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including both atomic and non-atomic (paragraphs 6 I (a) an (b) of the four-power draft resolution of 8 March 1955, DO SC.1/15/Rev. 1);

(2) The major reductions in armed forces and convention: armaments (paragraphs 6 II (a) and 6 III (a) of the four-powe draft resolution of 8 March 1955);

(3) The total prohibition of manufacture and use, and th elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mas destruction, as well as conversion of existing stocks of nuclea materials to peaceful uses (paragraphs 6 II (b), 6 III (b) of th four-power draft resolution of 8 March 1955);

(4) The continued supervision of permitted atomic energ installations and facilities.

B. In order to enable it to carry out these responsibilities and fund tions, the control organ shall be accorded powers to be exercised i accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty and which shal include the following:

(1) To determine, within the limits established by the dis armament treaty, the details of the methods and processes o supervising and guaranteeing the effective observance of the various phases of agreed limitations, reductions, and prohibitions in order to ensure that the disarmament programme is carried ou as rapidly as possible and with safety and equity for all;

(2) To supervise and verify the disclosures of information required at each stage of the disarmament programme laid down in the four-power draft resolution of 8 March 1955, with respect to all armaments and armed forces and related installations and facilities;

(3) To ensure that installations, facilities, equipment, and materials, including stocks of nuclear materials, are disposed of or utilized in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty;

(4) To organize and conduct field and aerial surveys in con nexion with the above functions and for the purpose of determining whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed;

(5) To conduct such research as is necessary to keep itself in the forefront of nuclear knowledge and to enable it to be fully effective in eliminating the destructive uses of nuclear energy, so that such energy shall be used only for peaceful purposes;

(6) To report and provide information to the Security Council. the General Assembly and the signatory States and to make recommendations concerning appropriate action by them in the event of violation of the disarmament treaty;

(7) To take such measures provided for in the treaty as may be necessary to deal with violations of the disarmament treaty pending action by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the signatory States, and to call upon the party concerned and its agents to comply with such measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the party concerned.

C. In order to ensure that the international officials of the control organ are continuously in a position to fulfil their responsibilities, they will be granted the right:

(1) to be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament agreement;

(2) of unrestricted access to, egress from and travel within the territory of participating States, and unrestricted access to ali installations and facilities as required by them for the effective performance of their responsibilities and functions;

(3) of unrestricted use of communication facilities necessary for the discharge of their responsibilities;

(4) of inviolability of person, premises, property and archives. D. The control organ shall remain in being to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed.

Western Proposals, Second Phase: July 1955—

United States Proposals and Statements

70. STATEMENT ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (EISENHOWER), GENEVA, JULY 21, 1955

Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda. Is is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces-but also of homes, and industries and lives-than ever known or even imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made much more complex the problems of limitation and control and reduction of armament.

After our victory as Allies in World War II, my country rapidly disarmed. Within a few years our armament was at a very low level. Then events occurred beyond our borders which caused us to realize that we had disarmed too much. For our own security and to safeguard peace we needed greater strength. Therefore we proceeded to rearm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.

The American people are determined to maintain and if necessary increase this armed strength for as long a period as is necessary to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

But we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people. It would make it possible for every nation, great and small, developed and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people, to attain better food, and clothing, and shelter, more of education and larger enjoyment of life.

Therefore, the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own Government. From these studies, which are continuing, a very important principle is emerging to which I referred in my opening statement on Monday.

1 UN Document DC/SC.1/28, 29 August 1955.

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.

The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting.

Questions suggest themselves.

How effective an inspection system can be designed which would be mutually and reciprocally acceptable within our countries and the other nations of the world? How would such a system operate? What could it accomplish?

Is certainty against surprise aggression attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly and effectively counteracted? We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We have not as yet been able to discover any accounting or other inspection method of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total expenditures for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing. We by no means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in these fields.

As you can see from these statements, it is our impression that many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping than can be insured by effective inspection.

Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference. I have been searching my heart and mind. for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves immediately. These steps would include:

To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country-we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaisance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing

tension.

Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

Now from my statements I believe you will anticipate my suggestion. It is that we instruct our representatives in the Subcommittee on Disarmament in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step-by-step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.

The successful working out of such a system would do much to develop the mutual confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.

The quest for peace is the statesman's most exacting duty. Security of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility. Practical progress to lasting peace is his fondest hope. Yet in pursuit of his hope he must not betray the trust placed in him as guardian of the people's security. A sound peace with security, justice, well-being, and freedom for the people of the world can be achieved, but only by patiently and thoughtfully following a hard and sure and tested road.

71. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 21, 1955 PRESIDENTIAL PROPOSAL AT GENEVA REGARDING DISARMAMENT, AUGUST 30, 1955 1

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this outline plan is to translate the proposal made by President Eisenhower on 21 July at Geneva into terms of reference, a concept, and an outline of procedures. The details are subject to negotiation within the principles stated by the President.

2. Terms of Reference.

a. The term "blueprint of military establishments" is defined as consisting of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.

b. Each nation has recognized the need for ground observers and these will be stationed at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to certify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization.

c. Each country shall permit unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by visual, photographic, and electronic means by the other country.

3. Concept.

The United States and the USSR will exchange all data relative to military forces and installations which, coupled with measures for veri

1 UN Document, DC/SC. 1/31.

fication and surveillance, are essential to provide against the possibility of surprise attack. This exchange is to be accomplished in progressive steps as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments. Among the elements of information considered essential to preclude surprise attack and to be sought by an exchange between the Governments and to be verified and maintained under surveillance are:

a. Weapons and delivery systems suitable for surprise attack. b. Transportation and telecommunications.

c. Armed forces, structure and positioning of armed forces. d. Additional facilities as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments.

4. Initial Procedure.

a. Exchange of "blueprints" of military establishments.

(1) The Governments of the United States and the USSR will each prepare lists of major military forces and establishments, showing the deployment of forces and the locations of installations and facilities by geographical co-ordinates.

(2) Schedules will be drawn for time phasing of exchanges to assure simultaneous delivery of similar types of information by each Government, and completion of verification by each side before progressing to a subsequent phase. Provision for immediate spot-checking will be included.

b. Verification of "blueprints" of military establishments.

(1) Arrangements will be made for the posting of on-the-spot observers with operating land, sea, and air forces, at their supporting installations, and at key locations as necessary for the verification, continued observation, and reporting of each category of information. The number and location of the observers will be as mutually agreed upon prior to the exchange of information, and provisions will be made for changes in the location should the initial arrangements prove to be inadequate.

(2) Aerial reconnaissance will be conducted by each inspecting country on an unrestricted, but monitored, basis to augment the efforts of the posted observers. Each inspecting country will utilize its own aircraft and related equipment. Liaison personnel of the country being inspected will be aboard each reconnaissance aircraft during all over-flights.

c. Facilities and services to be provided.

(1) Each sub-list of military installations will include the designation of one or more airfields or bases at which facilities will be made available for support of the aerial reconnaissance aircraft and crews.

d. Checks and controls. Procedures will be established for:

(1) Designation of ports of entry and egress for incoming and departing observers and reconnaissance aircraft.

(2) Clearance of incoming and departing observers, aircraft and crews and arrangements for monitored passage to and from home territory.

(3) Check and identification of observers and reconnaissance aircraft, personnel and equipment engaged in this activity.

(4) Orientation of observers and reconnaissance personnel. (5) Air traffic control of inspecting aircraft by host Government.

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