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Marcus Wolf is head of the "Main Administration for Intelligence" of this Soviet-directed East German school.

This school gives a 1-year course to 40 handpicked students annually. I think you would be interested in the curriculum.

The first 6 months are given over to political indoctrination and knowledge of foreign countries. Dialectical materialism; history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the class structure of foreign countries; and the strength of their respective Communists Parties are some of the subjects covered.

Particular emphasis is placed on West German political parties their personnel, structure, outlook, and internal dissensions; the structure of the Federal German Government—especially its security seryices, Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, All-German Affairs, and the Federal Chancellery; the West German Army and its relations with NATO, CENTO, and SEATO pact countries.

The second half year of study is devoted to practical subjects, such as audio surveillance and the use of audio equipment, lock picking, and making copies of keys. The students have to prepare two dead drops (places of concealment and pick-up of intelligence material), which are filled and serviced by other students. They have to prepare and carry through two meeting plans in East Berlin, using an experinced HVA officer to play the part of a secret agent. They have to take and develop clandestine photographs of secret installations.

To prepare for work in cultured circles, the students are lectured on etiquette, literature, architecture, and religion. During the entire year there is regular instruction in English, photography, driving, military training, sports, and hand-to-hand fighting.

At the completion of the course the students are taken across the border for trips through West Germany. The purposes are to allow the students to become acquainted with the targets they will be working on; to give them some background knowledge of the area so they will be able to instruct their agents; to give them some familiarity with the target area so they will be able to estimate the validity of their agents' reports and provide tighter control.

Each year roughly half the students-about 20-are sent forth to be resident agents—Soviet Zone spymasters actually living in West Germany-with the responsibility of establishing and supervising a network of subagents.


Major Buchsbaum, I am wondering if you know of any efforts being made to educate and thereby to equip American personnel serving in West Berlin and in Western Europe to defend themselves against the subversive activities of these highly trained and specialized Communist agents ?

Major BUCHSBAUM. Well, there are security lectures and there are security briefings of personnel against attempts of sabotage, infiltration for reasons of espionage, and so forth. But, sir, as I mentioned before, I did not serve with American headquarters, but, rather, with an allied headquarters in Berlin.

Senator THURMOND. Major Buchsbaum, it is not just our military personnel who require education to combat Communist subversion, as I am sure you



All Americans, including civil service employees, are subjected to the same dangers. Consider, for example, one case that happened early in 1961. It is the case of a woman employee--an American citizen-of our Armed Forces in Germany. For the purpose of clarity, we will call her "Margaret,” which is not her name.

While visiting the Embassy Club in Bonn, Margaret met a manPaul-who claimed to be a naturalized U.S. citizen. Romance developed and Paul soon began talking of marriage.

Soon, thereafter, Paul moved to West Berlin. A few weeks later, Margaret received a telephone call telling her that her fiance had been involved in a serious automobile accident and was in an East Berlin hospital.

Margaret visited the hospital in East Berlin and returned home without incident. One week later she again flew to Berlin to see her fiance.

Just before she left the hospital, Paul handed her a package containing a roll of films and asked her to deliver it to his West Berlin landlord. As Margaret left the hospital, she was stopped by the Soviet-controlled East German Security Police, arrested, and charged with espionage. Margaret, thereupon, was driven to a private home, stripped, and forced to undergo a thorough physical search.

The developed film contained photographs of East German military equipment. Margaret was then taken to Soviet headquarters where she was confronted with Paul. He admitted giving her the film but protested that she had had no knowledge of its contents.

After several hours of intense interrogation, Margaret was allowed a few minutes alone with Paul. He told her that he was employed by a Western intelligence service and was now in serious trouble. Margaret was then taken back to the private home.

Margaret was introduced to a Soviet Army officer, who wasted no time in offering to release Paul, provided she would steal coded telegrams on U.S. policy from her office. Margaret frantically agreed, signed a statement of obligation to the Soviet Intelligence Service, and was then escorted to the West Berlin border.

Immediately upon her return Margaret reported the entire matter to her superiors.

Investigation by authorities brought the facts to light. Paul's claims to American citizenship were false. He was a Soviet intelligence agent, under instructions to lure Margaret into a compromising situation. The Soviet Army officer was identified as the former Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Yevgenily Alekseyevich Zaostrovtsev, who had been unofficially asked to leave the United States in 1959. Zaostrovtsev, it was learned, had been using East Berlin as a base for coercing American citizens into espionage activities.

Major Buchsbaum, this particular young American woman had the very sound judgment which prevented her compromise by the Communist espionage apparatus. Others, unfortunately, do not always think so clearly and act so wisely under the intense pressures generated by the highly trained Communist agents, who, as a matter of fact, are often experienced, hardened criminals recruited into, or hired by, the Communist apparatus.

I was just wondering if you knew the extent to which our American personnel in Europe, such as the type person I just mentioned, are

prewarned concerning the whole gamut of the commonly used Communist devices for compromising our personnel and, through them, our security ?

Major BUCHSBAUM. Well, I believe that blackmail through compromise is one of the favorite tactics of the Communist intelligence agencies, and I believe that all personnel, all American personnel going overseas, should be thoroughly briefed on it. I know I was briefed, but I do not know, because I have not been in this field, I do not know whether briefing of others is adequate or not.


Senator THURMOND. At the U.S. Military Academy a secret lecture on Communist subversion is provided before the Cadets go overseas on summer duty.

What I have used here is unclassified information. I am just wondering if you know why our authorities conceal this type of information by classifying it “secret” ?

Major BUCHSBAUM. No, sir, I have not seen the text of the lecture and I could not say.

Senator THURMOND. It is important for the people going overseas ?

Major BUCHSBAUM. I imagine the cadets, having before then a very honored position in the Army, the position of commissioned officers, probably are given information from intelligence reports that are not available to the general public.

This may be-I am just speculating—this may be the reason for the secret classification.

But I have not personally seen any of the lectures or briefings to the cadets.

Senator THURMOND. Is there any reason why a lecture to cadets on Communist subversion, unless there is something there that is very secret, should be classified as secret, because that is information, it seems, that would be helpful to most people who are going overseas, where they are especially going to work with the American forces in one way or another?

Major BUCHSBAUM. Sir, in many cases the fact that we have knowledge of certain operations, incidents, would indicate what sources we are using

Revealing our knowledge might give away or compromise our sources, and that is, in many cases, the reason for classification, which someone, who is not particularly informed about the whole setup, might not understand.

Senator THURMOND. I can understand that.
Major BUCHSBAUM. Yes, indeed, sir.
Senator STENNIS. Let me interrupt you here, if I may.

Would it suit you just as well to recess now and come back at 2 o'clock, or would you rather run on until 1 o'clock and come back at 2:30 ?

Senator THURMOND. I will be through, I think, in about 10 minutes.
Senator STENNIS. I am not rushing you. I am just compelled to go
Senator THURMOND. I will be through in about 10 minutes.
Senator STENNIS. You would rather recess until 2:30, then. Just


go ahead.

Senator THURMOND. We can come back at 2 o'clock.
Senator STENNIS. Go ahead if you have just 10 more minutes.
Senator THURMOND. We will make it 2:30.
Senator STENNIS. All right, continue.
Excuse me.

Senator THURMOND. (presiding). I can understand, Major, if there is any information that would reveal any sources of information, which, if divulged, would be helpful to the enemy.

Major BUCHSBAUM. Right, sir.

Senator THURMOND. But, otherwise, such as the Communist methods of infiltration and subversion and kidnaping and all of those things where sources are not revealed which would be helpful to the enemy, it seems it would be much more effective if they were not classified.

Major BUCHSBAUM. Well, we are urged in our Army Regulation 380-5 to classify all information on the substance and we are warned against overclassifying.

I can hardly believe that just only the way the Communist espionage system operates would be classified information, unless actual incidents and actual cases are mentioned.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, you see no necessity for it unless there was some source to be divulged or something that would be helpful to the enemy?

Major BUCHSBAUM. I do believe that all officers who classify information are using their best judgment in not overclassifying the content of the paper that they are working on. We are trying

very hard and I am trying in my shop. I have downgraded many items that have been classified.

We are not



Senator THURMOND. Let me ask you this, now. I am going to put in this record before the hearing is over some information that is marked "secret” by the Army, but I am going to take it from unclassified newspaper clippings.

Now, how do you explain that?
Major BUCHSBAUM. I do not know, sir.

I would have to look at the individual item and maybe I could guess.

Senator THURMOND. I am going to put in numbers of items which the Army has marked "secret" which have been obtained from newspapers, and so, evidently, such a case as that, there would seem to be no excuse for that, would there?

Major BUCHSBAUM. Well, I say there would be no excuse, if the information is gained from the newspaper, it is no excuse for classifying it.

Senator THURMOND. Exactly.

And if they made a mistake in a case like that, evidently they can be made in other cases. They are not infallible just because they are in the service, are they?

Major BUCHSBAUM. No, they are not infallible, but I would really have to see the text of the statement.


Senator THURMOND. Do you not think, Major, the more information that we can get to the people about this Communist enemy, this international conspiracy, the manner in which it operates, its aims and designs, its goals to dominate the world and enslave the people of the world, and the insidious manner in which it operates, and the infiltration and the propaganda and the other devices it uses, that the more information we can get to the people, the better we inform them about this enemy, the better we will be able to defend ourselves?

Major BUCHSBAUM. I, indeed, think so, sir, and it was my attempt within the narrow scope that I could work in to bring the things to the knowledge of the public.

That was the very purpose of my prepared statement, sir.


Senator THURMOND. Now, Major Buchsbaum, returning to Mr. Hans' testimony in the hearing of the Internal Security Subcommittee, on page 39, Mr. Hans summarizes what he called

Major BUCHSBAUM. Excuse me, sir; 39, you said ?

Senator THURMOND. I'm sorry, I should have said 35. Mr. Hans summarizes what he calls our "fearful and cautious regulations" concerning communism. I think this is perhaps the most urgent appeal in his entire testimony. He says:

My urgent recommendations are that the U.S. intelligence and security agencies be built up and expanded to become more effective and to constitute a true deterrent to further Soviet and Communist aggression and subversion; that operational needs in this respect are not disregarded or inadequately met within, for instance, military intelligence and security organizations, for the sake of overriding administrative or budgetary policy considerations; that the intelligence and foreign area specialists of the U.S. Government and Armed Forces are not lost to the security effort because of strict adherence to such “fearful or cautious” regulations as any recent foreign nationality, foreign spouses, or unwillingness to grant necessary waivers for their utilization and retention under unusual circumstances.

As long as it was possible, shortly after World War II, to use to really great national advantage such onetime enemies and currently truly loyal Americans as Wernher von Braun, then the utilization of valuable and capable individuals in the fields of intelligence and security at the present state of "peace” with the Soviets should be just as important, if not more essential, to winning the running battle of the cold war. Inadequate funds, antiquated measures for the sake of not taking chances on any foreign-born individuals, the neglect of operational requirements for the benefit of increased administrative activities, and the failure to coordinate all agencies efficiently on all levels in an all-out national security and, above all, active propaganda effort, should all be overcome in future measures and plans by the U.S. Government regarding really adequate endeavors to combat Communist aggression and subversion.

Major, I think you will agree, based on your own personal experience—and we have found this also to be true in these investigationsthat we have been on the defensive against communism too long.

The Soviet success has been our apathetic reluctance to stand up at home and abroad for what we know to be right.

Certainly, Mr. Hans documents has appraisal of our ineffectiveness in stemming Communist subversion, espionage, and propaganda in Europe.

From your previous answer to a question, I am sure you agree, do you not, that we do need more intelligence officers, who are trained in intelligence, who can assist in this effort against communism?

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