Congress should attempt to control in some measure the function of administration. Department heads in Congress, answering questions and called upon to defend their activities, even without the degree of responsibility which obtains under a Cabinet system, would furnish a much more adequate check than the methods of control now available to Congress. Investigations into the work of the War Department have had good results; but their attitude is distinctly hostile, and Mr Wilson objects to them. Informal conferences between members of Congress and the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff were not attempted until the spring of 1918; had they been begun earlier and made really informative, investigations embarrassing to the Executive and disquieting to the people would have been less necessary. Mr Wilson's dictatorship will continue even with Congress adequately informed; but it will be helpless to interfere.

We need not bestow any lengthy consideration on the President's control of foreign affairs, since, in saying that it is autocratic, one has said practically all there is to say. Under the constitution of the United States, the Federal Government, as a whole, possesses plenary authority over foreign relations; but this is divided between the two Houses, the President, and the Senate. Congress enjoys, among other powers, the right to punish offences against the Law of Nations, to declare war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to make rules concerning captures on land and sea, to raise armies, to provide a navy, and to enact any regulations that may be necessary and proper for carrying these powers into effect. The President has complete executive authority; he is Commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and he makes treaties and appoints ambassadors with the concurrence of the Senate, whose power is limited to these two cases in which its approval is necessary to validate the President's acts. This constitutional authority, as is evident, is both incomplete and not too definitely parcelled out; nothing is said about neutrality, the recognition of new governments, the abrogation of treaties, or the conclusion of agreements not so formal as to require the sanction of the Senate; and, while Congress

has the power to declare war, if a treaty of alliance required the United States to take up arms, this obligation could be met only with the concurrence of the House of Representatives.

Nevertheless the gaps in the constitutional delegation of powers have been filled, says Prof. Corwin, 'by the theory that the control of foreign relations is in its nature an executive function, and one, therefore, which belongs to the President in the absence of specific constitutional provision to the contrary.'* When, in 1793, war broke out between France and England, Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality which was bitterly attacked by French sympathisers on the ground that he had exceeded his constitutional authority. An exhaustive debate on the legal question was engaged in by Hamilton, who approved, and by Madison, who objected to, the President's action; but the former was theoretically correct, and Washington's course has been followed without exception to the present day. The outcome is that the initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without restriction, is virtually the power to control them without any check except the indefinite one of public opinion. As Mr Wilson wrote in 1908:

"The President cannot conclude a treaty with a foreign power without the consent of the Senate, but he may guide every step of diplomacy; and to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if the faith and prestige of the Government are to be maintained. He need disclose no step of a negotiation until it is complete; and, when in any critical matter it is completed, the Government is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination, the Senate may feel itself committed also.' †

Mr Wilson has not hesitated in acting unreservedly on the principles he here expressed. Without consulting the Senate he withdrew the United Sates from participation in the Six-Power loan to China; on the question of Panama Canal Tolls he was forced to deal with Congress, because the repeal of a statute was necessary, but

Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Relations,' p. 5. + Constitutional Government in the United States,' p. 77.

he so mobilised public opinion that Congress was forced to do his bidding. The Mexican policy, whatever we may think of its success, was Mr Wilson's own; he reported to Congress in his messages, and when necessary, asked for authority to intervene. Probably a majority in Congress disapproved of the President's policy so far as they understood it, but the authority to occupy Vera Cruz was granted. Later developments-the mediation with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, at Niagara, and the recognition of Carranza-were governed solely by Mr Wilson's wishes. With regard to Pan-America, the foundations of an entente cordiale were laid, while at the same time a strong hand was manifested in Nicaragua, Haiti, and San Domingo, where revolutions were being attempted. The Senate was consulted only when treaties were necessary; and Mr Wilson has not been over-punctilious in asking the cooperation of the Senate. The Lansing-Ishii agreement, under which the United States gives Japan a rather free hand in China, was negotiated by the President without consulting the other branch of the treaty-making authority.

When the European war broke out, President Wilson dictated the course to be pursued by the United States. Our proclamations of neutrality, our silence over the rape of Belgium and succeeding violations of International Law so far as they did not affect our rights, and the policy pursued toward England and Germany which aimed at persuading them to abandon their restrictions upon American commerce, represented the will of an executive head who was not responsible to the Legislature. Had Mr Wilson desired, he could have led the country into war when the 'Lusitania' was sunk; the crime of the 'Sussex' in April 1916, could likewise have been made a casus belli that would have been approved by the American people. The proposals of peace in December, 1916, were sent without consultation except perhaps with a few intimate friends; communications with European Governments were made through Colonel House, Mr Wilson's closest friend and adviser; the magnificent address of Jan. 22, 1917, announcing the programme that America would stand for at the settlement, and which, if satisfactory, she would pledge her faith and strength to secure, was made,

indeed, to the Senate as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations,' but it was President Wilson's own policy. He broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, reporting the fact to Congress, but not asking for, or being compelled to secure, approval. When, subsequently, Mr Wilson desired to arm American ships, the Senate rules prevented him from securing this authority before the end of the session, but he found it in an old statute.

Then came the declaration of war, made by Congress as soon as the President asked for it. No formal alliance has been entered into by the United States with the other nations fighting Germany; semi-officially it is stated that the United States looks on the Entente Powers as 'cobelligerents' rather than 'allies,' and that there is a 'gentlemen's agreement' rather than a formal document. The extent of diplomatic cooperation with the co-belligerents,' the intervention in Russia, the pretence of not declaring war on Turkey and Bulgaria-all depended on the President. Mr Wilson conducted the negotiations with Germany preceding the armistice, and appointed the American peace commissioners without consulting the Senate. The terms of peace that the United States will endeavour to secure-as formulated in the 'fourteen points' of Jan. 8, 1918, and later addresses-represent Mr Wilson's views. Even with few international problems to be settled, an almost absolute control of foreign affairs has been gradually assumed by Presidents; and American foreign policy is conducted under conditions that are thoroughly undemocratic. There is almost as much secrecy as under European systems; nothing is yet known in the United States, for example, as to the outcome of the Lusitania' negotiations, with which the President and his Secretary of State professed themselves to be satisfied. Diplomacy proceeding 'frankly and in the public view '-the first of the war aims enumerated by Mr Wilson in his great address of Jan. 8, 1918-will mean as great a change for the United States as for its Allies.

So recently as 1908, Mr Wilson wrote that, if the President rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it, he is irresistible.' A President

6

trusted by the country can not only lead it, but form it to his own views.' President Wilson has been irresistible, and he has formed the country to his own views. He has looked upon his rôle as the leader of American Democracy as something more than a counting of heads; and in time of war he has taken the responsibility of deciding questions, not as he thought the public at the moment wished the country to act, or even as he thought the public would wish him to act if all the facts of the situation were known. On the contrary, Mr Wilson, it appears, has made his decisions according to what his information, his judgment, and his conscience have told him will ultimately be approved. This is not to say that Mr Wilson does not pay attention to the demands of public opinion from moment to moment; they help him to steer the course which he thinks will be justified in the end. Public opinion now sanctions presidential dictatorship in the United States; and that, as I have said, makes the fact not the less true but simply the less alarming.

LINDSAY ROGERS.

*Constitutional Government in the United States,' p. 68.