DIFFICULTIES ARE CONCEDED

I am mindful of the difficulties in this regard, pointed out in your Government's proposals of May 10, 1955, arising from the possibilities for evading international control and organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The risks inherent in failing to achieve control, however, make it imperative to overcome the difficulties involved and to devise and implement an effective system of safeguards. With genuine efforts on both sides, I feel confident we can succeed in this endeavor.

In general, my feeling is that disarmament should be sought primarily, though not exclusively, in terms of limitations on armaments rather than on men. The former are more subject to supervision, regulation and control than the latter.

In the present state of international affairs and especially in the absence of real peace, in the Far East, I foresee that it may be difficult. to agree on reductions in the general level of armed forces at this time. It should, however, be possible now to agree on measures having a stabilizing effect, dealing with the control and limitation, under proper safeguards, of major types of armaments. These measures will be an essential part of the comprehensive system required to provide security to participating states.

If the United States and the U. S. S. R. and our associates on the subcommittee the United Kingdom, France and Canada-can reach a basic agreement, I am confident that other nations would want to join in what they would regard as a favorable development for world peace. With the agreement of other nations concerned, the United States would expect the agreed system of supervision to apply, in an appropriate and effective manner, to forces and facilities which we both have outside our borders.

UNITED STATES AGGRESSION RULED OUT

During the early phases of such a program, both the U. S. S. R. and the United States would have very extensive military strength, including stocks of nuclear weapons. I wish to make it clear that, so far as the United States is concerned, we would continue to hold such strength, not for aggression, nor for narrow national purposes but as a contribution toward world stability in this transitional period.

I welcome indication that you are giving major attention to this subject, which has such extraordinary significance to the peoples of our two countries and of the other nations of the world. May I assure you and the people of your country that the objective of the United States continues to be the attainment of a just and durable peace.

I hope that the coming meeting of the disarmament subcommittee will succeed in making real progress toward that goal.

I also wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 1, which replied to mine of January 28. My view remains generally as expressed in that letter. But I shall continue to study the problem with a view to seeing whether it seems that any useful new steps can be taken as between us. I may communicate. again with you later on this matter.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 1, 1956.

73652-5624

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

United Kingdom Proposals

76. UNITED KINGDOM: MEMORANDUM: THE CONTROL ORGAN: METHODS, OBJECTS AND RIGHTS OF INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION, SEPTEMBER 13, 19551

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, the methods, objects and rights of inspection and supervision would have to include the following:

1. GENERAL

All States shall, at times to be specified in the conventions, supply the control organ with all the information it requires on the following subjects:

(i) Levels of overall armed forces;

(ii) Conventional land, sea and air armaments, including certain categories of civilian aircraft and shipping;

(iii) Military installations, including barracks, ordnance depots, dockyards and airfields;

(iv) Factories manufacturing armaments (including aircraft), explosives and propellents;

(v) Nuclear installations and reactors;

(vi) Plants making chemical and biological weapons;

(vii) Budgetary documents used by States in preparing and presenting annual estimates of military expenditure;

The control organ shall have the right to analyse and check the above information, in accordance with the procedures described below.

2. THE FREEZE

During this phase the control organ shall:

(i) establish regional offices which shall analyse the information provided by States under paragraph 1 above;

(ii) establish observation posts at specific points such as railway junctions, ports, highways and airfields;

(iii) have the right to:

(a) send teams of inspectors to check on the information provided under sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) of paragraph 1; (b) travel freely to, from and within all States party to the convention;

(c) use the communication systems of all States party to the convention and possess suitable transport and communications of its own.

The control organ shall make preparations during this phase for supervising the measures prescribed in stage 1, so that it may report that it is ready to supervise the measures provided for therein with the minimum intermission.

3. STAGE 1

During this phase, the control organ shall, in addition to possessing the organs and rights prescribed in paragraph 2 above:

(i) have the right to make use of:

(a) aerial reconnaissance;

1 UN Document, DC/SC.1/34, 13 September 1955.

(b) inspection on the ground, under conditions prescribed in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (iv) below;

(c) budgetary control, based on analysis of documents disclosed under sub-paragraph (vii) of paragraph 1 above; (ii) establish fixed teams at points where armed forces are being demobilized and conventional armaments destroyed;

(iii) establish resident inspection posts at certain of the installations and plants listed in sub-paragraph (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 1 above; namely those installations and plants, where inspection is peculiarly difficult and a margin of error critical;

(iv) have the right to inspect all other installations or plants listed in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 1 above at all times which it considers necessary. Advance notice would be given of routine visits, but the right of inspection without warning would also be essential;

(v) have the right to investigate alleged or suspected breaches of the treaty in any establishment or installation;

(vi) have the right to use all technical equipment and devices which may assist inspection and supervision of the measures prescribed for this stage.

The control organ shall make preparations, during this phase, for supervising the measures prescribed in stage 2 so that it may report it is ready to supervise the measures provided for therein with the minimum intermission.

4. STAGE 2

During this phase, the control organ shall, in addition to the organs and rights prescribed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above:

(a) have the right to establish resident inspection posts at, or inspect under the conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (iv) of paragraph 3 above, those installations and plants listed in subparagraphs (v) and (vi) of paragraph 1 above;

(b) have the right to make use of all technical equipment and devices which may assist inspection and supervision of the measures prescribed for this stage.

Proposals by France

77. MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT GENEVA BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION, JULY, 21 1955 1

At the opening meeting of the Geneva Conference, the French Prime Minister stated the reasons which led him to believe that a first condition for ensuring a lasting peace was progress toward disarmament. A second condition is assistance to the peoples of underdeveloped territories in improving their general living conditions.

The French Government believes that these two forms of activity. should be carried out side by side and that consideration should be given to establishing an organic link between them. Such a link should make possible at least a partial solution of the problem of supervision and sanctions in regard to disarmament.

UN Document, DC/SC.1/27, pp. 1-4.

The French Government proposes that States should agree to reduction in the amount of their military expenditure and that the financial resources thus made available should be allocated in whol or in part to international expenditure for development and mutua assistance.

The essentially financial aspect of these proposals must be stressed for it will make possible a comprehensive view of military problems at a high level and will facilitate on an international level the transfer of military expenditure to productive purposes which exceed the resources of any particular country.

The application of these arrangements entails various problems such as the collection and distribution of the financial resources and administrative procedure, which are dealt with in this memorandum.

1. In order to establish the basis for the contribution, an annual statement would be made by each of the Governments concerned on its estimated amount of military expenditure during a twelve-month period, which as a rule would be the period covered by their budget. The first statement would relate to the twelve-month period covered by the budget for the current year.

The statements made by the States would be submitted to an international Secretariat, whose chief task would be to ensure that a common definition of military expenditure was interpreted in the same spirit by all the States. For that purpose the Secretariat would be given the civil and military budgets submitted by the Governments to the legislative bodies which according to their Constitutions are responsible for voting or approving the budget. The Secretariat would also prepare a common nomenclature for all States and a list of the categories of military expenditure, subject to eventual agreements relating to the disarmament programme or to its progressive application and supervision.

The percentage reduction in military expenditure for a particular budget period in relation to the preceding period would be defined for subsequent years by agreement between the Governments concerned. This would make it possible to compute the amounts to be allocated to the International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance.

The rates of assessment during the years in question should be progressive so as to enhance the attractiveness of disarmament. These rates could be related either to the figure for actual military expenditure or, if the Powers agreed on a normal level of military expenditure in relation to their national income or some other criterion to the excess of expenditure over the normal figure thus defined. This second formula would have the advantage of linking the amount of the assessment to the unduly high level of military expenditure maintained by some States.

2. The use of the resources of the International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance would be supervised by the international Secretariat in accordance with the following four criteria:

(a) In order that the peoples of the States concerned might be associated with the results of disarmament, the amount of the contribution due from each country would be reduced, according to a formula to be determined, by part of the reduction in military expenditure effected between one budget period and the next.

Each country would thus be able to make internal transfers in accordance with its own procedure.

(b) Each State contributing to the Fund would also be able to use a predetermined part of its contribution for the benefit of States or territories constitutionally linked to it. All that would be necessary would be to prove to the international Secretariat that the expenditure was genuine.

(c) A part of the available funds then remaining would have to be allocated to orders of all kinds placed in the countries providing the funds. This provision would prevent the reduction of armament expenditure from reacting unfavourably on the level of economic activity of each country, by guaranteeing a certain volume of orders to take the place of military production.

(d) The remaining balance would be used on an international scale and without special restrictions for the development of underdeveloped territories. This allocation would be made in close co-operation with, or even through, the international agencies of the United Nations. It should, however, be made clear that any State which increased its military expenditure would itself be excluded from participation in the benefits of the International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance.

3. The United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France would, of course, be associated with the procedure to be laid down. As, however, these four nations are all represented on the Sub-Comnittee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, of which Canada is also a member, it might be best to entrust to that Sub-Committee the task of formulating the procedure for applying this disarmament and transfer plan.

As a suggestion, however, I should like to make the following points:

(a) The administration of the Fund could be carried out by a managerial organ associated with the international Secretariat already referred to, and those two bodies could come under a common political authority which might, for example, include the competent ministers of the four Powers.

(b) The use of the resources of the Fund would be supervised by the managerial organ, which would not necessarily be composed solely of representatives of the four Powers and of the nations which agreed to adhere to the principles set out in this memorandum, but also of representatives of other countries, selected from among those benefiting from the resources of the International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance.

(c) So far as operations are concerned, recourse might be had to existing agencies, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and various other United Nations bodies, so as to avoid the establishment of an international agency which would duplicate those already functioning to the general satisfaction of all.

(d) The political authority alone would be competent to fix the amount of the contribution from each State. There might be alternative methods of procedure, according to whether the State concerned accepted financial supervision or not. If it refused, the contribution would be arrived at by applying the progressive rate of the levy to the figure of military expenditure declared for the first year. If it accepted, the contribution would be de