those policies, to bring the benefits of international engagement to the American citizens and institutions, by helping them build strong, long term relationships with their counterparts overseas, and to advise the President and other policymakers on the way in which foreign attitudes will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. policies.

That mission is no less important now. It must be redefined, as we have done so, but no less important than it has ever been. The fact is, what foreign publics around the world-and they are now far more critical in many cases than their governments-what they think and do can help and harm Americans, their lives, their livelihoods and their well being.

There are a number of resources that USIA uses to support our foreign policy goals. International radio and television broadcasting, targeted information materials, which cut through the white noise of information overload and direct attention to American policy, educational and cultural exchange programs in cooperation with local institutions, citizen groups and nongovernmental organizations in all 50 States, assessments of foreign public opinion and its impact on U.S. foreign policy, and most important, the officers who serve our Government in USIS posts around the world.

The next chart, I would like to ask you to direct just a moment's attention to, because it gives a picture of what our embassies and our representation really looks like overseas. The top part of this chart, the part that is in orange, represents the 150 Account USIA, State and USAID. Half of that chart-and we are now talking about the people who represent us, staff our embassies around the world-represent other agencies of the government not in the 150 Account and not being discussed today: The Department of Defense; the Department of Justice, it has as many staff members around the world as USIA does, 5 percent of the total representation, Agriculture; Commerce; Transportation; the Treasury and other agencies.

These are the representation and interests overseas, and I want to come back at the very conclusion of these remarks to indicate why looking at that chart should make us pause as the Vice President did about this kind of superstructure and mass bureaucracy that we are talking about with what has been called consolidation. I want to pause just for a moment here to reflect upon the reinvention at USIA since 1993, not since November. USIA is responsible for 6 percent of the resources of the 150 Account. But, of the savings that the administration has put forth in its reinvention effort, USIA alone has accounted for 58 percent of those savings in the 150 Account. We are coming before the Congress this year with a request for $120 million less than we spent last year. Much of this is due to the consolidation of broadcasting and other efforts that have been made to reshape the bureaucracy, the offices, the programs.

We have eliminated magazines and exhibits and looked to other programs to redefine them. In fiscal year 1989, our savings were $10.4 million, 158 positions. In fiscal year 1996, $6.5 million, 75 positions. There are details on these charts of the way in which we have gone about this effort.

This is consistent with what President Clinton announced 2 years ago, a plan to reduce the Federal deficit, to make investments in areas of critical national interest in this country, health of children, education, other areas that were neglected during the cold war, and to reassess our role in the world and to build organizations and structures that can support that world in a realistic way under the present conditions.

The USIA has made these changes with, at every point, the involvement of the men and women who work for the agency, who know its work, who care about it. It is painful and difficult to do it in a humane way and to respect the contributions of people to provide for retraining, to have them involved in the effort that we have undertaken.

I feel that whole effort will be thrown off course if we are put in one vast hierarchical bureaucracy.

My final comments then relate to why a separate structure working under policy guidance from the Department of State is the most effective way to approach the question before us. This is why, I think, the Vice President came to the conclusion he did and the administration has taken this position that organizations become more effective or management becomes more effective not by simply moving boxes. It comes from organization of coherence, a clarifying of the mission, from credibility and flexibility.

So, the points I would make in arguing for a separate agency, working closely with the Department of State and other agencies here have to do first with coherence. We just looked at a chart indicating our representation around the world. Fully half of it is not in any of the organizations talked about here.

The USIA serves all of those organizations. Its purpose, when conceived by President Roosevelt, and with further reflection from President Eisenhower, and then President Kennedy, was to provide a way for the U.S. Government to speak with one voice abroad. So, this is an agency that does work and tries to represent all the constituencies and agencies of the government that represent us and work on our behalf overseas.

Second, credibility. Broadcasting information, exchange programs, other activities that USIA is engaged in, benefit in large measure from being seen as separate from official government-togovernment interactions.

Our Government seeks many objectives in its foreign policy. Sometimes it is our intention one with the other. USIA is an agency that does not have to confront every day the official governmentto-government representation that is critical to the operation of the State Department, and therefore, is able to pursue a wide range of longer term interests in a credible way.

Finally, flexibility. I have suggested that I do not think that USIA could have moved nearly as rapidly to address the concerns of the President and the Congress and the nation to this point, in terms of change, had we been involved in a large hierarchical organization. We have the ability now to meet and talk with a broad range of groups and individuals outside of formal government-togovernment channels and to work internally to deal with the challenges of reduced resources and a new mission.

In short, it seems to me that the proposal that is before us to put these separate and related institutions into one large, rather hierarchical organization, is absolutely counter to everything we know about effective institutions and management in the business and organizational world.

It would work against our effort to achieve clarity and change as we reassess and define our role in the new world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Duffey appears in the appendix.] Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Duffey. Mr. Holum.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. HOLUM, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY Mr. HOLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like my colleagues, I respectfully request that my full statement be included in the record. Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. HOLUM. Chairman Gilman, I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify today. Your support, Mr. Chairman, along with Mr. Hamilton and other members of the committee last year, in enacting the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Act of 1994 reflected a strong bipartisan commitment to a revitalized Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as the nation's lead agency for negotiating, implementing and verifying arms control agreements.

The U.S.-Soviet arms race is over, but we are just now bringing formal arms reduction agreements into force, and their implementation will take years of careful attention. Moreover, the U.S.-Soviet competition has been succeeded by the looming danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to more countries, and now to terrorists, as well, as we have seen tragically in Japan.

So, ACDA does not have a reduced workload. As the President stressed in his March 1 address to the Nixon Center in 1995, we face the most ambitious agenda to dismantle and fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction since the atom was split, including, of course, most immediately, the conference starting in just 2 weeks in New York to save the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from an uncertain future.

Certainly, the world has changed, but given the remaining dangers of Russian over-armament and the new dangers of the postcold war world, ACDA is a relic today only if nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles are only a rumor and proliferation just a bad dream. Make no mistake, the issue of ACDA's future, as with the other agencies, is a question not of form alone, but of substance. Your decision will have a profound effect on our ability to advance the nation's central goals in arms control and nonproliferation.

In light of global realities, proponents of ACDA's disappearance usually assert that they want to serve the same causes, only better. But, whatever the intent, the actual inescapable effect would be to drastically undercut these missions.

It has been said, for example, that if ACDA is folded into the State Department, nonproliferation will be the responsibility of an Under Secretary of State, reporting directly to the Secretary, so it will get the attention it deserves. In fact, the ACDA Director already reports directly to the Secretary of State.

In contrast, under the plan advanced by Senator Helms, for example, arms control and nonproliferation would be assigned to an Assistant Secretary of State, 1 of 20, three layers down from the Secretary, and would compete for even the Under Secretary's attention with such matters as humanitarian assistance, refugees, migration, international narcotics and political-military relationships. Moreover, while reporting directly to the Secretary of State, the ACDA Director today also reports directly to the President of the United States; it is that access, carrying with it the role of a full participant in the interagency process, where decisions are made and policy decided, that ensures that these issues truly receive high level attention.

The Helms' plan would cutoff that reporting line to the President and expel ACDA from the interagency process. ACDA brings to that table first the depth and concentration of expertise not found elsewhere. Arms control is usually highly technical. Quite literally, it often is rocket science.

Like the U.S. trade representative, we use diplomatic methods, but in a highly specialized realm, applying not only negotiating ability but scientific expertise, specialized legal knowledge, and well honed intelligence and verification skills to a precise, well defined mission.

ACDA also brings to the table an unconflicted perspective for arms control and nonproliferation. That distinct viewpoint, I submit, is even more important now than during the cold war. When arms control was the dominant element of our relations with the Soviet Union, there was little risk it would be overlooked. Now, however, we are more often confronted with the question whether to press nonproliferation standards with scores of countries, virtually all of which the United States has many important issues at stake besides arms control.

In 1992, the Inspector General cited one such case relating to Pakistan's nuclear program as an example of why ACDA should not be eliminated, but retained and revitalized. In 1994, based on experience in Iraq, the Congress decided that ACDA should have a larger role in reviewing export licenses to reduce the likelihood that commercial or country relations considerations would overrule nonproliferation concerns.

Now, if ACDA's functions were made the portfolio of an Assistant Secretary of State, its interagency voice silenced, and its arms control voice muffled in a larger institution, the unavoidable result would be to de-emphasize and subordinate arms control and nonproliferation to other concerns, just when those issues need a strong voice more than ever before.

Another side to ACDA's role requires emphasis. Notwithstanding ACDA's distinct input as policy is decided, we are part of the Secretary of State's team and operate under his foreign policy guidance. We are housed in the Department of State. Once our internal policy deliberations are completed, the United States speaks with one voice. We work closely with the Department of State and are further integrating our operations, both in administration and substance, while protecting independence where it has a purpose.

ACDA is already a small, lean agency. We have just 250 employees and a core budget of $45 million. In constant dollars, that is

the same as it was in 1966, but in that same 30 year timeframe, ACDA's missions have grown by more than five times. As set forth in my statement, further streamlining, consolidation and removal of unnecessary duplication is continuing under the Vice President's National Performance Review. That process will give taxpayers value for their money by producing less hierarchical, more efficient government.

In contrast, legislatively imposing a one size fits all mega-bureaucracy would embrace the dubious premise that as things grow bigger, they become more efficient. Indeed, it would contradict the basic principles of streamlining by increasing red tape, adding bureaucratic layers and muddling missions. It would not be simply moving boxes, but a substantive decision to deemphasize arms control and nonproliferation in a dangerous world.

I would urge the committee to support a strong, separate streamlined and effective agency to pursue one of the nation's most urgent post-cold war missions. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holum appears in the appendix.] Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Holum.

I want to thank our panelists for their review of what they have been doing and what their recommendations are. It certainly will be important as our committee reviews potential reorganization

measures.

Secretary Moose, within the State's large Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, the PM Bureau, was a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Control within the Bureau for Nuclear Energy Affairs, Regional Non-Proliferation, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Missile Non-Proliferation, Defense trade controls, Export Control Policies, Strategic Policy Negotiations and Arms Control and Implementation.

The State's regional bureaus also handle arms control and nonproliferation issues. Can you tell us how many people in State are responsible for arms control and nonproliferation issues, and does this somewhat overlap with the Arms Control Agency?

Mr. Moose. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the overall number of persons involved with arms control, nonproliferation issues in the Department is about 120 or so out of the 120, 150 or so out of the total of approximately 265 persons in the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs.

Now, in addition, outside the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, in the regional bureaus to which you referred, I do not have a precise number on that, but I would imagine that there are another perhaps 20 or 30 persons outside the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs who are addressing, in one way or another, with some part of their time, arms control and nonproliferation issues. Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Moose, I would appreciate it if you could provide that information to us for the record, and it will be made part of the record at that time.

Mr. MOOSE. I will certainly do that, Mr. Chairman. [The information follows:]

There is only minimal duplication of effort between State and ACDA personnel working on arms control and nonproliferation. Within the bureau of Politico-Military