Affairs there are 107 professional and clerical positions involved in nonproliferation and arms control functions.

In regional bureaus within the Department, there are four political military officer positions involved in the more general PM functions and are assigned to the country desks within the bureaus. In EUR, there are 14 political military positions involved in PM issues, all in RPM (European Security and Political Affairs)."

Chairman GILMAN. Do you feel there is some overlapping?

Mr. MOOSE. Yes, there is some overlapping, and I think not all overlapping is bad. It is rather like cholesterol. Some cholesterol is good and some cholesterol is bad.

Chairman GILMAN. Most of it is bad. [Laughter.]

Mr. Moose. Well, certainly that is true, but I think there are some other ones in there that do good things. Now, I am not a big one for arguing the virtues of creative tension, because I think that is often a rationale invoked to obscure conflict. But, in fact, these matters of arms control nonproliferation are among the most complex that we deal with in the Department.

They do not lend themselves to clear cut objective judgments. I think there is good to be said for having on occasion countervailing expertise brought to bear on the same subjects. There can be legitimacy in more than one perspective on a given issue.

So, I think some overlap is justifiable, but I think the duplication of functions, where there is no value added, certainly ought to be eliminated. We have this area under intensive review. It is one that the Vice President specifically identified in his press release as being one that needed further examination, and that is ongoing precisely to eliminate the needless and nonproductive overlap. Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Director Holum, how do you feel about that overlapping?

Mr. HOLUM. Well, one thing that strikes me, and I will echo what Secretary Moose said about the ongoing process to examine this, we are coming to terms with it, but I am struck in this current period by the size of the mission we have, particularly in the nonproliferation area, where we are routinely now, after the cold war, given the availability of technology around the world, addressing proliferation concerns on a routine basis, where they used to be the exception.

So, I tend to think that as we confront those missions with shrinking or static resources, that we can use all the people that we can get. Where they sit may be adjustable.

In addition to that, I think the Secretary of State, because ACDA has an independent policy voice in the interagency process, should and would want to have a small core of experts to advise him independently from ACDA's advice on these issues, so he can bring the State Department perspective to bear.

Chairman GILMAN. ACDA could not supply that kind of advice to the Secretary?

Mr. HOLUM. Well, ACDA, in fact, does a great deal of that. We are not talking about a large number of people. It is more a sounding board that he maintains, a core of expertise, rather than comprehensive expertise.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Duffey, according to your agency, our Government has no less than $2 billion in exchange and training programs in 63 dif ferent Federal agencies. Can you tell us what is being done to end

the duplication and overlap in 63 agencies that run their own exchange programs? If USIA or State were responsible for overseeing the government's exchange programs, to what extent could administrative or program duplication be eliminated?

Dr. DUFFEY. Mr. Chairman, that inventory of programs is something USIA was charged by the Congress to prepare, and it does indicate a very significant growth in recent years. One of the reasons for that, and actually, as I have thought about it, it heartens me, because it shows that the exchange activities which USIA has been engaged for more than 40 years, are now being recognized as extremely important. It is through exchanges and training that we encourage new, independent and open economies around the world. The exchange mechanism appears to be a way of assistance that is, in many cases, more effective than other things we do.

We have proposed to the Vice President's office some considerations that have to do with savings that could be achieved through consolidating some of those exchanges and also eliminating duplication. I believe the Vice President's office is pursuing now an analysis, and will bring to the Congress some proposals as to how that might be achieved.

Proliferation has been very rapid in the last half decade, and we need now, I think, to consolidate both for cost, but also for some programs that duplicate each other.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. My time has run, but just one other question.

Brian Atwood, when USAID was established initially, our Nation provided 60 percent of the world's development assistance. We built up an extensive overseas staff.

Today our Nation provides about 20 percent of the world's development assistance, and the USAID staff does very little hands on implementation. Instead, USAID overseas the work of contractors who do the actual implementation.

These changes would seem to argue for substantial reform in the numbers of our USAID posts abroad. Since USAID is primarily acting as a broker of U.S. funds, why should not the Congress take the additional step of consolidating the agency, to make certain that the projects directly support our foreign policy?

Mr. ATWOOD. You are absolutely correct in suggesting that we have managed through good donor coordination to convince other countries to come into this business. We now only provide about 17 percent of all of the Official Development Assistance in the world. That is why we are reducing our staff. That is why we have reduced our senior staff by 25 percent, why our goal, over the next year, is to reduce our overall staff by 25 percent. We have already reduced by 1,200. We are going to reduce by another 830.

We have announced the closing of 26, 27 of our missions overseas. We fully intend to work our way out of a job in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, perhaps more quickly than some other places. We intend in the future to be letting Congress know exactly how long we expect to stay in a country. We may have to adjust that, based on the development progress being made, but we do intend to reduce responsibly.

But our field missions are still vitally important vehicles for our leadership. We do not use those field missions just to aid other

countries. We use them to leverage money from other countries. We are the only development agency in the world that has these kinds of field missions. Even the World Bank, with all of the money that it handles, has representatives scattered around the world, but essentially, they send people in on a short-term basis to try to find out what is happening in a country. I think that we do inform the development process more than any other development agency in the world.

If I had to take the reductions, I frankly would rather see them taken in programs than in our field presence, because the relationships we establish with the people of the country and the governments enable us to make much more sense out of what we do over

seas.

So, we are reducing. I think we are reducing in a responsible way, and we do not want to lose the leverage we have over other governments.

Chairman GILMAN. I might note that even under your current plan, the reduction, you will still be employing over 5,000 in 50 some overseas posts, is that correct?

Mr. ATWOOD. I am not sure about your numbers, Mr. Chairman. In the Bush administration, 27 months ago, the Agency had 11,600 employees. We now have 9,400. I am not sure what numbers you are using.

We are counting our entire workforce, not just the direct hire Americans. We are also including the personal services contractors that work directly with us as employees.

Chairman GILMAN. I think the 5,000 came from the direct hires category.

Mr. ATWOOD. The direct hire total is a little less than 3,000.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Duffey, it is my understanding that USIA, whose fiscal year 1995 enacted appropriation represents roughly 6 percent of the so-called Function 150 international affairs account, nevertheless, provided approximately 58 percent of the savings claimed by the administration, as a result of reinventing government initiative.

How would the proposed consolidation into the State Department affect your reinvention efforts?

Dr. DUFFEY. We have approached reinventing the way Vice President Gore has described it. That is, you involve the men and women who have the expertise and specialty to do the work, who show a seriousness about reductions. You do it in the effort to redefine the national interest, to shift your programs.

I brought with me today and the chairman has some copies, a publication called Trade with America, published in about six or seven languages. It was marginal to USIA's activity 5 or 6 years ago. President Clinton has said that the strengthening of our own economy, jobs and investments is an important priority. USIA has moved its programs in that direction.

I believe that this kind of effort in which we are still engaged at every level of the agency, which involves looking at what the work place looks like, looking at opportunities for retraining for employees, working on the removal of mid level managers and the configuration of offices, are the kind of thing that simply could not con

tinue would really be hampered-I should not say could not continue, but would certainly be very hampered in a large kind of superstructure.

Mr. WYNN. Who is the division reporting to, or having to report to?

Dr. DUFFEY. Well, I am now directly accountable to the Secretary of State and to the President, and I believe USIA's record for working with the administration is better now than it may have been at any time in the past.

But, we are able to pursue questions like the definition of our mission and reorganization of our work much more efficiently, I believe, in the present structure.

Mr. WYNN. Under a Helms like structure, how do you envision it would operate?

Dr. DUFFEY. Well, I think we would be choked, as any very large bureaucracy is with the very size, the number of clearances and procedures, the size of meetings.

Mr. WYNN. How many people would be between you and the Secretary of State?

Dr. DUFFEY. Well, the Under Secretaries report directly to the Secretary, but I report directly to the Secretary now. I think it is a question of a horizontal line or a vertical line.

But, my relations with the Secretary now have to do with policy, cooperation. They do not have to do with a hierarchy with structural questions that come up day after day about organization.

Mr. WYNN. OK. Mr. Atwood, one of your statements, I believe, was something to the effect that you were very proud of the measurable results that you had attained, and this was one of the rationales that you gave for believing you ought to retain your independence.

Could you talk about two things? One, some specific measurable results that you would cite to defend your agency's independence, and second, if you believe that there is a fundamental incompatibility working with the State Department, what would that be?

Mr. ATWOOD. Let me take the second question first. I do not think there is an incompatibility. This is an administration that does feel that development is a very important part of our foreign policy, as did the last administration. So, it is not a question of being incompatible.

What I was suggesting was that the Department's mission is different from that of the Agency for International Development, in the sense that its mission is basically good diplomatic relations, negotiating, handling crisis situations.

Ours is a more programmatic mission. We manage programs. They have ongoing, permanent relationships with foreign governments. While our relationships are not intended to be permanent and have specific goals and objectives. So there is a fundamental difference between us. It seems to me that the thing works very well the way it is, whereby we operate under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State, as Dr. Duffey has indicated. We meet with him frequently, three scheduled meetings a week. Now we are having an additional meeting for the 150 Account agencies, where we discuss particular problems that we all have, and we lis

ten to the Secretary of State, so that we understand what his foreign policy priorities are.

So it is not incompatible, it is just that there are different missions. We are under that foreign affairs umbrella.

What we are trying to do in establishing a results orientation at the Agency is to create the systems that will enable us to measure those results and to use indicators to measure progress toward achieving them. We have done this very well in the population area. We look at such issues as contraceptive prevalence and fertility rates and the like.

We are trying to do it in the more subjective areas like democracy. How do you actually know whether you have made progress in the democracy field? How do you know whether you made progress in the economic growth field?

You asked me what we have done. In places like Egypt, for example, where we have had ample amounts of money to spend, we have had a 50 percent drop in the infant mortality rate. Eighty thousand children are saved each year as a result of our programs. Fertility rates have gone from six to four. There has been a 50 percent increase in agricultural productivity. Twenty-three million Egyptians have access to clean water, and 1 million Egyptian children are enrolled in schools that USAID constructed.

Now, that is a program where we spend a lot of money. But, I will tell you today that if we had not been investing that money in Egypt in the last 20 years, Egypt today might be another Algeria or another Iran. It has been a good investment in development and in peace.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. WYNN. I would like to ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Atwood submit that kind of data on some of his other specificChairman GILMAN. Without objection.

[The report appears in the appendix.]

Mr. WYNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Let me first of all say that in a conversation on Friday that I had with President Clinton with Ambassador Albright and Tony Lake, Mr. Talbott and Brian Atwood and others who were there, the President made it very clear that he certainly supports these three agencies remaining separate.

I am curious and I might ask if I have time about the Times calling the plan the Christopher-Helms' plan. I just would like to maybe ask about the Christopher part.

But, let me just ask Mr. Atwood real quickly, Mr. Atwood, would you tell me, in presenting his reorganization proposal, Senator Helms claimed that USAID's somewhat autonomous status has prevented the United States from assuring that our foreign policy assistance programs are representative and responsive to the evolving U.S. policy and interest in post-cold war era.

Could you quickly respond to Senator Helms' criticism, that you are out of touch with our goals? I got three questions in about 5 minutes.

Mr. ATWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I do not know quite what he means, and I did not hear in the hearings that we had at the Foreign Relations Committee any examples of our not being re