the Foreign Relations Committee received in executive session the testimony of Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, supreme allied commander, Europe. On Tuesday, March 29, 1955, it received the testimony of Secretary of State Dulles; on Wednesday, March 30, it heard Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson and received statements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, and Gen. Orval Cook, deputy United States commander in chief, Europe. On the same date the committee also heard the testimony of private witnesses.

On March 31 the committee favorably reported the pending protocols to the Senate and recommended their early consideration and approval.

4. THE NATO PROTOCOL

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that the parties may

by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.

It will be recalled that the North Atlantic Treaty protocol of 1952 (Ex. R, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), which was approved by the Senate but which did not come into effect because the treaty to establish the European Defense Community was not fully ratified, did not invite Western Germany to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. It was not then contemplated that Western Germany would become a member of NATO. Instead, that protocol had the effect of extending the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty to an

armed attack (i) on the territory of any of the members of the European Defense Community in Europe or in the area described in Article 6 (i) of the North Atlantic Treaty or (ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of the European Defense Community when in the area described *

* *

Through another protocol, the Federal Republic as a member of the EDC gave reciprocal commitments to the members of NATO.

The 1954 protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany (Ex. M. 83d Cong., 2d sess., see p. 37) differs from the 1952 protocol in that it authorizes the extension to the Federal Republic of an invitation to accede to the treaty. Germany will by this action become a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

It should be noted that the 1954 NATO protocol will not come into effect until the relevant related treaties have been approved, particularly the instruments modifying the terms of the Brussels Treaty of 1948. This means that Germany will not be able to join NATO until the necessary action has been taken to link steps related to German remilitarization to those provisions of the Brussels Treaty concerned with international control of European armaments.

5. GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

One of the principal purposes of this network of agreements is to enable Western Germany to make a contribution to the collective defense effort of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The importance of this has long been recognized by the Senate. It arises

from the fact that the Soviet Union has in being 175 well armed and trained divisions plus a smaller number of less adequate satellite divisions. It also has a strong air force.

The NATO forces which would be called upon to resist an attack are much smaller. NATO's inferiority in this regard will in part be redressed by a German contribution to those forces. It is expected that this contribution will consist of 12 divisions, about 1,300 tactical aircraft, and some naval craft. General Gruenther, supreme allied commander, Europe, estimated that it might take 3 to 4 years to bring this contribution into being. A major Soviet threat would, of course, accelerate this program.

The committee inquired whether Germany would need United States assistance in building its new armed forces. The Secretary of State pointed out that for a number of years the United States, from military-assistance funds, has been building a substantial stockpile of military equipment for the use of a German Army whenever it should come into being. It was his opinion, therefore, that these agreements would not substantially add to the burden on the United States.

By the Finance Convention, one of the conventions submitted to the Senate for its information (see S. Doc. 11, pp. 59-77), Germany is also obligated to contribute to the support of the Allied forces which will remain stationed there for the free world's protection. Up to June 30, 1955, or until the agreements relating to Germany, the Western European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty all become effective, if this happens before June 30, 1955, this contribution will be (deutschemark) DM600 million or approximately $150 million a month. Should the agreements enter into force before June 30, 1955, Germany's contribution for the next 12 months will be DM3,200 million or about $800 million-an average of $65 million a month. If they do not enter into force by June 30, new negotiations will have to take place to establish Germany's contribution for the following 12 months. After the expiration of the periods set forth in the Finance Convention, Germany agrees to negotiate further with NATO members who have forces stationed there for assistance in the support of those forces.

A further contribution may be expected from Germany in the form of industrial production. In connection with the Brussels Treaty protocols, Germany has renounced the right to manufacture atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as the right to manufacture guided missiles, large naval vessels, and strategic bombing aircraft, without the approval of the Council of Western European Union. This limitation still leaves the German industrial arsenal free to produce many kinds of conventional arms and ammunition for the western alliance.

There are other benefits which will spring from Germany's associa tion with NATO. The committee was impressed in particular with Secretary Dulles' statement on the psychological impact of this association-the increased effectiveness and the sense of unity and cohesion which will be brought about in Western Europe by German participstion in NATO and the Western European Union.

6. THE BONN CONVENTION OF 1952 AS AMENDED BY THE PARIS PROTOCOL

The 1952 Bonn convention, amended by the Paris protocol on the termination of the occupation regime, has three major purposes: (1) It terminates the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and, as noted earlier, the Federal Republic thereby acquires "the full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs"; (2) it sets forth and defines the so-called "retained rights" of the Three Powers which will be continued and which relate to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement; and (3) finally the convention enunciates certain common policies which the parties will pursue, including efforts to achieve a freely negotiated peace settlement and the reunification of a democratic Germany integrated within the European community.

The differences between the amended convention and the original convention of 1952 which the Senate approved are shown on pages 3-18 of Senate Document 11. The amendments themselves, which are now before the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, are contained in schedule I of the Paris protocol on the termination of the occupation regime (pp. 16-21 of Ex. L and Ex. M, 83d Cong., 2d sess.).

Most of the amendments are minor and merely serve to bring the 1952 Bonn convention up to date. There is printed in appendix I of this report a detailed analysis of the original Bonn convention and of the changes thereto which the Senate is called upon to approve.

There are three major changes to which the committee invites the attention of the Senate. The substance of these is to endow Germany with a somewhat greater degree of sovereignty than the 1952 conventions. As such, these changes are of interest primarily to the Republic of Germany and in words of the Secretary of State

neither increase the obligations of, nor diminish the benefits to, the United States as against those reflected in the Bonn convention which was approved by the Senate on July 1, 1952.

One of these changes affects the power originally retained by the occupation authorities (art. 2) relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and their security. The amended convention makes new provisions for the stationing of troops by the Three Powers in Germany. Since the reason for keeping troops in Germany is the Soviet position in East Germany and the necessity of maintaining strong defenses for the free world, of which West Germany is a part, it seemed preferable to enter into a contractual agreement with Germany which would place these troops on a footing substantially equal to those of NATO forces stationed in territory of other NATO members. A separate convention was, therefore, negotiated which is discussed in greater detail below. In his report to the President, Secretary Dulles stated that the elimination of this general right

will not affect the right of a military commander if his forces are imminently menaced to take such immediate action (including the use of armed force) as may be appropriate for their protection and as is requisite to remove the danger.

A second major change has been made in the Charter of the Arbitral Tribunal which is appended to the Convention on Relations. This Tribunal as originally constituted was given powers not customary for an organ which arbitrates disputes between sovereign states. These powers, which applied to legislative and administrative measures or judicial decisions within Germany, are now eliminated.

The amended convention also provides that the Three Powers will give up their right to assume emergency powers when the German Federal Government obtains the requisite legal authority itself.

The last noteworthy change relates to the problem of reunification Under the original terms, the signatories agreed to review the Convention on Relations

upon the request of any one of them in the event of unification.

The amended convention adds this substantive language:

or an international understanding being reached with the participation or consent of the States parties to the present Convention on steps towards bringing about the reunification of Germany * * *

In this case, the parties mutually agree to modify the convention, and the related convention governing the presence of foreign forces on German soil, to the necessary extent, if any. The Secretary, when questioned on the effect of unification on the treaties before the Senate, gave assurances that although unification would alter our legal relationships with the Federal Republic of Germany, there was no danger of a unified Germany alining itself with the Soviet bloc.

7. PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY (EDC) AND WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU)

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which in 1952 recommended approval of the Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic-the Bonn Agreement-stated that the fear—

of the possibility that a German national army might be recreated and a German imperial staff rebuilt

gave rise to the Pleven plan. By that plan the countries of Western Europe were to be able to pool their military power and—

create a single army under common control, the command of which would lie within the general jurisdiction of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE).

The EDC treaty, had it come into effect, would have provided for the assignment of national armed forces to the EDC. In the words of the report:

men

An international or multinational command [would] be created at the army corps level with national units limited to forces of between 13,000 and 14,000 ***. There [would] be common uniforms, a common budget, common procurement of military equipment, and a common training program. All this would have meant

a merging of national sovereignty and power into a common defense organization. Members of the European Defense Community would have been Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and Western Germany.

The Brussels Treaty, which provides the framework for the projected Western European Union, was an agreement made in 1948 as between France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. By that treaty the parties agreed to give full and immediate military assistance to any party against which aggression might occur. It also provided for the development of common defense plans and for broad areas of cooperation between the parties.

When it became apparent that the EDC had failed of the necessary ratification, steps were taken to strengthen and extend the Brussels Treaty so that it might be a more effective focus of European integration. A strengthened Brussels Treaty would serve as a method of assuring German participation in joint defense plans and at the same time create a method to control armaments among the Brussels powers. Four protocols have been proposed.

The first protocol to the Brussels Treaty provides for the accession of Italy and Germany. Thus the membership will correspond to the membership of the defunct EDC except that the United Kingdom will be a member of this group. This protocol also provides that the Consultative Assembly of the Brussels Treaty is to be transformed into a new "Council of Western European Union." Provision is made for close cooperation between this new Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The second protocol to the Brussels Treaty concerns the size of the armed forces to be placed under the command of the supreme allied commander. Increases in the size of these forces will be subject to unanimous approval of all parties to the treaty. In connection with this protocol, the United Kingdom has undertaken to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of the forces it now assigns to the command of the supreme allied commander. This commitment and the actual participation of the United Kingdom in the substitute for the EDC was an important factor in getting French acceptance of the agreements.

The third protocol is concerned with armaments which are to be controlled by the Western European Union, including those which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture. There is provision for relaxation of the limitations on German armaments in some categories provided SACEUR so recommends and its recommendations are approved by a two-thirds majority of the Council.

The final protocol to the Brussels Treaty establishes an Agency for the Control of Armaments. This Agency is to exercise its control over stocks of armaments rather than over production. It also has responsibility to see that prohibited items are not produced in Germany.

The protocols to the Brussels Treaty do not in any way affect the obligations of the United States. The United States is not a party to the Brussels agreement. The effective operation of the Brussels Treaty, as amended by these protocols, is, however, of concern to the United States since it provides a method whereby German forces may be contributed to the defense of Western Europe without rousing the fears of other nations of Western Europe essential to that defense. Further, not only as a major step toward the elimination of intraEuropean strife but in a broader sense, these agreements provide the