toward developing practical consideration of the regulation and reduction of armaments. This and related efforts should be actively pressed to the maximum degree.

Regulation and reduction of armaments with safeguards cannot be considered separately from other aspects of world security. It can be accomplished only to the extent that international confidence and security are achieved. Establishment of effective international control, dependably protected against bad faith, to provide security from atomic warfare is the immediately crucial aspect of the entire problem of armaments and must be emphasized accordingly. Endowment of the Security Council with real enforcement machinery pursuant to article 43 is likewise an essential requirement for attaining practicable agreement on conventional armaments. Difficulties so far encountered in each of these respects must be taken into account in considering the efforts to be made and the rate of progress which may prove possible. They impel the committee to urge, in view of the world's needs, that increased efforts be made in these fields of the work of the United Nations.

11. POSSIBILITY OF CHARTER REVISION

Two methods of proceeding to a review of the Charter are envisaged in paragraph 6 of the resolution. The General Assembly may adopt, by two-thirds vote, amendments which become effective if ratified by two-thirds of the members including all permanent members of the Security Council. Alternatively, under article 109 a General Conference may be called to review the Charter at any time upon a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and any 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council. Under either method amendments become effective if ratified by two-thirds of the members, including all permanent members of the Security Council. Thus each of these permanent members has a veto over final action on an amendment.

The committee concluded that it would be unwise to insist at the present time on revision of the Charter. Such insistence would entail serious risk of breaking up the United Nations and leading to developments inimical to our own national interests and to world peace.

The committee considered that the resolution contains in its preceding provisions the major feasible steps toward rendering the United Nations more fully effective without revision of the Charter. Revision is regarded as a method to be followed only if necessary after a reasonable period of experience and effort toward realizing the purposes of the United Nations within the present Charter provisions. Peace and security could be undermined just as much by impatient attempts to make fundamental alterations of the United Nations as by failure. to make firm and determined efforts to strengthen the United Nations where improvement is needed.

12. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS

It has been contended in some quarters, incorrectly, that this resolution would empower the President to finance shipments of arms to Europe or underwrite a general European defense pact without appropriate congressional approval. On this point the members of the committee were unequivocally in agreement. During the committee

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deliberations it was repeatedly emphasized that the resolution does not bestow upon the President any additional authority whatsoever to make any commitment without the subsequent approval of Congress normally required under the Constitution. Its sole purpose is to advise the President to pursue, by constitutional process, certain objectives within the framework of the United Nations.

The words "by constitutional process" are used in the resolving clause and are repeated in paragraph 3, which relates to regional and other collective arrangements. In addition it has long been clear that any agreements entered into by the United States to provide the United Nations with armed forces or to regulate armaments, as well as any amendment to the Charter, would require congressional approval.

The committee likewise agrees that the resolution should not be interpreted as a commitment on the part of the United States to extend assistance to any state or group of states. Any steps which may be taken in the future to implement the resolution will have to be considered on their merits at that time in order to determine whether such steps are consistent with the Charter and our own national security interests. Clearly any such commitments as those referred to above would call for congressional approval.

13. CONCLUSIONS: REASONS FOR COMMITTEE ACTION

The committee on May 19, 1948, by a vote of 13 to 0, approved the resolution. It recommends its prompt adoption. The major reasons for the action of the committee are summarized below:

1. A constructive program for the strengthening of the United Nations is essential for world peace. To this end, a clear expression of the Senate's views on the objectives which the United States should pursue will support the efforts of the executive branch in the United Nations and will make clear to world opinion the unity of this Government in regard to this program.

2. The United States cannot ignore the security aspect of world recovery. European recovery involves not only the economic elements covered by recently enacted legislation, but also international security considerations. These considerations have fundamental bearing alike upon successful economic recovery and upon world peace.

3. World peace the paramount objective of the United Statescan and should be bulwarked by the development of regional and other collective arrangements among free nations for their selfdefense consistent with the Charter. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such arrangements as affect our national security and as are founded upon the practical principle of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will promote the security of all members of such arrangements, including our own.

4. The time is opportune for the United States to contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear now its determination to defend itself against any armed attack affecting its national security, by exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense recog nized in the Charter. Certainty in advance concerning this intention on the part of the United States should constitute a vital factor in deterring aggression.

5. Maximum efforts to complete the enforcement machinery of the United Nations and to achieve universal regulation and reduction of armaments, with effective safeguards, is obligatory upon every faithful member of the United Nations. The United States should continue to make vigorous efforts to this end.

The United Nations is the forum of negotiation of 58 nations. It is available daily to assist its members to resolve difficult issues between them. It will grow stronger only as members strive to improve it, to use its resources, to conduct their policies in accord with their obligations under its Charter. It is the considered judgment of the committee that world peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms will be advanced through the United Nations strengthened by the practical steps set forth in this resolution.

194. THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION, JUNE 11, 1948 1

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective selfdefense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

1 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d sess.

INTERRELATION OF DISARMAMent, secuRITY, AND peaceful

SETTLEMENT

195. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY (INCLUDING THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT), SEPTEMBER 10, 1919 (EXCERPT) '

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AMENDMENTS

The first amendment offered by the committee relates to the league. It is proposed so to amend the text as to secure for the United States a vote in the assembly of the league equal to that of any other power. Great Britain now has under the name of the British Empire one vote in the council of the league. She has four additional votes in the assembly of the league for her self-governing dominions and colonies, which are most properly members of the league and signatories to the treaty. She also has the vote of India, which is neither a selfgoverning dominion nor a colony but merely a part of the Emprie and which apparently was simply put in as a signatory and member of the league by the peace conference because Great Britain desired it. Great Britain also will control the votes of the Kingdom of Hejaz and of Persia. With these last two of course we have nothing to do. But if Great Britain has six votes in the league assembly no reason has occurred to the committee and no argument had been made to show why the United States should not have an equal number. If other countries like the present arrangement, that is not our affair; but the committee failed to see why the United States should have but one vote in the assembly of the league when the British Empirehas six.

Amendments 39 to 44, inclusive, transfer to China the German lease and rights, if they exist, in the Chinese Province of Shantung, which are given by the treaty to Japan. The majority of the committee were not willing to have their votes recorded at any stage in the proceedings in favor of the consummation of what they consider a great wrong. They can not assent to taking the property of a faithful ally and handing it over to another ally in fulfillment of a bargain made by other powers in a secret treaty. It is a record which they are not willing to present to their fellow citizens or leave behind them for the contemplation of their children.

Amendment No. 2 is simply to provide that where a member of the league has self-governing dominions and colonies which are also members of the league, the exclusion of the disputants under the league rules shall cover the aggregate vote of the member of the league and its self-governing dominions and parts of empire combined if any one of them is involved in the controversy.

The remaining amendments, with a single exception, may be treated as one, for the purpose of all alike is to relieve the United States from having representatives on the commissions established by the league which deal with questions in which the United States. has and can have no interest and in which the United States has evidently been inserted by design. The exception is amendment No.

1 U. S. Congress. Senate. Report No. 176, 66th Congress, 1st session.

45, which provides that the United States shall have a member of the reparation commission but that such commissioner of the United States can not, except in the case of shipping where the interests of the United States are directly involved, deal with or vote upon any other questions before that commission except under instructions from the Government of the United States.

RESERVATIONS

The committee proposes four reservations to be made a part of the resolution of ratification when it is offered. The committee reserves, of course, the right to offer other reservations if they shall so determine. The four reservations now presented are as follows:

"1. The United States reserves to itself the unconditional right to withdraw from the league of nations upon the notice provided in article 1 of said treaty of peace with Germany."

The provision in the league covenant for withdrawal declares that any member may withdraw provided it has fulfilled all its international obligations and all its obligations under the covenant. There has been much dispute as to who would decide if the question of the fulfillment of obligations was raised and it is very generally thought that this question would be settled by the council of the league of nations. The best that can be said about it is that the question of decision is clouded with doubt. On such a point as this there must be no doubt. The United States, which has never broken an international obligation, can not permit all its existing treaties to be reviewed and its conduct and honor questioned by other nations. The same may be said in regard to the fulfillment of the obligations to the league. It must be made perfectly clear that the United States alone is to determine as to the fulfillment of its obligations, and its right of withdrawal must therefore be unconditional as provided in the reservation.

"2. The United States declines to assume, under the provisions of article 10, or under any other article, any obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between other nations, members of the league or not, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States in such controversies, or to adopt economic measures, for the protection of any other country, whether a member of the league or not, against external aggression or for the purpose of coercing any other country, or for the purpose of intervention in the internal conflicts or other controversies which may arise in any other country, and no mandate shall be accepted by the United States under article 22, Part I, of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States."

This reservation is intended to meet the most vital objection to the league covenant as it stands. Under no circumstances must there be any legal or moral obligation upon the United States to enter into war or to send its Army and Navy abroad or without the unfettered action of Congress to impose economic boycotts on other countries. Under the Constitution of the United States the Congress alone has the power to declare war, and all bills to raise revenue or affecting the revenue in any way must originate in the House of Representatives, be passed by the Senate, and receive the signature