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THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, DC. 2045I

MAY 5 1995

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on April 4, 1995, before your Committee on International Relations on the need for an independent U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the post-Cold War world era. Enclosed are answers to questions you submitted following the hearing as well as the edited transcript.

As you know, ACDA's mission is to strengthen U.S. national security by advocating, formulating, negotiating, implementing and verifying sound arms control and nonproliferation policies and agreements.

An independent Agency is essential to U.S. national security interests in the postCold War era. ACDA has one mission: the arms control and nonproliferation perspective. An independent ACDA is the best way to assure that unconflicted arms control viewpoints, which at times compete and even conflict with other foreign and national security perspectives, will be presented in the policy-making process at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.

Over the past third of a century, ACDA has developed a unique, specialized expertise needed for arms control advice, negotiations, implementations, compliance and verification -- all maintained by a core budget of $45 million that is the same today in constant dollars as it was in 1966.

ACDA is the U.S. Government's institutional memory for all arms control activities as stipulated in the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994. ACDA provides the historical reporting of U.S. arms control decisions, studies, negotiating records, compliance history, verification requirements and implementation activities.

The Honorable

Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman

Committee on International Relations

U.S. House of Representatives

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Additionally, ACDA also has the statutory responsibility to ensure the verification and compliance of all arms control agreements. It is responsible for developing verification requirements during arms control negotiations and ensuring compliance. ACDA serves as the arms control watchdog for verification and compliance -- assessing the performance of our arms control treaty partners and reporting our findings to Congress. Without an independent arms control agency, verification and compliance would become secondary considerations for any other foreign affairs or national security agency.

For more than 30 years, every President since Eisenhower has recognized that if the United States wants to pursue arms control, an independent, specialized, unconflicted agency is the way to do it. An independent ACDA ensures that strong arms control policy, implementation, enforcement and compliance judgements are given full voice within our government and not buried in other institutions with competing responsibilities.

As I indicated in my testimony, export controls are a case in point for having a vigorous, independent arms control and nonproliferation agency. The Congress has long been concerned with the effectiveness of U.S. and international nuclear, chemical and missile export control policies and regimes.

In the past, ACDA's role in this area was limited until a bi-partisan Congress addressed this concern specifically in the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994, mandating an enhanced ACDA role in U.S. export control licensing and policy. In addition to nuclear-related dual-use exports, ACDA's present role encompasses missile and chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation, and broader dual-use export control policy activities. I should point out though that we do not always persuade a majority; nor do we have a veto. However, ACDA's independent status does ensure that arms control and nonproliferation concerns receive due consideration in the arms control and technology export policy deliberations at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.

ACDA's missions have grown considerably while its core budget has remained the same in nominal dollars over the past 5 years. As a result, our core budget request for FY 96 is 10% less than our FY 93 appropriation. ACDA remains small and lean as our mission continues to grow. As a result, we remain firmly opposed to the merger and elimination provisions of H.R. 1561.

I look forward to working closely with you on the crucial and important arms control and nonproliferation issues challenging us during the 104th Congress. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

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Q1.

Al.

ACDA's report on compliance agreements is the only exercise that looks at how well countries comply with their arms control agreements, according to ACDA officials. According to DOD officials, DOD contributes the majority of the collection and technical support for verification efforts.

How does ACDA coordinate with, and prevent against duplication of DoD's effort for ensuring that the United States complies with its arms control commitments?

Section 51 of the ACDA Act mandates, as part of the ACDA Annual Report, that ACDA address questions of U.S. compliance with its arms control obligations. The compliance portions of the ACDA Annual Report, including the U.S. compliance sections, are coordinated through an interagency group, the Verification and Compliance Analysis Working Group (VCAWG). The VCAWG is chaired by the ACDA Bureau of Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support, and includes representatives from DOD and other relevant national security agencies. ACDA does not duplicate the internal DOD process (described in previous and forthcoming ACDA Annual Reports), but rather addresses, in coordination with DoD and other agencies, questions of U.S. compliance as required by law. Consistent with the law's purposes, the internal DoD process and the ACDA report on compliance with arms control agreements provides Congress, the rest of the USG, and our international treaty partners with a higher degree of confidence that the United States has and will continue to set

the highest standard of practicing scrupulous compliance with arms control obligations.

Q2.

A2.

ACDA's staffing pattern as of April 1, 1995 includes 38 GS-15s, 33 GS-14s, 29
GS-13s, 24 GS-12s and 10 GS-11s, for a total of 134 FTEs out of 251 FTEs, or
about 53 percent. ACDA'S Senior Executive Service is represented by 24 SES
FTEs, 8 EX FTEs, and 3 ST FTEs for a total of 35 senior level staff.

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What accounts for the large number of high-graded staff at ACDA?

ACDA is a specialized Agency requiring a high level of professional and technical skills. Over 50% of our employees have advanced degrees and 70% have college degrees or higher.

ACDA has relatively high grade structure compared to that in United States Government agencies across the board, but not when measured to other comparable components of national security policy agencies that deal with the same or similar

substantive areas.

Q3.

A3.

The largest concentrations of ACDA staff positions fall under the categories of Foreign Affairs Specialist (53), Secretary (34), Physical Scientist (15), Attorney Advisor (9), Computer Specialist (9), and Consultants and Experts (7). In comparison, the State Department's Bureau of Political Military Affairs has at least 35 Foreign Affairs Officer and 25 Political Military Affairs Officer in arms control and nonproliferation-related offices.

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How are the responsibilities and skills of the ACDA positions different from those of State and how are they similar?

How do ACDA and the State Department ensure that there is not unnecessary duplication between the functions of its Foreign Affairs Specialists and State's Foreign Affairs Officers and Political Military Affairs Officers who are responsible for arms control, nonproliferation, and export controls functions?

Though the titles of some ACDA and State staff positions are similar, others have concrete distinctions between ACDA and State. ACDA's only mission is arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament. State's mission is multi-faceted with arms control and nonproliferation considerations being balanced with many other foreign policy concerns such as human rights, economics, developmental concerns, refugees, etc.

Both formal and informal interagency coordination assists to ensure that unnecessary duplication between State/PM and ACDA is avoided and/or eliminated.

Most recently, the NPR concluded that ACDA is vital and that unnecessary duplication between State and ACDA is to be eliminated.

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