by the FRAPH organization, and of course, the ship turned around and came back. Later, some weeks later, we found out that FRAPH was an organization that was sponsored and supported by our intelligence agency, CIA. It seems that there might have been a little lack of coordination if, in fact, we are bringing in people to help build some roads in another organization that we seem to have a relationship with, and evidently knew that this demonstration was going to occur with a handful of people on the docks. By the intelligence agency, I guess, not telling the ship that they were going to be out there and do not pay much attention to them, or at least tell them not to do it that day, it seems that there is a lack of coordination currently in some of those activities. But, to address Mr. Helms' proposal, how do you get a greater coherence? You were talking about, you do not have a plan, but you do have a process to do that. Could you, maybe in the half a minute I have left, try to clarify that for me? Mr. Moose. Well, I think, Mr. Payne, that you referred to the multiplicity of agencies that are interested in expanding trade, for example. Here we have, I think, an interesting case. It is not entirely clear to us what the proposal referred to by Senator Helms would require of the trade agencies. But, the fact of the matter is that the promotion of foreign trade is one of the more successful activities that is going on at the moment in our Government. It has been highly successful. We have never had such a successful trade promotion program as we have today, and there are quite a number of different agencies contributing to that. You mentioned some of them, and they achieve a very high degree of coordination through something called the Trade Policy Coordinating Council. That group achieves an effect there using the multiple programs and authorities of the various agencies in a very creative and skillful way. I, for one, think we should take that as an example of something that works well, is not broken, and therefore, it does not need to be fixed. I think the same will apply to a number of the other areas of the foreign affairs area, in which what is really required is a kind of collaboration and interaction that takes place between Secretary Christopher and these gentlemen over here to my left. Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you know, when I was first elected in 1980, I will never forget, the day after my election, the newspapers carried, in one of the largest newspapers, a very big headline that Smith will be a one-termer. Sure enough, I ran against the president of the New Jersey State Senate that year, the following year, who gerrymandered a district just for himself. It reminds me, and I remember thinking this at the time, that nothing focuses the attention so wonderfully as the knowledge of one's own impending execution. I say that somewhat tongue in cheek to the very distinguished witnesses that we have today, because we have had three hearings so far, Mr. Chairman. On February 7, we heard from Mr. Moose, on February 23, from Mr. Holum, and USIA, Dr. Duffey on March 1. Frankly, I was very impressed that even then, and now I think now in a more accelerated way, inside each of their respective agencies, they have tried to accelerate the pace of reform, knowing that there is a very significant and credible threat of consolidation. Threat or reform, depending on how one looks at it. So, good may come out of this, regardless of what happens during this process, and I say that being a very firm believer in the work that these gentlemen do. Mr. Holum, you in your testimony, somewhat today, but even in a more expanded version before our subcommittee, made a number of very significant points about ACDA. You pointed out that we are in a period of time of harvest, that with all of those conventions and treaties that have been negotiated painstakingly over the many years, that now is the time when the rubber meets the road, so to speak, and it was time to implement and to do so with an expertise that could not just be taken off the shelf somewhere. You made the point that 1995 is our one chance to safeguard the NPT for all time. Then, you obviously made the point repeatedly in your testimony about the importance of this harvest. What threat or what benefit do you see might come from a consolidation that would put ACDA under State? What would happen to some of those people that have considerable experience, and again, you know, the institutional memory potentially could be lost. Do you see this as a threat? Matter of fact, you made another point, and I think ACDA sometimes does not make its own case sometimes on the Hill perhaps, persuasively, as it can. Maybe you are too busy doing the work that you are supposed to do. But, you made the point that arms control is a national security bargain, and that for pennies, vis-a-vis the Pentagon's budget, if this is done correctly, with the right type of expertise, a tremendous amount of fruit could be gleaned. Mr. HOLUM. Thank you very much, Congressman Smith. I appreciated the opportunity to testify on February 23, and I am happy to be here again today. The point you made about the resources involved in ACDA, I think, is an important one. Our entire budget, operating budget, is equivalent to the unit cost of a single F-15E aircraft. We are talking in the range of $45 million a year. Part of the difficulty we have is getting noticed, in terms of the sheer numbers that Congress is dealing with. I think that the problem of moving ACDA into the State Department, in terms of the effect on our mission would be twofold. One, as I have emphasized in my statement, it would be that the independent voice in the policy process that elevates arms control and nonproliferation issues to a high degree of attention would be seriously diminished. That, inevitably, the arms control and nonproliferation considerations would be subordinated to the other broader concerns that the Department of State has to deal with, including country relations. One of my colleagues said that he would not go behind the Secretary of State's back to the President. I agree with that. I would not go behind the Secretary of State's back to the President, but I do have the right to go to the President when we disagree. That fact makes ACDA a part of the policy process, a distinct part of the policy process, at every level of deliberations as national decisions and policies are being determined. If we are put in the State Department, that voice would be silenced. The other thing that I think would be very harmful would be that we would inevitably dismember the technical skills that form the unit that makes up ACDA. For example, we have about a dozen lawyers in ACDA who are probably the premiere experts in the country on the negotiating history of the arms control agreements that we are now seeking to implement, and who provide the legal advice for all arms control delegations in continuing negotiations. Now, I do not know where they would go, since there is no specific proposal on the table, but if those lawyers were put in the legal advisor's office in the State Department, would that concentrated knowledge and expertise be preserved, or would they be assigned to other things, and gradually lose that sharp focus and expertise? In the case of verification, again, we do not know the specifics. But, you referred to the arms control harvest. It is an enormous undertaking. Many people think that once you have signed a treaty, that the work is over with. START requires, for example, elimination of many SS-18 missiles in the former Soviet Union, but we are just starting to reap the benefits of that Treaty, of the START Treaty, and we still have to ratify START II and implement it. The people who negotiated that treaty are also necessary for its verification and implementation, which also involves intense negotiations for matters left unresolved, for disputes that arise during the course of implementation. Would you put intelligence people in the Intelligence Community, would you put the negotiators somewhere else, and therefore break up the set of experts, the synergies that work between those groups of people and scatter them in a different bureaucracy? I think there is a very great risk that we would do this work at greater cost and less well. Mr. SMITH. I see my time is up. Thank you very much. Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time is expired. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Johnston. Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Atwood, in your testimony, you stated that there were, what, 26 missions closed in the past 2 years? Mr. ATWOOD. We have announced the closure of 27. We have identified 21 and all of those will be closed by the end of fiscal year 1996. I think a dozen of those have been closed. Mr. JOHNSTON. Nine of those were in Africa, were they not? Mr. JOHNSTON. Do you anticipate closing any more missions in Africa? Mr. ATWOOD. In the six, we have identified three additional very small missions in Africa, but we have not announced them publicly. Mr. JOHNSTON. I am sorry Congressman Kim is not here. He kind of lectured the Secretary of State last week on the fact that even though the State Department's budget was 1.3 percent of the additional budget, that additional cuts need to be made. Congressman Kim is a Korean-American. Now, if this is not a leading question, I do not know what would be. Do you have any information regarding the correlation between foreign aid and the subsequent benefits to the United States in the form of exports or other monies, Mr. Atwood? Could you give a specific example? Mr. ATWOOD. Korea is a wonderful success story for the foreign aid program, as you know, Mr. Johnston. We did provide something like $16 billion worth of aid over a 20-year period, and helped Korea establish the right policy framework. We helped them educate their people and helped them create a private sector. We helped them with the health care of their people, and of course, they became very, very productive. They now, of course, import $30 billion worth of U.S. goods each year. This may be a very dramatic story, but we can give you dozens of examples of creating markets in that way. That is what our aid program does. Chairman GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. JOHNSTON. Certainly. Chairman GILMAN. Korea occurred quite a while ago for that graduation. Have there been any graduations of late? Mr. ATWOOD. Yes, indeed. In the list of 21 close-out countries, there are some very prominent_countries that we have graduated. Costa Rica in this hemisphere, Thailand in Asia, Botswana in Africa. All of these countries have achieved a great deal of progress and development. Their per capita incomes have come up. There are now capital flows in terms of trade, investment, and U.S. exports going to those countries. So, there are very recent graduates from the aid program. Chairman GILMAN. You closed the mission offices, but you reopened some of the regional offices in some of the same countries, have you not? Mr. ATWOOD. We have closed the bilateral mission, which means that we have closed down bilateral programs in that country. But Botswana, for example, this is the headquarters of the SADC, the South African Development Community. That is where we want to be working in a regional way. We think we can do it cost-effectively by working regionally to try to create networks among the private sector, the people, and the nongovernmental organizations. Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the chairman for his question. Do you anticipate equal success in the near future of your operations in Africa, that they may too experience the Korean experience? Mr. ATWOOD. I think that if you look at southern Africa, in particular, which is a potential market of about 100 million people, we do anticipate making progress there in the next decade. In many parts of Africa, I would cite countries like Uganda and Ghana, they have made great strides forward, where they are now increasingly importing American goods. We are able to gain a great share of that market and are competitive with the Europeans in particular. We have only 10 percent of what, in essence, is a $60 billion market today, but if we make the right investments along with other donors, and that is important, because we only give 5 percent of all the development assistance to Africa, then I think that American business will be able to take advantage of what I call the last great developing market, the African market. Mr. JOHNSTON. Quickly, if the development fund for Africa were cut from $800 million to $500 million, would this seriously cripple the operation on this continent? Mr. ATWOOD. It would seriously cripple it, and it would probably increase the cost of dealing with some of the crises in the area. Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Atwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnston. Mr. Roth. Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield 2 minutes to my friend, Mr. Burton. Mr. BURTON. Mr. Atwood, I am sure you are aware that there are a lot of human rights abuses taking place around the world. In particular, I have been concerned about human rights abuses in northwestern India, in Punjab and Kashmir. It is a very difficult issue up there. Over the past several years, we have had a number of votes in the House to focus attention on this issue. Two years ago, when the Democrats had the majority, I had a colloquy with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, during which time we reached a compromise of cutting $4.5 million in developmental assistance to India; not because it was not a substantial amount of money, but because it sent a very clear signal to the Indian Government that we were concerned about the human rights abuses in Kashmir and Punjab and we wanted to see them stopped. It was a signal that we thought was very important. The USAID Department, which you head, decided not to stop that money from going to India for developmental purposes. You and I had a meeting in my office, and you said that when you talked to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, he did not recall the situation the way I mentioned it to you. So, I got a copy of the transcript of the debate that took place on the floor and the colloquy between the chairman and I, and I think it proved beyond any doubt that it was the intent of the Congress to cut $4.5 million in developmental assistance. Yet, USAID chose not to make that cut to India. I do not require an answer. I would just like to say to you that I think the Congress of the United States, when it expresses its will to an agency director such as USAID, expects this person to listen and to honor what the Congress asks him or her to do. In the future, should USAID survive and not have budget cuts that put it out of existence, I hope you will at least listen to people who might be in the minority now, but who may be in the majority later and have some control over your agency. I got the distinct feeling when we had our conversation, that it was the feeling of USAID that we were going to be perennially in the minority and you really did not have to pay much attention to us. I hope that attitude has changed just a little bit. Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address that question. As Mr. Burton knows, I did go and visit with him. I told him at the time that we were analyzing his assessment of the legal situation. I told him that this was an issue that not just USAID was considering, but the State Department and the entire administration, as well. I told him that we were concerned about the human 92-171 95-2 |