that beat High cause to toast their good have we; The ocean kings, the far at sea. S. R. JACKSON. U. S. JOURN, No. 117, Aua, 1838. 2 I |