Staff

24. Operations of the Atomic Development Division would be carried out by an international Staff, the international character of which would be similar to that of the Secretariat of the Disarmament Division, except that, to the greatest extent consistent with the requirements of efficiency, inspection, accounting and control, positions in any country would be filled by nationals of that country.

25. The Staff would be headed by a Manager, appointed by the Board subject to the approval of the Authority. The Authority would have the power to remove the Manager at any time.

C. FINANCE

26. It would be desirable to consider the finances of the Authority and its subordinate agencies under three subdivisions: (i) the budget of the Disarmament Division, (ii) that part of the budget of the Atomic Development Division directly concerned with establishing and operating atomic facilities (cost of raw materials and plant construction, operational costs, etc.), and (iii) that part of the budget of the Atomic Development Division dealing with the necessary international coordination and with the administrative costs above the operational level as well as with research necessary to the discharge of its duties and ensuring security.

27. The cost of the budget of the Disarmament Division ((i) above) and that part of the budget of the Atomic Development Division covered in (iii) above would be borne by the participating States in accordance with a scale of contributions based upon principles of cost-sharing to be agreed upon.

28. The cost of establishing and operating the various atomic facilities (26 (ii) above) should be met by the benefiting nations and not by general assessments upon the States participating in the disarmament programme. In carrying out its prescribed functions, however, the international control agency should interfere as little as necessary with the economic plans and the private, corporate, and State relationships in the several countries.

29. The budget of each division would be prepared by the division and submitted to the Authority for final approval.

II. Rights, Powers and Functions of the Authority

30. The Authority would derive its rights and powers from the disarmament programme treaty. The General Assembly would take appropriate action, in anticipation of the signing of this treaty, to ensure the establishment and activation of the Authority immediately upon the coming into effect of the treaty and the progressive assumption of its functions as required.

31. The Authority would be empowered to supervise and control progressive and continuous disclosure and verification of all armed forces including para-military, security and police forces-and all armaments including atomic.

32. Within the limits of the programmes and phasing as laid down in the disarmament treaty, the Authority would be empowered to determine the details of the time and the manner of the reduction of armed forces and armaments and to supervise such reduction insofar

as such details are not fixed by the treaty. The disposition of existing stocks of nuclear fuel would be made by the Authority in accordance with the treaty on international control.

33. The Authority would be empowered to function in accordance with whatever plan may be agreed upon for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure effective prohibition of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes only.

34. Except for the rule of procedure that decisions made by the Authority within its defined functions would require a determined majority, the Authority would have the right to adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

35. The Authority would be authorized to hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Authority as in its judgment would best facilitate its work.

36. The Authority would be empowered to issue administrative regulations within its field of competence.

37. The Authority would carry out an agreed programme of safeguards to ensure the observance of the agreements for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. This programme of safeguards would include provision for whatever programme of effective disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments may be agreed upon. This function would include, among others, the following tasks:

a. Provide guidance and instructions, within the framework of the treaty, for the disclosure programme;

b. Control the receipt of and process the information from each State, and, within the framework of the disarmament programme treaty, prescribe the particulars of the information desired from the States;

c. Organize and conduct field inspections and aerial surveys to verify information on reported installations and to determine whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed;

d. Station personnel permanently in countries adhering to the programme for the purpose of ensuring continuous verification; e. Prepare reports of disclosure and verification for the United Nations and for the signatory States;

f. In the event of a finding by the Authority of violations, obstructions, discrepancies, or pertinent omissions by a State, call upon such State to remedy forthwith the violation or other infraction; in the event of failure within a reasonable time of the offending state to comply fully, report the violation or other infraction to the Security Council, to the General Assembly, and to all States in order to permit appropriate action by the United Nations or by individual states in accordance with the treaty establishing the control organ;

g. Submit such special reports to the Security Council as may be requested by any seven members thereof;

h. Submit such special reports to the General Assembly as may be requested by that body;

i. Determine when each provision of the treaty relating to the timing of disclosure and verification and of reductions of armed forces and non-atomic armaments has been completed.

38. The power of the Authority relating to disclosure and verification, of course, would not be limited to the initial disclosure and verification but would continue as permanent powers of the Authority.

a) The Authority would carry out the agreed programme for safeguards other than disclosure and verification;

b) The Authority should have positive research and developmental responsibilities in order to remain in the forefront of atomic knowledge so as to render the Authority more effective in promoting the beneficial uses of atomic energy and in eliminating its destructive ones.

39. Authorized personnel of the Secretariat of the Disarmament Division would have the right, in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty, to conduct on-the-spot inspections preparatory to and in aid of inspections by formal inspection teams.

40. The Atomic Development Division should have the responsibility to determine and report to the Authority any violations in connexion with the execution of the provisions of the treaty establishing the system for the control of atomic energy.

41. The Authority should be empowered to take action as appropriate short of the imposition of sanctions as provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to remedy any violations or infractions in connexion with the enforcement of the provisions of the treaty establishing the system for the control of atomic energy. Such action would include:

a. Calling upon the offending state to remedy within a reasonable time the violations or other infraction;

b. Bringing about the suspension of the supply of nuclear materials to the offending state;

c. Closing of plants utilizing nuclear materials in the offending state;

d. Reporting to the Security Council, to the General Assembly and to all States the violation or other infraction in order to permit appropriate action by the United Nations or by individual states in accordance with the international convention establishing the control organ.

42. In connexion with the inspection of items critical to the system of safeguards for both atomic development and non-atomic armaments, in contrast to the items critical primarily to atomic development, the responsibilities of the Authority would in general be exercised by the Disarmament Division, subject to appropriate arrrangements for co-ordination. The responsibilities of the Authority for such control as might be established over such items would, in general, also be exercised by the Disarmament Division.

43. Any jurisdictional questions arising between the Disarmament Division and the Atomic Development Division would be settled by the Authority.

III. Relation to other United Nations Organs

The relations of the Authority to the several organs of the United Nations should be clearly established and defined by the treaty creating the authority.

To the Security Council.

44. The Authority would be required to submit such reports as might be requested by any seven members of the Security Council. 45. The Authority's findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions should be referred, as appropriate with certification of facts, to the Secrutiy Council.

46. Findings would be accompanied by such recommendations as the Authority might deem appropriate. In this regard, provision would have to be made for specific steps to be taken by the Security Council and/or the General Asesmbly to bring about rectification of violations of the disarmament programme treaty.

To the General Assembly.

47. The Authority would transmit to the General Assembly periodic reports and any findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security Council. 48. The Authority would be required to submit such reports as might be requested by the General Assembly.

To the International Court of Justice.

49. The Authority would be authorized by the General Assembly to request of the International Court of Justice advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the Authority's activities. Proceedings before the Court, however, would not be permitted to delay the taking of measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

To the United Nations Secretariat.

50. The Authority would use the services of the United Nations Secretariat to the extent mutually agreed upon.

51. Reports and other communications from the Authority to other organs of the United Nations would be transmitted through the Secretary-General.

IV. Relationship to Individual States

52. The question of the relationship of the Authority to the participating States will require careful treaty definition particularly regarding the extent to which the privileges and immunities accorded to the Authority will exempt it and its personnel from the operation of national laws and the means by which individual rights and liberties of citizens of each State will be protected against possible infringement stemming from inspections. The grant of privileges and immunities to the Authority should be based on the principle of minimum interferences with the national laws of a State consistent with adequate and expeditious carrying out of the Authority's responsibilities and activities.

53. The privileges and immunities accorded the Authority should include:

a. The right of its accredited representatives to the privileges and facilities of ingress, egress and access into and from the territory of participating States including rights of transit for persons and equipment over, across and through such territory;

b. The right to use communication facilities to the extent adequate to the discharge of its responsibilities;

c. Such exemption from customs and immigration regulation as may be necessary to effective operations;

d. Inviolability of premises, property and archives.

54. Any findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies of pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security Council and to the General Assembly would be transmitted also to the participating States.

55. Provision must be made in a treaty to permit individual state to take necessary steps to protect themselves in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter in the event of serious viola tions determined by the Authority and not remedied within a reasonable time. Such provision would include the right of any State under such circumstances to terminate its obligations under the treaty, to take steps for individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, and to take such other action as might be decided or recommended by the United Nations Security Council or by the United Nations General Assembly.

56. The Authority would be empowered to negotiate with each participating State such administrative agreements as may be desirable to facilitate the operation of the disarmament programme.

57. Each participating State would designate and maintain a national agency to supervise the execution of its obligations and to assist the Authority in its work.

64. FRANCE AND UNITED KINGDOM: MEMORANDUM, JUNE 11, 1954

The French and United Kingdom delegations submit the following proposals as a possible basis for compromise:

1. The States members of the Sub-Committee regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. They recommend that the Disarmament Treaty should include an immediate and explicit acceptance of this prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as proposed in the subsequent paragraphs of this memorandum. They further recommend that the obligations assumed by the Members of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State should be accepted by all signatory States not members of the United Nations.

2. The draft disarmament treaty prepared by the Disarmament Commission and submitted by it to the Security Council, to the General Assembly and to the World Disarmament Conference should include provisions covering the following:

(a) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.

1 UN Document, DC/SC.1/10, 1, June 1954.