72. LETTER OF PREMIER OF THE USSR (BULGANIN) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (EISENHOWER), SEPTEMBER 19, 1955 1 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I feel I must sincerely and frankly exchange opinions with you on a subject which at the present time has acquired particular importance. I have in mind the question which is being discussed now by our representatives in the subcommittee of the U. N. Disarmament Commission.

In the course of our memorable meetings in Geneva we agreed to work jointly for elaboration of an acceptable system of disarmament. When we approved directives to our Ministers of Foreign Affairs on this score, I thought a great deal had been accomplished. Now the representatives of our countries, guided by these directives and taking into account in their work the opinions and proposals put forth by the heads of the four governments in Geneva, can and must achieve definite progress.

I and my colleagues thought that even at the very beginning of their work our representatives would be able to reach general agreement on those basic questions on which our viewspoints either coincided or had already appreciably approached each other. I have in mind first of all the question of the levels of armed forces of the five great powers, the question of dates for introducing into force the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the question of international control. In this manner there would be created a solid foundation for further work during which it would be possible to make more precise all the details of the necessary agreements concerning the working out of an acceptable system of disarmament.

However, the first weeks of the work of the subcommittee so far have not yet produced those results for which you and I were fully entitled to hope, and I must frankly say that the delay is occasioned to a considerable degree by the fact that the members of the subcommittee so far do not know the position of the representative of the United States with regard to those provisions which we had all the grounds to consider as agreed. As is known, the representative of the United States completely put aside the questions of reduction of the armed forces, of armaments, and prohibition of atomic weapons, having expressed the desire to discuss first of all and mainly your proposal concerning the exchange of military information between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. as well as of the mutual exchange of aerial photography of the territories of both countries. In this manner the impression is left that the entire problem of disarmament is being confined by him to these proposals.

I think to put the question in this manner would not satisfy the aspiration of peoples, even though I fully recognize the importance of the proposals introduced by you in Geneva.

However, since I and my colleagues have received the abovementioned impression, I consider it my duty once more to share with you, esteemed Mr. President, certain primary considerations.

We feel that the main problem for us is to use further efforts to look for ways which would permit us to move the problem of disarmament away from dead center, which problem has vital importance for

1 Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1955, pp. 644–647.

the peoples of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. as well as peoples the entire world.

In connection with this allow me to touch upon the proposals pu forward by you at Geneva. We regard these proposals as testimon of your sincere desire to find a way to settle the important probler of the international control and inspection and to contribute personall to general efforts for the normalization of international relations.

Upon our return from Geneva we with all carefulness have studie your proposal of July 212 which was introduced on August 30 b Mr. Stassen into the disarmament subcommittee. In the course o this study several questions have arisen about which I would like t express to you my thoughts.

First of all, about the mutual exchange by the United States o America and the Soviet Union of information concerning their arme forces and armaments.

In principle, we have no objections to this proposal. I think tha at a definite stage the exchange of such information between states i necessary. It would be better, however, if such information concern ing armaments were submitted by all states, and not only by the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., to the international organ of control and inspection, concerning the creation of which we should reach an agree ment. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is self-evident tha information on all kinds of armaments, conventional as well as nuclear must be submitted in order to avoid misunderstanding. If these con siderations are valid, we should carefully discuss exactly when this ful information on armaments of states should be presented and first o all information concerning the armaments of great powers.

It is self-evident that the submission of the above-mentioned infor mation to an international control organ would become significant only if agreement is achieved on the reduction of armaments and or taking measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

It seems to me that the problem of the creation of an internationa control organ which would satisfy the requirements of the problem of disarmament should be considered in indissoluble unity with de cisions for putting into effect a plan for gradual disarmament. At the same time it is necessary to keep sight of the fact that achieve ment of a really valuable exchange of military information will become really effective to the degree that mutual trust among states is strengthened.

Now I would also like to express my opinion about the problem of aerial photography.

I do not doubt that when you introduced your proposal for photographing from the air the territories of our two countries, you were guided by a legitimate desire to create confidence that neither of our two countries would be subjected to attack by the other.

However, let us be frank to the end. Under present international conditions both our countries are not acting singly. The United States of America, as is known, heads all military groupings which exist in the West and in the East, and what is more their armed forces are stationed not only on American territory; they are also stationed in England, West Germany, Italy, France, Spain, North Africa, Greece, Turkey, in several countries of the Near and Middle East, in Japan, on Taiwan, in the Philippines, etc.

Ibid., Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

To this should be added the fact that the armed forces of several states are organically connected with the military forces of the United States through inclusion under a single command.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union on its side has united militarily with several allied states.

It is impossible not to see that the proposal introduced by your completely omits from consideration armed forces and military installations which are outside the area of the United States and the Soviet Union.

And yet it is perfectly self-evident that aerial photographing should also be extended to all armed forces and military installations located on the territories of those other states.

This presents an entirely new problem: Would the governments of such states permit their sovereign territory to be photographed from the air by foreign aircraft?

All this shows that the problem of aerial photography is not a question which, under present conditions, would lead to effective progress toward insuring security of states and successful accomplishment of disarmament.

This conclusion is suggested by the fact that your proposal, unfortunately, does not mention the necessity for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

It is therefore natural that people should ask more and more often what the proposal for aerial photography and the collecting of such information would really do to end the arms race. If such a proposal does not promote the ending of the arms race, then it means that it does not remove the threat of a new war. It does not lighten the burden which the peoples are bearing in connection with this arms race. Would such a proposal satisfy the expectations of the people of our states and those of all countries?

Finally, it is impossible not to stop and think about what would happen if we occupy ourselves with the questions of aerial photography and the exchange of military information without taking effective measures for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

I have apprehensions which I cannot help but share with you. Would not such a situation lead to the weakening of vigilance toward the still existing threat of violation of the peace generated by the arms race?

My remarks do not at all mean that we cannot achieve an agreement on important aspects of the disarmament problem. I would like to call your attention to the fact that on very substantial aspects of this problem our positions have become so close that we would be able to reach a definite agreement.

Let us take such a question as the establishment of levels of armed forces for the great powers.

It is generally recognized that this is a question of great importance. Originally, the idea of establishing levels to which armed forces of the Big Five should be reduced, as is known, was put forth by your Government together with the Governments of Great Britain and France in 1952.3 In the interest of achieving general agreement on this matter, which is so important for the problem of disarmament, we decided to adopt this joint proposal of the U. S., England, and

Ibid., June 9, 1952, p. 910.

France as a basis for discussion. Consequently we have a common point of view on this question. It is very important for us to arrive at agreement on this point.

On the question of atomic weapons, we must remember that at the present, when the greatest armies of the world have at their disposal such means of mass destruction as atomic and hydrogen weapons, it is impossible, of course, to talk about disarmament without touching on this important subject. Therefore, we have always attached paramount importance to the problem of prohibition of atomic weapons. In the discussion of this problem, one of the substantial subjects of disagreement was the question of dates when the prohibition against the use of atomic weapons would go into force. In our desire to bring the opposition positions closer and to thereby facilitate and expedite the achievement of agreement on this subject, we agreed to accept the dates for putting into force the prohibition on the use of atomic weapons which were proposed by the representatives of England and France in the subcommittee of the U. N. Commission on Disarmament in London in April 1955.*

I think you will agree that the proposal concerning the stage at which prohibition against the use of atomic weapons would come into force, as proposed by England and France, and accepted by the Soviet Union, satisfies our common interests.

It would be desirable and I think completely feasible to reach an agreement also on this question.

It also seems expedient for us to reach agreement at this time on putting into effect several measures designed to prevent sudden attack by one state or another. We feel that this measure would be in accord with the interests of maintaining peace and security of nations and in this respect it would be possible to reach agreement also concerning the form of control suitable to the above-mentioned problem.

You, Mr. President, as a military man, know from your own experience that modern war requires drawing into military action armies of many millions and an enormous quantity of technical combat equipment. In this connection great importance has now been acquired by the definite locations where concentrations of large military groups can take place and whose armaments would include all this technical combat equipment. The system of control proposed by us, namely the creation of control posts in large ports, at railroad junctions, on automobile highways, and at airfields, is designed to prevent dangerous concentrations of troops and combat equipment on large scale and thereby remove the possibility of sudden attack by one country against another. Establishment of such posts would be an important step toward relaxation of international tension and the establishment of trust among states.

In my opinion our proposal concerning control posts has the advantage that it provides a definite guaranty against a sudden attack by one state against another.

I think you will agree that the proposals introduced by us concerning levels of armed forces, the dates for coming into effect of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and for the establishment of control posts can promote the reduction of tension in international relations and strengthening of peace. I do not see, therefore, any reasons why we

Ibid., May 30, 1955, p. 897.

could not arrange to reach agreement on these questions. Such joint decisions of the Four Powers would have tremendous importance because they would put into the hearts of millions of people the assurance that disarmament is fully realizable and that real steps are being taken in this direction. An agreement on these questions would open the way toward solution of other questions which concern the problem of disarmament. It would encourage the strengthening of that atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understanding which we initiated at Geneva, and it would create favorable conditions to put into practice a broader program of disarmament and control over this disarmament.

In presenting ideas to you, Mr. President, I am inspired by the sincere desire to achieve through a frank exchange of opinions on the problem of disarmament better mutual understanding which may facilitate reaching agreed decisions on this most important problem. Inasmuch as the solution of these questions depends mainly on the four great powers who participated in the Geneva Conference, I have taken the liberty of sending copies of this letter to Mr. Eden and Mr. Faure and hope that you will not misunderstand this action. I hope soon to receive your ideas on the questions touched upon in this letter.

With sincere respect,

N. BULGANIN

73. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MEMORANDUM SUPPLEMENTING OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 21, 1955 PRESIDENTIAL PROPOSAL AT GENEVA REGARDING DISARMAMENT, OCTOBER 7, 19551

IMPORTANCE OF INSPECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM IN A DISARMAMENT

PROGRAMME

All five of the Governments represented in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have recognized the crucial importance of effective inspection and control in providing the assurance that commitments to reduce and limit and regulate armaments and armed forces will be honoured. President Eisenhower in his statement on disarmament made at Geneva on 21 July 1955 reaffirmed the desire of the United States "to introduce a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armaments". The President said "No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate and reciprocal inspection increase the danger of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace."

The Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Bulganin, on 4 August 1955 told the Supreme Soviet that "the President of the United States justly remarked that each disarmament plan boils down to the question of control and inspection".

Foreign Minister Pearson of Canada, Foreign Minister Pinay of France, Prime Minister Eden of the United Kingdom, have all within the last few months emphasized the need for the kind of control and

UN Document, DC/SC.1/36, pp. 1-6.