A

CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY

INTO THE

MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS

OF THAT

FREEDOM OF THE WILL,

WHICH IS

SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MORAL AGENCY,
VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT,
PRAISE AND BLAME.

I. A CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY INTO THE PREVAILING NO
TIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

PAGB

1

ib.

PART I. Wherein are explained and stated various terms and things belong-

ing to the subject of the ensuing Discourse

SECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the Will

II. Concerning the Determination of the Will

1. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility, Inability,

&c., and of Contingence

Iv. Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability

v. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency

PART II. Wherein it is considered, whether there is or can be any sucn sort of

Freedom of Will, as that wherein Arminians place the essence of the Lib-

erty of all Moral Agents; and whether any such thing ever was or can be

conceived of

FACT. 1. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty

of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power

II. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered

III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come tc

pass without a Cause of its existence

IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the

nature of the soul

20

ib.

▼. Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed

to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of

Arminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian

writers are obliged to talk inconsistently

VI. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent

in the view of the mind

30

32

39

VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference

VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity 45

IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Under-

standing

x. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with partic

ular observations of the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and

reasonings about the Freedom of the Will

XI. The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral

Agents

XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, in-

consistent with such a Contingence of those volitions as is without all Ne-

cessity.

XIII. Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with

any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as

to overthrow Arminian Liberty

PART III. Wherein is inquired, whether any such Liberty of Will as Arminians

hold be necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Dis-

praise, &c.

SECT. I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy

11. The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy,

yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, &c.

725108

48

II. The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man in gen-

eral, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with Blamewor-

thiness

IV. Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral İnability

to obey

94

99

v. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in

the non-performance of things in themselves good, particularly considered 105

VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly incon-

sistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, in-

consistent with Arminian notions of Liberty and moral Agency

110

115

119

ib.

VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence of Mo-

tive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions

PART IV. Wherein the chief groun is of the reasonings of Arminians, in sup-
port and defence of the forementioned notions of Liberty, Moral Agency,

&c., and against the opposite doctrine, are considered

SECT. 1. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and
acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature

11. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of Action,

and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of

the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.

III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose

those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame. 127

17. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to

suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward

and Punishment

v. Objections, that this scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavors

for avoiding Sin, or obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain, and to no pur-

pose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines, in affairs of

morality and religion, answered

VI. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintain-

ed, that it agrees with the Stoical doctrine of Fate, and the opinions of Mr.

Hobbes

VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will

VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions

considered

IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained,

that it makes God the author of Sin.

x. Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World

XI. Of a supposed Inconsistence between these principles and God's moral

character

122

131

136

140

169

XII. Of a supposed tendency of these principles to Atheism and Licentious-

ness

XIII. Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvin-

istic doctrine is supposed, that it is metaphysical and abstruse

The Conclusion.

Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion,

in a Letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

PART I.

WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE.

SECTION I.

Concerning the Nature of the WILL.

Ir may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the Will; this word being generally as well understood as any other words we can use to explain it philosophers, metaphysicians and polemic scurity by the things they have said of it. of some use, and will tend to the greater to say a few things concerning it.

and so perhaps it would be, had not divines brought the matter into obBut since it is so, I think it may be clearness in the following discourse

And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical refining is plainly, that by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty of the Will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.

:

If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to say, that it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses; I am content with it: though I think that it is enough to say, it is that by which the soul chooses for in every act of Will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another; it chooses something rather than the contrary, or rather than the want or non-existence of that thing. So in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative; and the mind's making its choice in that case is properly the act of the Will; the Will's determining between the two is a vol. untary determining; but that is the same thing as making a choice. So that whatever names we call the act of the Will by, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively.

Mr. Locke says, "the Will signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose." And in the foregoing page says, "the word preferring seems best to express the act of volition;" but adds, that "it does it not precisely;

Vol. II.

* Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197

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