General MEYER. The question is, are they ready? That is different than the actions they might be forced to take upon initiation of

war.

Mr. BRINKLEY. What degree of importance would you attach to civil servants within the military, General Meyer, especially the Army?

General MEYER. The U.S. Army is absolutely dependent upon its civil servants to insure the sustainability of the force through our depot and base systems and to insure the readiness of the force. They are an integral part of our capability. We are understrength in civilians at the present time, and it has an impact on readiness. Mr. BRINKLEY. Is there coordination in the planning of the Joint Chiefs, NATO planning with the State Department with reference to balance, forced reductions? In the relations that I have had with that, it seems to me there has always been an effort to put a floor on the forces that we have there rather than placing a ceiling on them.

I wonder if the label for force reductions is really a misnomer? In short, you are privy to the actions of the State Department within that area.

General JONES. Yes; we are fully involved in the interagency process on mutual- and balanced-force reductions as well as in the negotiations. The big problem has been that we and the Soviets cannot agree as to the number of Warsaw Pact troops deployed in the forward area. That is the fundamental problem right now before getting to any discussion of any reductions on either side. Mr. BRINKLEY. With reference to NATO again, what are we going to do with our defenses in Europe if war breaks out?

General MEYER. We have a noncombatant evacuation plan which, assuming we have some warning, will bring back dependents on the same airlift that brings over reinforcing units. That is a plan that is practiced, but it is dependent upon warning.

Mr. BRINKLEY. Thank you.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Stump?

Mr. Leath?

Mr. LEATH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It has been a long day and many of the questions I had in my mind have already been asked, so I will be very brief.

General Meyer, in reading through your recent statement and some of the comments that you have made today on Army requirements, I am delighted to see your concern about civilian manpower shortages.

Could you elaborate just a little further on the nature and extent of this problem as it does impact our readiness and mobility capabilities, and perhaps briefly give us an idea of what the Army intends to do to address this problem and what success we might have with the new administration as opposed to the obvious lack of success we had with the last one.

Finally, if you have the time, I would like you to address this proposition of contracting out somewhat. Like many members, I am sure, I became interested in this primarily because of the parochial issues involved because, as I delved deeper into it, it appears to me that there are also a great many problems we are

facing in that area that might have some impact on our ability to mobilize and readiness ability.

I would appreciate your comments on that.

General MEYER. The main reason that I address civilians as an urgent priority is that we want to have the most immediate beneficial effect on the readiness of our forces, that can be obtained by giving us additional civilian authorizations. Today in the Army, we have more than one division's worth of soldiers who daily are diverted to jobs normally authorized civilians. These are principally NCO's, which means at the same time we are trying to train an Army, we draw the NCO's trainers away to work in supply rooms and other areas where things have to be done.

The immediate impact on the Army of additional civilian authorizations would be one of enhanced readiness. I am sure that pertains to all of the other services as well, because they have the same problem we do as a result of the long-term decrease in civilian manpower in the Defense Department. While the other agencies of Government have shown growth in civilian manpower, the Defense Department has gone down, and that has had a direct impact on readiness of the force.

The Army is proposing an increase in authorized civilian end strength, and the Secretary and I are hopeful that the new administration will support that increase, because we believe it has the kind of immediate impact I have identified.

Yesterday Senator Tower indicated that previously there was a commitment from the administration that the Defense Department would not be held to the same level as the other administration, and I hope that is a correct interpretation that is kept.

Regarding contracting out and CITA (commercial-industrial type activities) that has had varying impact. On some installations, it reduces the flexibility of the commander to divert his civilian work force to handle a specific requirement. Contract civilians are there to run a specific function, like the laundry. With a civil service work force, he has a flexible force which he can apply across the base to provide additional help under mobilization.

We have to watch that very, very carefully as we get into the contracting. The commanders out in the field are rightfully concerned about it. We have to watch that contracting does not degrade our mobilization capability.

Mr. LEATH. Thank you, sir. I certainly hope and feel that we can certainly count on your support in trying to make some changes in those areas this year and also from the rest of the chiefs.

General Jones, one thing you might comment on just briefly that I think you probably mentioned in your remarks that I have not heard anyone speak to additionally this afternoon, is the concern that we potentially are facing or probably right now are facing as far as strategic minerals are concerned in our industrial base. What focus do you think this committee might need to get into as far as that particular area is concerned or how important is it for us to face that problem perhaps more so than we have in the past? General JONES. I think it is very important that it be addressed. We don't get into it directly, as far as determining requirements or advocating specific funds, but I would urge the committee to look at this very critical area.

Mr. LEATH. Thank you.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. First I might say, gentlemen, that I would be remiss if I did not tell you that I was most impressed with your answers today to very difficult questions, your straightforwardness and the knowledge that you possess.

Two areas have not been discussed; two areas that I think are important, and the first is that of strategic defense of our country. This, of course, deals with the threat of enemy ICBM's and the more recent threat of the Backfire bomber with its refueling capability, which I understand is present.

Let me first put the question dealing with the ICBM to General Jones.

Your report mentions the dangerous decade ahead and the risk to our ICBM forces from Soviet target kill capability. Are the Armed Forces considering restoration of the antiballistic missile force, the ABM force especially, in light of the fact, as Secretary Weinberger has stated, that the United States may not automatically renew the ABM treaty when it expires.

General?

General JONES. Could I ask General Meyer rather than my taking most of the answers?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, sir.

General MEYER. Our ballistic missile defense program today is in R. & D. It emphasizes developing a low-altitude defense capability and a high-altitude capability. In my judgment, it is part of the strategic equation and must be addressed seriously in the context of both the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle and the defensive environment. As we look toward October of 1982, we must achieve a national decision on whether we intend to continue ABM development as an adjunct to the MX and how exactly we intend to make the most of that very important chip in future negotiations. Mr. SKELTON. Has our research and development lagged in recent years since the signing of that treaty, sir?

General MEYER. In the fiscal year 1980 and 1981 budgets we have kept the BDM program at a constant-funding level of about $250 million to $300 million a year for R. & D., but it has lagged in the development of such programs as exoatmospheric efforts into the endoatmospheric programs like the low-altitude defense prototype demonstration, so we have not done as much as we should have in the other efforts.

Mr. SKELTON. Next, regarding the Backfire bomber threat, I suppose General Allen would be the one to address this too.

Do you consider the Backfire bomber threat with its refueling capability to be a sincere threat to the continental United States? General ALLEN. Yes, even without its refueling capability we consider it a threat.

Mr. SKELTON. In light of that, why are we reducing the DEW (distant early warning) line attack warning system from 31 to 13 stations, and in light of that in the report we also see there is some rather vague language on page 74 that talks about upgrading the DEW line with state-of-the-art radars and a northern looking, Over-the-Horizon, the Back Scatter Radar system.

The Over-the-Horizon Back Scatter Radar system is in an experimental stage right, and it does not work toward the north for atmospheric reasons.

Now, where are we in rebuilding or thinking about rebuilding the DEW line? It seems to me like we have an open side door for a Backfire bomber to come in on the United States.

General ALLEN. I think it is an open front door. The DEW line as it presently exists has certain gaps and inadequacies. We are developing a system, the Over-the-Horizon Back-Scatter Radar, that will be more effective.

Mr. SKELTON. Would you agree with me right now that the present DEW line system is inadequate, and that we have very little if any warning from that segment?

General ALLEN. It is inadequate. It provides some warning but there are holes in the system that the Soviets could exploit. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. My time is up.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to keep within my 5 minutes and will make my comments brief and would appreciate my questions to be answered to be brief.

Gentlemen, I have some questions for the record that I would like to submit to you, and then I would like to say thanks to the chairman and to the chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for your fine support for the National Guard and Reserve in this fiscal year. [The following questions were submitted to the witness to be answered for the record:]

READINESS

Mr. MONTGOMERY. In his remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary Weinberger indicated his primary concern would be in equipping and bringing to a high state of readiness the sixteen active Army divisions. As you know, the National Guard and Army Reserves make up over 40 percent of the Army's combat forces.

Does this mean the National Guard and Reserve combat divisions and brigades cannot expect to receive any funding to improve their readiness capability?

General MEYER. No. We have a number of programs which will improve the readiness capability of those units. Our most serious problems at this time are manpower shortages and equipment shortages.

The manpower picture has improved recently and with our Full Time Manning program, increased enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, improved pay, and more recruiting resources, we can expect this trend to continue. Nevertheless, I reemphasize that the projected fiscal year 1982 manning of the Reserve Components will still be 17 percent-124,000 drilling reservists-short of their fiscal year 1982 wartime requirement.

The Reserve and National Guard combat units are critically short of equipment. They have many of the same equipment shortages as our Active Components, only to a worse degree. The majority of Reserve and National Guard units understandably are equipped at a lower priority than our Active units. Moreover, we are committed to improving first the units which go into battle first. In the Reserve Components, most of the early deploying units-those that enjoy a relatively high priority-are support units. The hard fact of the matter is that our Reserve and National Guard major combat units do not receive much in the way of equipment improvements as a result of this budget. Major equipment readiness improvements for the Reserve Components will require a massive increase to our funding. We will be addressing this to a limited degree in our fiscal year 1982 Budget Amendment request and in the Five Year Defense Program.

RECRUITS

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Presently high school drop-outs comprise 46 percent of new recruits in the Army at the same time that the equipment and weaponry they must use is becoming more sophisticated and technical. Do you believe there is a need to improve the mental quality of new recruits and, if so, how do you propose to do this?

General MEYER. We definitely need to increase the number of high school graduates with higher test scores and the Army has focused its management emphasis on this objective. We will continue to do this, but we need Congressional support for improvements in pay, bonuses and benefits, to include a new GI Bill.

SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS

Mr. MONTGOMERY. What are your views on requiring the mental and physical classification of Selective Service registrants now rather than waiting until it becomes necessary to reinstitute an actual draft?

General MEYER. Mental and physical classification of registrants requires examination. Although such prior examination could increase the rate of flow of inductees through the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations at the time of an emergency, the increased numbers could not be accommodated in the training base. Peacetime examinations would be valid for only one year.

FISCAL YEAR 1982 BUDGET ALLOCATION

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Another serious problem is the very high percentage of new recruits who do not even finish their original 3 year period of enlistment. How do you propose to eliminate this problem and the financial drain it causes?

General MEYER. We have found that the most important prediction of success in first term soldiers is the motivation and discipline demonstrated by earning a high school diploma. Persons who fail to earn a diploma are about twice as likely to become an attrition loss as are diploma graduates. The more high scoring, high school diploma graduates we recruit the lower the attrition rate. Further, we believe that strong unit cohesion and improved personnel stability can have positive effects on attrition. Some of the programs we are using to address these conditions are to improve overseas/CONUS personnel rations; eliminate leadership shortages through promotions coupled with requisite training; extend the amount of time officers remain in command; curtail practices which contribute to internal unit turbulance; and to test a company replacement concept. We would hope that with increased emphasis on the recruiting of high scoring High School Graduates, and increased emphasis on unit cohesion and personnel stability, we will reduce overall attrition and thereby cut the costs associated with these losses.

READINESS

Mr. MONTGOMERY. In the past, former Secretary of the Army Alexander rejected out-of-hand any reports from his officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel in the field that evidently did not square with his own views about the readiness or lack of readiness of the Army. One such example was Secretary Alexander's rejection of Human Readiness Report No. 5 that said that low-ability personnel among the junior NCO ranks in Europe are a direct and serious threat to NATO combat capabilities. Will you be willing to listen to your officers and take steps to remedy shortcomings in combat readiness when they are pointed out to you?

General MEYER. Yes, I have always welcomed constructive comments not only from officers but also from NCO's to remedy any shortcomings in combat readiness. I will continue to take immediate steps to resolve any shortcomings as soon as one is identified and confirmed.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

Mr. MONTGOMERY. One of the most glaring problems in the Army's combat readiness is the shortfall of several hundred thousand in the Individual Ready Reserve. What plans do you have to bring the IRR back up to its required combat ready strength level?

General MEYER. Before responding to the question on IRR strength, it may be beneficial to place the IRR in perspective. The IRR is a pool of individuals, most of whom are fully trained, who have a statutory or contractual obligation making them subject to call to active duty during mobilization to fill Active and Selected Reserve units to wartime required levels, to apply against fill of unmanned units, and replace casualties. The IRR does not have a structure or statutorily prescribed