Blind Spot: The Secret History of American CounterterrorismBasic Books, 24 апр. 2009 г. - Всего страниц: 432 In this revelatory new account, national security historian Timothy Naftali relates the full back story of America's attempts to fight terrorism. On September 11, 2001, a long history of failures, missteps, and blind spots in our intelligence services came to a head, with tragic results. At the end of World War II, the OSS's "X-2" department had established a seamless system for countering the threats of die-hard Nazi terrorists. But those capabilities were soon forgotten, and it wasn't't until 1968, when Palestinian groups began a series of highly publicized airplane hijackings, that the U.S. began to take counterterrorism seriously. Naftali narrates the game of "catch-up" that various administrations and the CIA played -- with varying degrees of success -- from the Munich Games hostage-taking to the raft of terrorist incidents in the mid-1980s through the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, and up to 9/11.In riveting detail, Naftali shows why holes in U.S. homeland security discovered by Vice President George H. W. Bush in 1986 were still a problem when his son became President, and why George W. Bush did little to fix them until it was too late. Naftali concludes that open, liberal democracies like the U.S. are incapable of effectively stopping terrorism. For anyone concerned about the future of America's security, this masterful history will be necessary -- and eye-opening -- reading. |
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Стр. xii
... administration had tried to kill him by launching cruise missiles at a camp in Afghanistan where he was expected to be. Although President George W. Bush had never said anything publicly about bin Laden, it had to be assumed that this ...
... administration had tried to kill him by launching cruise missiles at a camp in Afghanistan where he was expected to be. Although President George W. Bush had never said anything publicly about bin Laden, it had to be assumed that this ...
Стр. 23
... administration in any diplomacy with the regime. The Johnson administration would make no effort to contact Cuba directly over this issue or to seek the assistance of allies, all of whom maintained diplomatic relations with Havana, to ...
... administration in any diplomacy with the regime. The Johnson administration would make no effort to contact Cuba directly over this issue or to seek the assistance of allies, all of whom maintained diplomatic relations with Havana, to ...
Стр. 26
... administration was to increase overt and covert support for what was known as regional counterinsurgency. In mid-1967, for example, the Johnson administration oversaw counterinsurgency programs in seven Latin American countries: Bolivia ...
... administration was to increase overt and covert support for what was known as regional counterinsurgency. In mid-1967, for example, the Johnson administration oversaw counterinsurgency programs in seven Latin American countries: Bolivia ...
Стр. 28
... administration had already communicated to the intelligence agencies its belief that the country's covert action “platter was full.”31 In the previous eighteen months, the 303 Committee, an NSC group that in the Johnson administration ...
... administration had already communicated to the intelligence agencies its belief that the country's covert action “platter was full.”31 In the previous eighteen months, the 303 Committee, an NSC group that in the Johnson administration ...
Стр. 33
... administration to negotiating an end to the war in Vietnam, putting other foreign policy matters to one side. As a result, Lyndon Johnson would leave the new challenges of Mideast terrorism and air piracy to his successor, Richard Nixon ...
... administration to negotiating an end to the war in Vietnam, putting other foreign policy matters to one side. As a result, Lyndon Johnson would leave the new challenges of Mideast terrorism and air piracy to his successor, Richard Nixon ...
Содержание
1 | |
20 | |
The Lessons of Munich 1972 | 55 |
Theres Very Little We Can Do | 78 |
The Lull Before the Storm | 99 |
False Start | 116 |
Striking Back | 150 |
The Silent Struggle | 202 |
Afterword | 328 |
Notes | 336 |
19 | 337 |
54 | 339 |
78 | 343 |
99 | 344 |
116 | 368 |
150 | 370 |
The New Terrorism | 227 |
Clinton Versus bin Laden | 260 |
George W Bush and bin Laden | 286 |
Blind Spots and 911 | 313 |
227 | 384 |
311 | 385 |
335 | 389 |
Другие издания - Просмотреть все
Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism Timothy J. Naftali Ограниченный просмотр - 2005 |
Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism Tim Naftali Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |
Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism Tim Naftali Недоступно для просмотра - 2009 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
action activities administration advisor agency agents airlines allies American assistant attack August Beirut believed bin Laden bombing British Bush called chief Clarke Clinton Commission Committee concern counterterrorism December defense Department deputy director discussion domestic early East efforts evidence February File flight force foreign George Hezbollah hijackers hostages incident intelligence interest interview involved Iran Iranian Israeli issue January John July June killed Kissinger Laden later Lebanon Libyan March meeting military months national security needed Nixon November NSArch-CT October Office operation organization Palestinian passengers plane Poindexter political possible Post prepared president president’s problem Qaeda Reagan recalls received release remained response Robert secretary seemed September Soviet staff suggested Syria task terrorism terrorist threat tion turned U.S. government United Vice wanted warned Washington White House York
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Стр. 147 - yes," then we must win. If the answer is "no," then we should not be in combat. (5) FIFTH, before the US commits combat forces abroad there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress...
Стр. 121 - Haig at his first press conference adopted a hard line in announcing that "[international terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights.
Стр. 260 - The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — .is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it...
Стр. 116 - Above all, we must realize that no arsenal, or no weapon in the arsenals of the world, is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have.
Стр. 165 - Most of the terrorists who are kidnapping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations," Reagan said, "are being trained, financed, and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments, a new international version of Murder, Inc.
Стр. 125 - Testimony will be presented this morning by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and later by other officials directly concerned with each part of the program.
Стр. 121 - Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.
Стр. 287 - As we noted in our briefings for you, al Qida is not some narrow, little terrorist issue that needs to be included in broader regional policy. Rather, several of our regional policies need to address centrally the transnational challenge to the US and our interests posed by the al Qida network.
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Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe Peter Dickens,James S. Ormrod Недоступно для просмотра - 2007 |