were hastily brought from other sectors, it was clear that the troops had become demoralised. On Nov. 7 Allied forces reached the left bank of the Meuse from Mezières to Sedan, the western part of which fell into their hands; while, having forced the passage at Dun, American troops were making their way down the right bank towards Sedan and Montmédy. In this sector, on the stability of which, as we have seen, the whole situation depended, the retreat had become a rout.

On Nov. 5 the five armies between the Argonne and Avesnes began a retrograde movement, which, also, soon degenerated into a disorderly retreat towards the Meuse below Mezières. From Avesnes to the Scheldt the troops, while retiring, continued to offer resistance. On the Scheldt there was no change till Nov. 9, when a movement was begun in conformity with the retirement on the left. Further north, yielding to an Allied attack on Nov. 1, the Germans had fallen back behind the Scheldt and the Bruges-Terneuzen Canal; where, for the most part, they maintained their positions until the armistice came into force on Nov. 11. The remaining moves leading to the final position shown on the map are of little military importance; but it should be recorded that, a few hours before the suspension of hostilities, British troops fought their way into Mons-a fitting close to four years of heroic effort and endurance.

Such, in broad outline, are the main features of the retreat, and the conditions which appear to have governed its course. It differed from every operation of its kind on record. What, in former times, were rearguard actions, fought by detachments to cover the retirement of the main forces, became pitched battles on fronts of great extent, in which entire armies fought to cover the evacuation of their magazines. These battles entailed huge losses; for positions often had to be held to the last. In October the Germans lost over 100,000 prisoners and 2000 guns. The present war furnishes no parallel; for in no retreat effected under heavy pressure were such vast quantities of stores prevented, by removal or destruction, from falling into the adversary's hands. The German retreat in the spring of 1917 is not analogous; for the magazines had been evacuated before the movement began.

It seems probable that the Germans hoped, in the first instance, to wear out the Allies' offensive in the Hindenburg zone, in order to secure an unmolested retreat to the Meuse; or, at the worst, to effect the movement by easy stages during the winter. It is clear that they had made no preparations-as they might have done during August and September-for an early abandonment of that zone, which, in consequence, changed its rôle as a battle-position, and became a mere line of resistance to cover the evacuation of stores. Having failed in their original design, they sought to gain time by involving the Allies in a discussion of peace-terms on the basis of President Wilson's Message to Congress. In this way, according to the Libertê,'* they hoped to gain three months, prolonged by two months of winter, during which the armies would be reorganised and the German people prepared for the resumption of the war as a national struggle for existence. In the meantime differences might arise among the Allies, or one or other of them might decline to resume hostilities.

With the miscarriage of this scheme the position became almost desperate; but those who saw in the situation towards the end of October a probability that the German armies would be rounded up in northern France and Belgium were, perhaps, unduly optimistic. It may be doubted whether, even if von Gallwitz had succeeded in holding the critical position, a stand could have been made behind the Meuse; but there was a fighting chance that the armies might reach the Rhine, though with their numbers much reduced, and with a paralysing loss of guns and other equipment.

What caused the sudden demoralisation in von Gallwitz' army-group, and its extension to the armies on his right, remains a mystery. mystery. It is suggestive that the débâcle synchronised with the revolutionary outbreak at Kiel (Nov. 3) and the news of the surrender of Austria and Turkey; but the troops on the rest of the front, who, to all appearance, remained comparatively staunch, cannot have been ignorant of these events. So far as fighting was concerned, the troops on the British front

Quoted in the Times,' Oct. 18. The scheme was unfolded at a meeting of German propaganda agents at Berne, on Oct. 7.

had been subjected to a trial at least as severe, and more protracted; and they had, in addition, been exposed to the demoralising influence of a prolonged retreat. But, while the cause of the failure is uncertain, and while opinion may differ as to the probable course of events if it had not occurred, there is little doubt that, but for the suspension of hostilities, it would have sealed the fate of the German armies. From the military point of view one may, perhaps, be allowed to express regret that the Germans' oft-repeated appeal to humanitarian sentiment for which they have, themselves, shown no regard -should have been accepted. The Allied armies were thus deprived of their final and decisive victory, and the enemy was allowed to cherish the belief-as it is said they do that their armies are unbeaten.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 15. THE REVOLUTION IN VIENNA.*

ON Saturday, Nov. 16, 1918, we read in the evening paper that an Englishman-the first since the war broke out a certain Mr Jeffries, representing the 'Daily Mail,' had arrived in Vienna. Mr Jeffries reached Vienna from Innsbrück on the evening of the 12th, the day when the Republic was officially proclaimed; and, in an interview, he had expressed his astonishment at the quietness with which the function passed off. He is reported to have telegraphed to his paper that he saw only one broken window-pane; but, on the other hand, he was struck by the number of well-dressed promenaders on the Ring, and can hardly believe that the population of Vienna, especially the better class, is suffering so severely as is commonly supposed in England.

As a matter of fact, Vienna, as any competent person could have told him, is on the verge of starvation-no food, no clothes, no coals, and a severe winter in prospect. But it is clear that this is Mr Jeffries' first visit to Vienna, otherwise he would have known, first, that the Viennese

The author of this paper has been resident in Vienna since the outbreak of the war (Editor).