15. ACDA indicated that since its creation it has been involved in a total of 53 arms control and non-proliferation missions concerning negotiations. Of these efforts, ACDA has been the lead agency in 23 missions, State or another agency has been the lead agency in 23, and ACDA has shared the lead with another agency (usually State) in 7. ACDA currently is involved in 28 open-ended missions, of which it is the lead agency on 13 and shares the lead on 1, while another agency is the lead agency for 14. These include such missions as negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations in the multilateral Conference on Disarmament, planning for a Conventional Forces in Europe review conference, and planning for a START III agreement.
Given that ACDA historically has been the lead agency for about half of the ongoing arms control and nonproliferation missions, how will the distribution for leadership on these missions be impacted by consolidating ACDA into the State Department?
What levels of the ACDA work force would need to be
transferred to State to ensure continuity in performing
these missions?
Does State currently possess the staffing levels and
expertise necessary to perform these missions?
State does not currently possess the personnel or program resources necessary to assume responsibility for each of the arms control efforts led currently by ACDA. We have not estimated precisely what resources would be necessary to adequately staff these functions. As mentioned previously, we believe such a mandated consolidation would deliver worse outcomes for the U.S. when compared to the option of enhanced team work between streamlined and reinvented agencies working under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.
ELIMINATION OF EXCHANGE PROGRAM DUPLICATION
IF USIA OR STATE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEEING THE
GOVERNMENT'S EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, TO WHAT EXTENT COULD
ADMINISTRATIVE OR PROGRAM DUPLICATION BE ELIMINATED?
WHAT ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY WOULD USIA OR ANOTHER ORGANIZATION
NEED TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN CONTROLLING DUPLICATION?
WHAT FORM SHOULD THIS ROLE TAKE (ACTUAL ADMINISTRATION OF
THE PROGRAMS VS. OVERSIGHT TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL
DUPLICATION)?
USIA estimates that about one-third of the exchanges and training programs conducted by the U.S. government share similar objectives and are at least potentially duplicative. Funding related to these programs is estimated at about $400 million. If USIA were made responsible for overseeing the government's exchanges and training programs, with a mandate to determine where and how these programs can best be managed, duplication could be largely eliminated among this one-third of exchange and training and training programs with similar objectives.
Reducing and controlling duplication in U.S. government
international exchanges and training would require improved
coordination mechanisms to carry out the coordination
function currently assigned to USIA. Better coordination of
exchange and training programs throughout the U.S.
Government is currently being studied by the National
Performance Review. Pending the results of that review, we
believe a structure is required to bring federal agencies
together for coordination and analysis of U.S. Government
funded international exchange and training programs.
heart of this structure would be a working level interagency
staff to provide the planning and coordination necessary to
ensure that exchanges are consistent with U.S. foreign
policy and national security interests and, to the extent
possible, to avoid duplication. This staff would also be
responsible for the collection, analysis and distribution of
exchange program information.
SHARED ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES USIA USE STATE DEPARTMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT ITS REQUIREMENTS?
USIA is dependent upon the State Department's Diplomatic
Telecommunications System for the transmission of official
In addition, USIA has a substantial and growing dependence
upon the new State Department Black Packet Switch BPS/X.25
telecommunications network for data transmission, electronic
mail and remote processing. This system is being
implemented under the auspices of the Diplomatic
Telecommunications System - Program Office (DTS-PO).
Presently, 40 USIS posts have access to the BPS/X.25 network
with posts being added at the rate of four to five per
month. When the BPS/X.25 network is fully implemented, USIA
anticipates that all USIS posts will have access to the
network. Future USIA use of the BPS/X.25 network is
contingent upon its ability to adequately support the data
transmission needs of USIA. We have increasing serious
concerns about the performance and reliability of the
current DTS-PO BPS/X.25 network; and concerns that the
bandwidth installed in current and projected installations
will not support our needs.
SHARED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
COULD/SHOULD A COMMON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT ALL
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES IN THEIR COMMUNICATIONS WITH
OVERSEAS POSTS?
Yes. There are obvious advantages of pooling requirements
to drive down costs. But just as importantly, we should be
working toward a totally integrated communications
environment at overseas missions that easily facilitates
interagency work within an embassy.
At the same time, we believe that there should be two
distinct and separate networks: classified and
unclassified. It is increasingly clear that it is not cost-
effective to merge the two networks. USIA believes the
classified network should be supplied to all foreign affairs
agencies by a common provider. And, USIA is willing to
accept unclassified service from a common unclassified
system if it can meet our operational requirements.
When a common system cannot meet those needs, or is not
cost-effective, USIA should be given the flexibility and
resources to implement its own unclassified network, or go
to another government provider (e.g. DOD). USIA's
unclassified communications requirements puts it ahead of
many of the other foreign affairs agencies in seeking cost-
effective state-of-the-art telecommunications links (e.g.,
for connecting our Local Area Networks into a virtual
worldwide wide area network, video conferencing, multi-
media, etc.). These requirements are central to USIA's
mission. Because of this, and given the necessary
resources, USIA would be willing to take the lead in
developing sources for unclassified telecommunication
services to the entire diplomatic community.
USIA SUGGESTIONS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
IF CURRENT STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMS DO NOT MEET USIA'S
NEEDS, HOW DOES USIA SUGGEST THAT THE SYSTEMS BE CHANGED?
We have serious concerns about the performance and
reliability of the current telecomminications network for
data transmission, electronic mail and remote processing
(DTS-PO BPS/X.25 network); and concerns that the bandwidth
installed in current and projected installations will not
support our needs.
DTS-PO claims that current resources will not allow them to
offer expanded services free, and they expect the customer
agencies to cover the additional costs. For example, DTS-PO
has told us that it will cost USIA on average an additional
$100,000 annually per site to expand the bandwidth to our
desired requirement (i.e., 64Kb). Projected worldwide to
all USIS sites, that would total more than $20 million
annually. In USIA's current budget situation, it would be
impossible for us to cover those kinds of costs from our
limited resources. If there is to be a common service
provider for the foreign affairs community, that
organization should be fully funded to provide the necessary
services.
However, we believe that there are other technical solutions
available that would provide expanded service at the same or
even lower costs. The global telecommunications market is
changing very rapidly. New technologies are developing
quickly, and costs are dropping. As a result, several
months ago we initiated a preliminary analytical study of
the availability of alternate sources of service and costs
to meet USIA's current and future data telecommunications
requirements. Although the study is not complete yet,
early results look promising. They appear to confirm our
initial hypothesis that these types of services are
available from the commercial arena at substantially lower
cost than projected by DTS-PO. We plan to complete the
study in the next few weeks, and then discuss our findings
with DTS-PO and colleagues on the other foreign affairs
agencies.
UNCLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT OPERATE ITS OWN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
NETWORKS FOR UNCLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS, AND IF NOT, WHY?
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN NETWORKS BE PRIVATIZED?
USIA does not have a preference between government
owned/operated and privatized service. (NOTE: This assumes
privatized means owned, operated and maintained by the
private sector.) USIA's concern is that adequate resources
are available to accomplish its mission. Most of DTS-PO's
circuits currently are provided by private vendors.
It may make sense to explore the feasibility of awarding an
umbrella contract to one vendor covering design,
implementation, and management of a consolidated network.
Competition may drive the costs down, and if the vendor
knows he will have to recompete on a regular basis there
would be motivation to maintain quality service. Such a
contract should have strong incentives to keep current with
advances in technology.
PRIVATE VENDOR FOR UNCLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN/SHOULD THE STATE DEPARTMENT MEET THE
OVERSEAS SYSTEM? TO WHAT EXTENT CAN/SHOULD UNCLASSIFIED
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE BE PROVIDED BY A PRIVATE VENDOR
USIA recognizes the State Department's past and current role as a major provider of telecommunications services in the diplomatic community. USIA anticipates a continuation of this relationship only if State can provide a dynamic and flexible environment that can accommodate USIA's ever changing and increasing requirements. If State is unable to fulfill these requirements, the function should be shifted directly to USIA or an appropriate source(s) that can adequately perform the task.
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