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Secretary Rumsfeld told me that day he expected another unexpected event, that that is always what brings America to its attention, and of course his words could not have been any more prophetic. Just minutes later, the Pentagon itself was attacked.

Those catastrophic terrorist events of September 11th that killed thousands of Americans exposed the vulnerability of our own country and the shortcomings of U.S. intelligence services whose mission it is to prevent such attacks.

Today, on this sad anniversary, in the midst of our war on terrorists worldwide, our questions have become more seasoned, or less raw, than they were just 2 years ago.

We are here today to ask what lessons our intelligence services have learned and how they can be applied to protect the American people from another terrorist attack. We ask what went wrong in order to make sure that we now have it right, or nearly so at least. We ask what has been done these last 2 years to make us safe against our new everyday reality that terrorists will always, have us, our children, our homeland, and our way of life in their murderous sights until they and their supporters are eradicated. We must live with that. And we know how much has been done, but today we ask can it be even better.

Many of us were stunned by the coordinated nature of the attacks, which immediately suggested training at a remarkably sophisticated level and elaborate planning on an international scale. We were also stunned by the devastating impact of these attacks. In a little more than an hour and a half on that beautiful, clear, early autumn morning, 19 hijackers successfully converted four heavily fuel-laden commercial aircraft into deadly missiles that destroyed the majestic World Trade Center in New York City. They blew a massive crater into what many thought was the impenetrable Pentagon, and they brutally took the lives of 3,000 innocent people.

That day brought the worst from heartless terrorists and the best in the American people. We still vividly recall the courageous acts of the passengers of United Flight 93 who, responding to Todd Beamer's charge, "Let's roll," attacked the terrorists who commandeered the plane.

We saw first responders, police, firefighters and emergency medical personnel in New York and Washington act with great skill and selfless dedication to protect people, to relieve suffering, and to contain its damage. As we know, many of them-too many of them-lost their own lives in this noble service to others. We have not forgotten them.

As President Bush stated on that awful day, we owe it to these victims and to all Americans to ensure that no such attack will ever occur again on our soil. The President moved quickly to provide our intelligence services with the capabilities they would need to prevent terrorism, and he established, with the leadership of the Congress, the Department of Homeland Security to develop an essential new capability to enhance our security, including promoting the integrity of the critical infrastructure on which we so heavily depend.

We won't know how far we have come without recalling where we began. The Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence

Committees recently published its declassified version of its report. The bottom line is that we did not know what we needed to know, and what we did know did not get where it was needed most when it was needed.

The Joint Inquiry produced detailed factual findings as well as a number of systemic findings. We are fortunate to have Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the Joint Inquiry, here today. She is unequaled in her ability to discuss all aspects of the Inquiry's conclusions, but since we are here to consider our progress in fighting terrorism and securing our homeland over the past 2 years, I want to highlight a half dozen of the Inquiry's systemic findings this after

noon:

First, the CIA's failure to watch list suspected terrorists aggressively.

Second, the CIA's lack of a process designed to protect the homeland from the terrorist threat.

Third, the Intelligence Community's insufficient analytical focus on al Qaeda and the insufficient quality of that analysis, particularly in terms of strategic analysis.

Fourth, the failure of the U.S. Government to bring together in one place all terrorism-related information from all sources.

Fifth, information was not sufficiently shared not only between different Intelligence Community agencies but also within individual agencies. Nor was information sufficiently shared between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities.

Sixth, while technology remains one of this Nation's greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most effectively applied in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

The report makes many additional points, of course, but I have chosen these six because each of them points to a solution the Department of Homeland Security was created to address. The Department of Homeland Security is intended to bring together and focus the efforts of 22 formerly distinct and disparate agencies across the Federal Government. All those agencies and their employees now have a single, shared, and overarching mission of preventing terrorism, protecting our Nation, our people, territory, critical infrastructure, and way of life and preparing to respond to another attack should one occur.

We now talk about State and local governments as partners, not as distant, little known, and inconvenient civic cousins. The private sector and the government now share a mission: to protect the critical infrastructure on which our dynamic economy depends. And more than ever before, we look for the answers to the otherwise intractable problems of maintaining our security to the creativity of our own private sector.

The Department is, in a sense, the hub of the wheel. It holds our entire homeland security enterprise together, focuses it and gives us strength, but we must make it still stronger. We on this committee have from the outset been pressing for full implementation of the Department's statutory mandate. The Homeland Security Act requires that there be an intelligence analytic unit in the Department, entitled by statute to receive, quote, "all reports, including information reports containing intelligence which has not been fully evaluated, assessments, and analytical information relating to

threats of terrorism against the United States." That appears in section 202.

That the purpose of this is to identify-and now I am again quoting from the statute-"and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland, detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States, and understand such threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland." That is section 201(d)(1).

But what is happening now is that the Department currently is relying upon a nonstatutory construct called the TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to serve the all-source-based analytic function. The Department is merely one of its customers. That-and I believe my colleagues on both sides of the aisle share this view-may be a useful interim approach but it is certainly no part of the Homeland Security Act nor the intent of Congress in passing it.

We must use the hard lessons of 9/11 to look forward. We all can use the factual and systemic findings of the Joint Inquiry's report as a road map, a basis for asking where we are and whether we are well on the way to where we must go. We think, for example, of two of the 9/11 terrorists slipping in and out of the United States, and, 2 years later, ask do we in fact have a single consolidated watchlist now; and if we don't, why? And where better to place that responsibility than in the Department of Homeland Security? We consider the report's finding that there were, quote, “serious problems in information sharing prior to September 11th between the Intelligence Community and relevant nonintelligence community agencies, including other Federal agencies as well as State and local authorities.

We ask 2 years on, has the culture of the Intelligence Community adapted to the information sharing requirements of the post9/11 world? Is the Department of Homeland Security receiving all the terrorism-related information to which it is entitled, regardless of its source? Is the Department getting that information to those who need it in order to protect us, wherever they are? And this committee will go on, because it is the responsibility of our committee, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, to assist the new Department in developing these capabilities. We will exercise our oversight role constructively and responsibly and effectively, because the security of the American people depend upon it.

I want to welcome again Governor Gilmore and Ms. Hill here today, and I look forward to your testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

The catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed the vulnerability of the American homeland and the shortcomings of US intelligence services whose mission it is to prevent such attacks. Today, on this sad anniversary of the "9/11" attacks, in the midst of our war on terrorists worldwide, our questions have become more seasoned, are now less raw, than they were just two years ago.

We are here today to ask what lessons our intelligence services have learned and how they can be applied to protect the American people from another terrorist attack. We ask what went wrong in order to make sure that we now have it rightor at least nearly so. We ask what has been done these last two years to make us safe against our new everyday reality: that terrorists will always, until they and their supporters are eradicated, have us, our children, our homeland, and our way

of life in their murderous sights. We must live with that. And we know much has been done, but today we ask: can it be even better?

In little more than an hour on that beautiful, clear early autumn morning, nineteen Middle Eastern hijackers successfully converted four heavily fuel laden commercial aircraft into deadly missiles that destroyed the majestic World Trade Center in New York City, that blew a massive crater into what many thought was the impenetrable Pentagon, and that brutally took the lives of 3,000 innocent people. A day that brought out the worst from heartless terrorists also brought out the best in the American people. We still recall vividly the courageous acts of the passengers of United flight 93, who responding to Todd Beamer's charge, "Let's roll," attacked the terrorists who had commandeered the plane. We saw first responders police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel-in New York and Washington act with great skill and selfless dedication to protect people, to relieve suffering, and to contain its damage. As we know, many of them-too many of them-lost their own lives in this noble service to others; we have not forgotten them.

As President Bush stated on that awful day, we owe it to these victims and to all Americans to ensure that no such attack will ever occur again on our soil. The President moved quickly to provide our intelligence services with the capabilities they would need to prevent terrorism. And he established with Congress, the Department of Homeland Security to develop an essential, new capability to enhancing our national security, including promoting the integrity of the critical infrastructure on which we so heavily depend.

We won't know how far we've come without recalling where we began. The joint inquiry of the House and Senate intelligence committees recently published its declassified version of its report. The bottom line is we did not know what we needed to know-and what we did know did not get where it was most needed when it was needed.

The joint inquiry produced detailed factual findings, as well as a number of systemic findings. We are fortunate to have Eleanor Hill, staff director of the joint inquiry, here today; she is unequalled in her ability to discuss all aspects of the inquiry's conclusions. But, since we are here to consider our progress in fighting terrorism and securing our homeland over the past two years, I want to highlight a half-dozen of the inquiry's "systemic findings" this afternoon.

1. "The CIA's failure to watchlist suspected terrorists;" [#1]

2. "[T] lack of emphasis on a process designed to protect the homeland from the terrorist threat;" [#1]

3. "Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community's understanding of al Qu'aida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of strategic analysis." [#5]

4. The failure of the U.S. Government to "bring together in one place all terrorism-related information from all sources" [#9]

5. "Information was not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies." [#9]

6. "While technology remains one of this nation's greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most effectively applied in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts." [#4]

The report makes many additional points, of course, but I have chosen these six because each of them points to a solution the Department of Homeland Security was created to address.

The Department of Homeland Security is intended to bring together and focus the efforts of 22 formerly distinct and disparate agencies from across the federal Government. All those agencies and their employees now have a single shared and overarching mission: Prevent terrorism, protect our nation our people, territory, critical infrastructure, and way of life—and prepare to respond effectively to any attack. We now talk about State and local governments as partners, not as distant, little known, and inconvenient civic cousins. The private sector and the Government now share a mission-to protect the critical infrastructure on which our dynamic economy depends. And more than ever before, we look for the answers to the otherwise intractable problems of maintaining our security to the creativity of our private sector. The Department is, in a sense, the hub of the wheel. It holds our entire, homeland security enterprise together, focuses it and gives it strength.

But we must make it still stronger. We, on this committee have, from the outset, been pressing for full implementation of the Department's statutory mandate.

The Homeland Security Act requires that there be an analytic unit in the Department entitled, by statute, to receive:

"all reports (including information reports containing intelligence which has not been fully evaluated), assessments, and analytical information relating to threats of terrorism against the United States ...," [sec. 202]

in order to

"identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland; detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States; and understand such threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland." [ 201(d)(1)]

We have, instead, been hearing that a non-statutory construct called the "TTIC"the "Terrorist Threat Integration Center"-is going to serve the all-source-based analytic function, with the Department as one of its customers. That-and I believe my colleagues on both sides of the aisle share this view-was certainly no part of the intent of Congress in passing the Homeland Security Act.

But we must use the hard lessons of "9/11" to look forward. And, while we can have mixed views of some of the recommendations of the joint inquiry, we all can use the factual and systemic findings in the joint inquiry's report as a roadmap— a basis for asking where we are and whether we are well on the way to where we must go.

We think, for example, of two of the 9/11 terrorists slipping in and out of the United States and, two years later, ask: Do we, in fact, have a single, consolidated watch-list now? And if we don't, why-and where better to place that responsibility than in the Department of Homeland Security?

We consider the Report's finding that there were "serious problems in information sharing... prior to September 11, between the Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community agencies," including other federal agencies as well as state and local authorities? [# 10]. We ask, two years on: Has the culture of the Intelligence Community adapted to the information sharing requirements of the post9/11 world? Is the Department of Homeland Security receiving all the terrorism related information to which it is entitled, regardless of its source, and is the Department getting that information to those who need it in order to protect us, wherever they are?

I yield now to the distinguished ranking member of this committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner, for his opening statement.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know as you opened your remarks discussing the events of your day on September 11th of 2001, everyone here also recalled our own experiences. And it is still hard to comprehend that we lost over 3,000 lives, the largest loss of life in a single day in the history of our country. We all remember those pictures of the Twin Towers, pictures of the Pentagon, the pictures of that gaping hole in the ground in the field in Pennsylvania, and we all remember the determination in the eyes of those firefighters and those rescue workers who went into those infernos to save people they did not know. It truly was a dreadful day in America, and I think we will all recollect that on that day each of us said to ourselves and collectively that never again would we be caught unprepared. Never again would we send some of our bravest citizens, our police, our firefighters, our emergency crews into harm's way, unable to do the basic things like communicate with one another. We said never again would we allow security gaps to be exploited by those who seek to do us harm.

We have learned a lot over the last 2 years about how vulnerable we are to terrorist acts. Our eyes clearly were opened on September 11th to the malice and the evil and the capability of our enemies, and we also have learned that that threat will not abate. We have taken important steps over the past 2 years to protect America. The men and women of our armed services and intelligence services have dismantled the Taliban regime and disrupted the senior leadership of al Qaeda. In Congress we have taken

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