decomposition of compounded bodies; which two subjects have little or no connection with one another. The former must be for ever hindered from taking place by the simple preservation of being; but the latter can only be prevented by the permanency of the union, and adhesion of all the parts, of which that substance was composed. That the former shall take place, St. Paul never asserts; but that the latter annually occurs, is evident to every beholder; and by this obvious fact St. Paul has chosen to illustrate the state of the human body, during its repose in the grave, and its consequent resurrection.

The question, which is now before us, involves two distinct points; one of which relates to the identity of the substance itself, and the other to the identity of that modification, which the given substance might have assumed. The identity of the former never can be lost; because, though it may be perpetually divided, no one of its essential properties can possibly be either destroyed or changed. All that divisibility can possibly effect must relate to the arrangement of its parts; but no change in modification can ever effect identity. On the contrary, in all compounded bodies, every change which they undergo must affect their modification; and by a derangement of the composition, must eventually annihilate that identity, which consisted in the permanent union of all the parts.

In the subject, which is now before us, the above two identities are to be found; and to the distinc

tion which exists between them, if we wish to comprehend the Apostle's meaning, it is necessary that we attend. It is this distinction which Thomas Payne seems entirely to have forgotten; and by this means he has so blended these two identities together, as to have justly brought upon himself the charge of that folly which he, with equal injustice and indecency, has attributed to St. Paul.

When we take before us a grain, on which the Apostle has made his observation, we are instantly struck with the distinction I have made. We behold in almost one view, the identity of the substance itself, and the identity of that particular modifica tion of it, from whence we obtained the idea of grain. The former of these must always be inseparable from matter, in what light soever we may view it; while the latter as it applies not so much to existence itself, as to the particular manner of existence, may be totally destroyed, though the former remains unchanged and entire. Thus the identity of the grain is one thing, but the identity of the matter of which it is composed is quite another; and of these two identities it is necessary that we should have distinct ideas, in order that we inform ourselves of which of these St. Paul speaks, before we can decide on the accuracy or inaccuracy of his expression.

That the Apostle speaks of the identity of the modification, and not of that of the matter itself, is evident from the manner in which he introduces the subject. "That (says he) which thou sowest is not quickened except it die.”

What (we would ask) is it that is sown? The answer is obvious," a grain." What, (we ask

again,) is not quickened? The answer is equally plain," Vegetation which arises from that germ which is included in the composition sown, is not quickened into future life, except that body in which it is included, die: which body, in order that the germ may evolve itself, must be decomposed, and through this decomposition, its identity, which consisted in the stability of its modification, must be inevitably destroyed."

That St. Paul spoke of the grain which was sown, and not of the particles of which it was composed, is plain language which will admit of no controversy. If we deny this, it will be impossible to render his expressions any way intelligible; we must therefore assume it as an admitted point. It must, therefore, be to the modification, and not the constituent parts of grain, that we must look for that dying, of which the Apostle speaks.

A grain of corn is that certain combination of primitive particles, so peculiarly modified as to give us that complex idea which we have of it; which complex idea is derived from that peculiar union which exists in the body modified. And no longer than that union continues can we annex to it an idea which is dependent upon it; and which must cease to exist upon the disunion of those parts which were previously combined.

Having thus before us this complex idea of a grain, arising from the mere combination of its parts, it is certain that this idea can continue no longer, than while those parts continue in union

with one another; because upon this union the idea is entirely dependent for its own existence. While, therefore, the parts thus combined, continue in union with one another; our idea of grain remains undestroyed; while a change in its modification and sensible qualities must annihilate the identity of which we speak, and our complex idea together.

Such then is the nature of the grain, to which St. Paul applies, for an illustration, which he has so happily employed in proving the resurrection of

the dead.

In

Let us now suppose this grain to be deposited in the earth, and, through the grand process of nature, its parts dissolving into their elementary state. this case, though the parts themselves lose not their own peculiar identities; yet they so far lose their original state of combination, that the grain is now no longer in existence. And, as our idea of the identity of this grain depended upon that combination of the parts which is now destroyed, so when this combination vanished, from that very instant our idea of it ceased to exist.

That the grain itself must be dissolved, will admit of no dispute; and no man perhaps will assert that its identity can continue, when the only combination of particles upon which it depended is destroyed. For, certain it is, that when that cause which gave being to our idea of identity is removed, that idea must vanish with it; because being was necessary to its preservation. If then the identity of a grain be actually destroyed, must not that identical

grain be inevitably dead? And is not this very grain, that of which St. Paul speaks, in the very passage which has been ridiculed by Thomas Payne? And if so, the sentiment of the Apostle is at once philosophical and just; and the contempt of Thomas Payne has been most egregiously misapplied.

St. Paul, in the place under consideration, confines his observations exclusively to the grain, without once adverting to the matter of which it is composed; and he considers the dissolution of its component parts, as particularly necessary to that vegetation which shall spring forth from the germ included in it. In this view, he justly concludes from the change of its modification, the destruction of its identity; and from hence expresses himself with an evidence not to be controverted with success, that every compounded body must be dead when its identity is no more. And consequently, that the self-same act, by which its parts are separated from one another, is the identical act through which its modification, which constituted its identity, is destroyed, and through which the grain that was sown completely dies.

How far the destruction of the constituent parts of a grain may be necessary to call forth the active energy of those vegetative powers, that are lodged in the germ of future life, which the parent body encloses, is remote from the present question. It is sufficient to my present purpose, to have vindicated St. Paul from the charge of absurdity, and the ap