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Major BUCHSBAUM. I wholeheartedly agree, Senator, and another thing that I may add, that a man does not become an intelligence officer after 4 weeks in a training course. To be an intelligence officer requires many years of experience, and, unfortunately, we are losing those men at a very large rate, at a very fast rate of attrition.
Senator THURMOND. If there are any intelligence officers who have been released in the last few years who are competent, qualified, and experienced officers, and who are willing to be recalled to active duty, it would seem to be something worthy of consideration, would it not, to try to get them back?
Major BUCHSBAUM. Without any knowledge of other personnel considerations, because I have always tried to keep away from the personnel field, I might say that from the intelligence point of view, most of the people who have had years of intelligence should be recalled and put to work.
WHETHER COMMUNIST EFFORT IS CENTRALLY CONTROLLED
Senator THURMOND. Major, we were speaking about this Communist conspiracy being a total enemy and operating on an international basis.
And whether it is in Berlin or whether it is in New York City, or whatnot, they follow the same principles, the same orders are sent out from Moscow, and they follow the same methods.
They only adapt them to the circumstances of infiltration, subversion, propaganda, and other means, do they not?
Major BUCHSBAUM. Yes, sir.
There is no doubt that the entire Communist effort is centrally controlled.
HOW COMMUNISTS ADJUST TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Senator THURMOND. In other words, there would be no difference, other than in degree, in the methods of Communist operations, say, in Berlin, as compared with New York or some other place?
Major BUCHSBAUM. Well, sir, I have a slightly different opinion.
I believe that they are unusually uncanny in adjusting their own line to the local circumstances and to the times. They have the knack of doing it, and they are doing it very effectively.
But the basic principle never changes, and the central direction from one point never changes.
Senator THURMOND. They are more brazen in close proximity to the base of their operations, but the techniques of subversion and propaganda and infiltration are patterned from one cloth, even though they might make certain adaptations to suit the local situation ?
Major BUCHSBAUM. Yes, sir.
I wish to compliment you for your testimony here this morning and commend you for your deep insight and your knowledge of communism, and I might say that men like yourself, who have been behind the Iron Curtain, have firsthand knowledge of the situation and can be very helpful in our anti-Communist effort.
Major BUCHSBAUM. Thank you, sir.
Senator THURMOND. And I want to congratulate you for what you have said here this morning and for your service to the country in the work you are now doing.
Major BUCHSBAUM. Thank you, sir.
(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)
Senator STENNIS (presiding). The subcommittee will come to order.
Senator, I understood you had a couple more questions for the major, is that right?
Senator THURMOND. That is right. I am just about through with him.
Senator STENNIS. That is all right; proceed.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JOHN H. BUCHSBAUM-Resumed
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
Senator THURMOND. Major, this morning we covered the lack of not only intelligence training but the lack of adequate numbers of intelligence personnel thoroughly trained in techniques of Communist subversion and propaganda.
I would like to pursue this problem briefly because I think it is a key to our being on the defensive not only in oversea situations but even in dealing with domestic problems.
My point is this. We are at war with the Communists. It is a cold war. În this new type of war, the intelligence, psychological warfare and information officers are in the frontline in the battle for men's minds. This is the reason we must have skilled personnel and adequately staffed sections to handle this area of training.
Do you agree with the urgency that I am trying to convey to you?
Senator THURMOND. Are you in accord with that, or how do you feel about it?
Major BUCHSBAUM. I am. I agree that we have great need for larger numbers of well-trained and experienced intelligence personnel, both in the commissioned ranks and in senior NCO's.
Senator THURMOND. In this cold war do you feel there is a greater need or, I might say, there is a greater shortage in people of that skill than there is in people generally, say with the hardware people, for instance ?
Major BUCHSBAUM. Well, of course I am not qualified to pass any judgment on other branches of the U.S. Army, but my feeling is that the mission of combat training installations within the United States, for instance, at the present time is to prepare for a future hot war, if such a war were to come.
This is a training mission, a preparation for future needs. However, in our field, in the intelligence field at least, the need is present.
We are now at war, and the need for people in the intelligence community is a present one.
We do not have our people in the service in order to train and prepare them for some future contingency, but we need them now to operate, to perform their job within that cold war.
Senator THURMOND. In other words, there is an existing need now in the cold war, without waiting until there is a hot war, is that what you are trying to say!
Major BUCHSBAUM. That is what I am trying to say.
TIME REQUIRED TO TRAIN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
Senator THURMOND. Well, that is my thinking, and I just wondered if you were in accord with it.
Now we have agreed that the military must constantly improve across the board, of course, in all branches and in all services to get ready for a hot war situation, and I agree that we must have thorough preparedness for a hot war situation, understand, but I am speaking now of this cold war that we are presently in, that there is a definite need to have people trained in intelligence.
As a matter of fact, intelligence officers can be trained, but doesn't it take some time to make a good intelligence officer? You can't do it in just a few months, can you?
Major BUCHSBAUM. It takes a very long time. There is no substitute for experience. You can train an officer in school-type courses, and he is still not qualified to perform the functions, particularly the functions on a somewhat higher level.
In order to perform intelligence functions in a manner in which we would like to have it performed, an officer must have practical experience. He must have had the experience not only in one type of activity, but he must operate under different circumstances and different conditions. In other words, it takes a long time to train a good intelligence officer.
NEED FOR MORE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
Senator THURMOND. We must have ordnance sections, quartermaster, infantry divisions, submarine crews, tactical fighter wings, and so forth. I understand that, and we all I think agree with that, and I agree with the needs to prepare all of our services for a military conflict.
But I do not agree that it is a hot war that we must prepare for only, because I feel that we are losing ground in the cold war struggles going on every day. It is in the cold war conflict that we urgently need to pay greater attention to intelligence training, psychological operations, unconventional training and harder hitting troop information programs to apprise the soldier of the war that we are in.
Are you in accord with that?
Senator THURMOND. Major, when you were speaking about intelligence personnel shortages this morning, isn't the key here to your analysis, with which incidentally I wholeheartedly concur, that it is the intelligence officer and psychological officer and the information officer who are the crucial factors in winning or losing the battle for men's minds?
Major BUCHSBAUM. The intelligence officer actually is not actively engaged in battling for men's minds, but he provides first of all the information on which a psychological warfare officer can formulate his programs.
Secondly, he has a defensive mission in preventing any inroads of the Communist conspiracy into our own ranks. It is a dual mission, but it is not a mission of actively conducting a battle for men's minds.
Senator THURMOND. In other words, the psychological officer and the information officer need the information from the intelligence officer that assists them in preparation of their programs to win men's minds, isn't that true?
Major BUCHSBAUM. That is correct.
Senator THURMOND. Now the ordnance officer, the quartermaster and all of the others who are concerned with hardware weapons in preparation for a hot war are important, but they are not critically employed right now in the showdown with communism in the cold war.
Intelligence is badly needed, however, in this cold war, and we need more intelligence people in this cold war, do we not?
Major BUCHSBAUM. We do.
Senator THURMOND. One other point, Major. The lack of intelli. gence trained personnel at home and abroad creates the situation of coping only with the most urgent intelligence requirements.
As General Fitch told us several weeks ago, many of the other jobs that should be done go by the wayside because of the lack of adequate personnel.
For example, the intelligence inspections rarely turn up vulnerabili- . ties and faulty intelligence training or even security risks. The required instruction on Sino-Soviet subversion and espionage directed against the Army is checked by the inspector general to determine whether or not there is adequate training on AR 381-12.
Now, doesn't it take a thoroughly experienced intelligence officer who can determine whether or not this required instruction is actually being given and whether it is understood and whether the Army regulation is being acted on by all concerned to detect this?
Major BUCHSBAUM. It does.
WHETHER MANY FUNCTIONS ARE NOT PERFORMED BECAUSE OF LACK OF
Senator THURMOND. The inspector general neither possesses adequately trained people to determine vulnerabilities in this area nor is the inspector general particularly concerned with cold war problems.
In our own investigation, the staff members of the subcommittee have found any number of junior grade officers who neither understood the content of 381-12 nor were they capable of acting on its instruction.
Until the intelligence specialist assigned to the commander finds time to insure that intelligence regulations are adhered to, they will be giving lipservice as a nice to have, but not essential service. In my opinion it is in this attitude that we are losing ground in our struggle against communism. What is your view of the problem?
Major BUCHSBAUM. Because of a shortage of persomel, we have to perform the most important function first, and therefore may have to forgo the performance of very important functions, but which are a little bit lower on the list of priorities that we have to perform at this moment.
In other words, we are spread very thin, and in order to perform our functions, we cannot be spread any wider and thinner. Many things that we all would like to have done, and I think many things that are important, have been neglected and must be neglected, because there just is not sufficient manpower available, trained manpower that is available to perform all the functions.
Senator THURMOND. Now if we win this cold war, we have got to have the tools with which to win it, haven't we?
Major BUCHSBAUM. That is correct.
NEED FOR TRAINED INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN THE COLD WAR
Senator THURMOND. And isn't one of the essential tools these intelligence officers that I have spoken about, trained intelligence people?
Major BUCHSBAUM. Their knowledge, their experience, is indispensable. I believe that it would be to the benefit of our own mission and in the interests of our country if we had more well-trained and well-experienced intelligence officers, and I am afraid we are losing them. We are losing more through retirement at this very moment.
Senator THURMOND. And if necessary to increase the budget some or to get the funds and whatever is needed in some other way to provide these people, do you feel it is important the we have them, because this is the war we are in right now, the cold war, and if we are going to win this cold war, we have got to have, as I said, the tools here with which to win it.' We have got to have this training and this experience of these officers in intelligence.
Major BUCHSBAUM. Yes, sir, I think money devoted to this project would be well spent and will bring dividends.
However, training alone does not make an Intelligence officer. I believe I stated that once before. What would be important is to have a chance to keep on officers who are about to retire or, as you suggested previously, sir, to bring back some who already have retired, because you cannot find a substitute for experience. You cannot take a Finance Corps, a Quartermaster officer, and give him a 4-week course at an Intelligence Center, and then bring him in to perform an important Intelligence function. He just does not have the experience.
Senator STENNIS. Major, excuse me just a minute. You are talking to a man who has been on the Armed Services Committee a good long while. This testimony is so elemental that I am going to ask the Senator to go to another question.
Now let's see if we can take a little inventory of our time here, gentlemen.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I am through with those questions. That was the last question I had.
Senator STENNIS. I say I think he has fully covered that.