Again, examples are plentiful in the Report. While the DCI had declared "war" on Bin Ladin in December 1998, insisting that no resources be spared in the effort, the Director of the National Security Agency at the time told the Inquiry that he believed "the DCI was speaking for CIA only". The Report found that, prior to September 11th, neither the FBI nor the NSA focused on the importance of identifying and then ensuring coverage of communications between the United States and suspected terrorist facilities abroad. The Inquiry determined that one of the hijackers did communicate with a known terrorist facility in the Middle East while he was living in the United States. The Intelligence Community did not, however, identify the domestic origin of those communications before September 11th, so that additional FBI investigative efforts could be coordinated. There was, in short, insufficient focus on what many would have thought was among the most critically important kinds of terrorist-related communications, at least in terms of protecting the Homeland. Former Secretary of Defense John Hamre told the Inquiry that "he could not recall ever seeing an intelligence report on the existence of terrorist sleeper cells in the United States" and noted "we thought we were dealing in important things, but we missed the domestic threat from international terrorism". Former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Richard Clarke stated that when he visited FBI field offices to increase their focus on al Qa'ida, "I got sort of blank looks of 'what is al Qa'ida' The FBI counterterrorism agent responsible for the informant that had contacts with the hijackers said he did not discuss Bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida with the informant before September 11th because that was "not an issue in terms of my assignments". The former chief of the Counterterrorist Center's Bin Ladin Unit testified that between 1996 and 1999 "the rest of the CIA and the Intelligence Community looked on our efforts as eccentric and, at times, fanatic". Lack of Quality The Report cites quality problems in two critically important areas, analysis and investigation. In analysis, the Inquiry found quality was inconsistent, and many analysts were "inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to critical information." The Report concludes that there was "a dearth of creative, aggressive analysis targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to comprehend the collective significance of individual pieces of intelligence". There was little or no analytic focus on, for example, reports about terrorist interest in aircraft as weapons and the likelihood that Khalid Shaykh Mohammed was recruiting individuals for terrorist activity within the United States. The former FBI Assistant Director for Counterterrorism "could not recall any instance where the FBI Headquarters terrorism analytical unit produced 'an actual product that helped out' ". Richard Clarke testified that the FBI "never provided analysis to us, even when we asked for it, and I don't think that throughout that 10-year period we had an analytical capability of what was going on in this country." În investigations, the Report concluded that "the FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States." While in the United States, a number of hijackers successfully eluded FBI detection despite their interaction with subjects of FBI counterterrorism investigations. Even after the CIA watchlisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi on August 23, 2001, there was less than an all-out investigative effort to locate what amounted to two Bin Ladin-associated terrorists in the United States during a period when the terrorist threat level had escalated to a peak level. In conducting that search, the FBI never sought relevant information from FBI counterterrorism sources, including the California informant, or from relevant databases held by other federal agencies. Representatives of those agencies testified that, had the FBI done so, they believe they might have been able to locate the two hijackers using those agencies' databases. While the Inquiry found, in its review of CIA and FBI documents, information suggesting specific sources of foreign support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were in the United States, CIA and FBI officials were unable to definitively address the extent or nature of such support. Despite the serious national security implications of the information, the FBI Director acknowledged that it was the Joint Inquiry's work that brought some of these facts, found in CIA and FBI documents, to his attention. The Inquiry referred this material to the FBI and CIA for further investigation and the Report notes that only recently, and in part due to the Inquiry's focus on this issue, did the CIA and FBI strengthen efforts in this area. Related Findings Finally, the Report includes three "related findings", at least two of which appear directly relevant to this Committee's focus on homeland security. These findings ad dress issues that, while not entirely within the scope or control of the Intelligence Community, impacted the Community's counterterrorism efforts before September 11th. They are: Despite intelligence reporting that Bin Ladin's terrorist network intended to strike within the United States, the United States Government did not undertake a comprehensive effort to implement defensive measures in the United States; Between 1996 and 2001, the counterterrorism strategy adopted by the U.S.government did not succeed in eliminating Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training ground for Bin Ladin's terrorist network; and - Prior to September 11th, U.S. counterterrorism efforts operated largely without the benefit of an alert, mobilized and committed American public. The assumption prevailed in the U.S. government that attacks of the magnitude of September 11th could not happen here and, as a result, there was insufficient effort to alert the American public to the reality and the gravity of the threat. Recommendations The Report also looks beyond the mistakes of the past to the future, and the need to strengthen our ability to combat the international terrorist threat that still faces this nation. Noting that “the cataclysmic events of September 11th provide a unique and compelling mandate for strong leadership and constructive change", the Committees agreed on nineteen recommendations for reform which are set forth in the Report. Among other things, the recommendations propose: - the creation of a statutory, Cabinet level, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), vested with the full range of management, budgetary, and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole. No person could serve as both the DNI and the DCI or head of any other intelligence agency; the establishment and enforcement of clear, consistent and current priorities throughout the Intelligence Community and an annual review and update of those priorities; preparation of a U.S. government wide strategy for combating terrorism for approval by the President; creation of a National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism on the National Intelligence Council; - full development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective allsource terrorism information fusion center, with full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information, including "raw" supporting data, as needed. This fusion center is intended to "dramatically improve the focus and quality of counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community"; implementation, at the FBI, of numerous specific improvements in its domestic intelligence capability, with a report to the President and the Congress on the FBI's progress on implementing those reforms; prompt consideration by the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of the Congress, in consultation with the Administration, of the question of whether the FBI should continue to perform the domestic intelligence function or whether legislation is necessary to create a new agency to perform these functions; - actions by the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI and reviews by the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of the Congress to ensure the fuller and more effective use of FISA authorities to assess the threat of international terrorists within the United States; - implementation of specific measures to greatly enhance the development of a workforce with the intelligence expertise needed for success in counterterrorism, including expanded training programs; greater development of language capabilities; the use of personnel and expertise from outside the Community as needs arise; expansion of educational grant programs focused on intelligence-related fields; and consideration of legislation, modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the concept of “jointness" throughout the Intelligence Community; reviews by the President and the Congress of the authorities that govern the national security classification of intelligence information, in an effort to expand access to relevant information for federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, for state and local authorities, and for the American public. The Committees believe that Congress should consider the degree to which excessive classification has been used in the past and the extent to which the emerging threat environment has greatly increased the need for real-time sharing of sensitive information; - implementation, by the DCI and heads of the Intelligence Community agencies, of measures designed to ensure accountability throughout the Intelligence Community; reviews by the relevant agency Inspectors General of the Inquiry record to determine whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable regarding the identification, prevention, or disruption of the September 11th attacks; the full development of a national watchlist center responsible for coordinating and integrating all watchlist systems and ensuring a comprehensive flow of terrorist names into the center from all points of collection; and aggressive action by the FBI and CIA to address the possibility that foreign governments are providing support to or are involved in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. interests and vigorous and continuing oversight of those efforts by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. The FBI and CIA should "aggressively and thoroughly pursue" related matters developed through the Inquiry that have been referred to them for further investigation by the Committees. While these recommendations do not have the force of law, Senators Graham, Rockefeller, and Feinstein recently introduced legislation in the Senate intended to statutorily implement the Report's recommendations. In the House, I understand that the Intelligence Committee is actively addressing those aspects of the recommendations that pertain to the Intelligence Community through hearings, continuing oversight of the intelligence agencies, and provisions in the Intelligence Authorization bill. Even absent legislation, there are indications that other efforts are underway to implement reform in at least some of the areas addressed by the recommendations. FBI Director Mueller, for example, has said that the FBI is addressing the need for internal reform in the areas identified by the recommendations. The President, as you know, announced the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) as a way of achieving greater sharing and better analysis of counterterrorism intelligence. At least some of the relevant agency Inspectors General are conducting accountability reviews, as recommended by the Committees. Absent more detailed information about the scope and nature of these efforts, I cannot say to what extent they reflect the specific actions called for in the recommendations. In closing, let me underscore the importance of the thought conveyed by the title of today's hearing, "Perspectives on 9/11-Building Effectively on Hard Lessons". Those of us associated with the Joint Inquiry are convinced that there is indeed much to be learned from the story of September 11th, both for the Intelligence Community and for our Nation. The lessons are hard, they are bitter, and they are tragic, but the importance of their message is undeniable: they are our clearest road back to a far safer and brighter future for all Americans. The Joint Inquiry's Report can, I believe, serve as an excellent roadmap for that journey. Chairman Cox. Governor Gilmore. We have also received your written statement, and you are invited to summarize your testimony as you see fit. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM GILMORE, FORMER GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA AND CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Mr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Turner, distinguished Congressmen and women of this committee and of the House, thank you for the opportunity to appear here with you today, and I request that my more extensive statement be put into the record, Mr. Chairman. This Commission is your advisory panel. This advisory panel was established by the Congress of the United States, Senate and the House, in 1999, or 1998 I believe was the public law that established this Commission. It is your official advisory panel on domestic response capability involving terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. By your statute, we have reported each year on December the 15th since 1999. I was approached in 1999, after the passage of the law and the establishment of the Commission, to chair the Commission by the previous administration's Department of Defense and National Security Council. The Commission was set up not of your standard people out of Washington, D.C., that perhaps you would see, but instead police, fire, rescue, emergency services, health care, epidemiologists, some retired general officers, some key people of this nature in the Intelligence Community. The alumni, if you will, of this Commission over the nearly now 5 years of its existence include Paul Bremer, General Clapper, who now heads the National Mapping and Imagery Agency, Ray Downey, a top official with the New York City Fire Department until he was killed at the World Trade Center, Rich Fairbank, who serves on the staff now in the current White House on Homeland Security. The Commission went to work, and in 1999 in our first year we reported an assessment of the threat to the Congress, which was widely reported, and of course copies were sent to each Member of the Congress and to the President each year. We did a threat assessment in that year, and in the second year we did perhaps some of our best policy work. We recommended that there be a national strategy. We were concerned about the strong probability of conventional attack in this country. We recommended that there be a national strategy to combat terrorism. We recommended a strategy that was national, was not Federal, and remains not Federal. It is Federal, State and local, and must contain all three levels of government in order to be able to respond to the terrorist threat. We recommended a need for a national office to establish such a strategy, and we had recommendations on intelligence sharing and expressed concern about the inability, particularly of Federal agencies, to share information back and forth, and absolutely the inability to share information up and down the Federal structure with Federal, State and local people together. In the third year, 2001, we focused our attention, as we were going out of business under your statute and sunsetting after 3 years, we focused our attention for our December the 15th report in five areas: How to use the local and State responders, how to equip them, border controls, health care and the public health system, how you use the military in a domestic setting, and cyber security. This Commission was very largely established under the leadership of a Member of this House, Curt Weldon, of the State of Pennsylvania, who was very strongly leading in the establishment of the Commission, and then we were done. We were going out of business just about the time that we sent it up to the printer when the 9/11 attack occurred. There has been some discussion in opening statements of where you were. Ladies and gentlemen, I was Governor of the State of Virginia at the time the attack occurred. I was Governor of one of the two States directly attacked that day, of course New York and Virginia, because that is where the Pentagon is, and the responders were Arlington, Alexandria, Fairfax, Prince William, later Montgomery County, and then as the days wore on people from all In 2002, we did another extensive report in which we focused our attention on some directional areas, particularly with respect to the intelligence issues, the Intelligence Community. We recommended that there be an intelligence fusion center to begin to find some vehicle for drawing together and connecting the dots on the intelligence that needed to be done in order to connect the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and State and local people who pick up most of the information on the street in the first place, and to try to create all of this in one place where information could be shared. We also addressed the issue of the appropriate agency to conduct domestic counterterrorism operations here in the United States, in the homeland. That gives you a quick history, Mr. Chairman, of the Commission. It is all fully set out in the statement that we put in. Let me speak to you now very quickly as an opening statement about the upcoming report. It is still in progress. It will be under your statute on December the 15th of this year. That will be the fifth report. Then under your statutory provisions we will again go out of business and we will not exist any longer. But we will have done 5 full years of material on this, which we hope has been of value to this Congress. It has been very extensive, very dispassionate, not grandstanding, as professional as we can be, in giving you the information we believe necessary for you to make good judgments as a legislative body. This fifth report as we look ahead, as we are anticipating the end of our Commission, we have asked ourselves the questions: What should the country look like in 5 or 10 years? With all of this that we are doing now, all this legislating and all of this administrating and all of this work that is being done, and all of this money that is being spent, what do we want the country to look like? Jersey walls? Statues all over the place? Security everywhere? What do we want the end state to be? What is the definition of preparedness? We do not today still have a definition of preparedness. What is it? How do you implement an appropriate national strategy? How do you define readiness? Until you do that, how do you know what to spend the money on? How do localities know what they are supposed to do and how they are supposed to fit in? Do they simply ask for money for their own local priorities or does it fit into a national strategy. These are the kinds of questions that have to be asked. Last week, we did a 2-day meeting, Mr. Chairman, in Sacramento, where we held a normal third quarterly meeting. We will have one more last meeting, probably in Washington, D.C. The RAND Corporation staffs us pursuant to your authority. And in that meeting in Sacramento, we had video conferenced in Admiral Jim Loy of the Transportation Safety Administration, who answered the two fundamental questions that we were asking, what do you want the country to look like, and how we protect our civil freedoms here in this country while we are doing it? |