EVALUATION OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S "PRIMER ON GUERRILLA WAR"

Senator THURMOND. Colonel Wilson, I would like to review with you the salient points in Mao Tse-tung's "Field Manual-Primer on Guerrilla War." It is of utmost importance for American military leaders to understand it. This pamphlet was translated by Gen. Samuel B. Griffith (USMC). Recently the President said that the Communists

send arms, agitators, aid, technicians, and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required it is usually done by others-by guerrillas striking at night *

*.

In his growing concern over this Nation's ability both to wage and to combat guerrilla warfare, the President has apparently been studying the works of the Communist authority in the field, the Chinese Communist Mao Tse-tung. Among Mao's many discussions of the subject was a primer of guerrilla warfare published in 1937 to summarize the lessons learned in a decade of civil war in China and to apply them to the war with Japan then beginning. The Mao doctrines later became a bible of guerrilla warfare from Indochina to Algeria to Cuba.

I would like your views and evaluation on several sections of the book, if you are familiar with it. Your remarks must of course be unclassified in open session. Are you at liberty to speak in open session on that?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, I feel I can, in general terms.

This is a book which, while it moves in the realm of tactical theory, is rooted in practice, rooted in experience, and from a doctrinal standpoint, sir, it has a certain soundness which again we from a professional standpoint have to respect. And in respecting it, we had better learn from it. I think you will find that this book, and other works of Mao Tse-tung, are found on many, many officers' desks today, both in the Pentagon, as well as at such places as Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, and other posts, camps, and stations where people are concerned with this problem.

So the growing awareness of the criticality of this threat has been accompanied, not only by official actions, but by officers on their own acquainting themselves with what the problem is and what their role is in connection with it, in order to carry out their responsibilities more effectively.

Senator THURMOND. A statement from Mao's books states:

Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people, for their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counterrevolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the people and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.

Doesn't this suggest to you that defenders against Communist guerrillas must be educated on the propaganda line of Communists in guerrilla action localities in order to be able to sever the ties between the guerrillas and the local people by refutation of the Communist's political propaganda line?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, sir-but not only to refute the Communist propaganda line, but to carry a positive message at the same time to the same target.

DEPENDENCE OF GUERRILLA ACTIONS ON LOCAL SUPPORT

Senator THURMOND. Colonel, do you agree that guerrilla actions are limited in potential for success to those areas where they have at least a substantial degree of sympathy and support from the local populace?

Colonel WILSON. As a general statement, most emphatically, yes, sir. There may be exceptions where the support can be provided from a third country, via other means. But as a general statement, decidedly, yes. This is required for the guerrilla to be successful.

COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING TO BREACH TIES BETWEEN COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS AND LOCAL SUPPORTERS

Senator THURMOND. What effort is being made to train our forces for counterinsurgency in the techniques of breaching the political ties between the Communists and local populace supporters?

Colonel WILSON. If you could raise this question under executive session, sir, I feel that I could give you a more complete answer.

Senator THURMOND. Now, to accomplish a breach of sympathies between Communist guerrilla forces and a particular local populace, is it not necessary for our counterinsurgency forces to be educated in the fallacies of Communist ideology and the tyrannical nature of their regimes?

Colonel WILSON. I would like to repeat my previous remark-that that is half of it, sir. The other half is you have got to have a positive product to sell.

Senator THURMOND. You do not have to go into executive session on that.

Colonel WILSON. No, sir.

WHETHER PICTURES OF COMMUNIST ATROCITIES ARE USED BY

COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES

Senator THURMOND. Has anyone compiled, for example, a pictoral presentation of Communist atrocities to be used by our counterinsurgency forces in opening the eyes of local populace supporters to the wile and inhuman methods and practices of Communist rule?

Colonel WILSON. I have seen none, sir, and know of no specific effort to do this. It could well have occurred at a field level. But to the extent it would come to my attention, I know of no such effort.

EFFECT OF ISOLATION OF MILITARY FROM POLITICS

Senator THURMOND. According to Mao, there are some militarists who say:

It is

We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms. vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal.

Have you found that our traditional isolation of the military from political areas prevents our military leaders from full and objective recognition of an defense against the integration of military and political offensives wherever they operate?

Colonel WILSON. The traditional policy of the military to stand clear of partisan politics in this country, a correct posture, has on many occasions been distorted and projected into the international political arena where this rule should no longer apply. So the answer is yes, sir, it has been an impending and inhibiting influence in a number of different instances, and it has grown out of our own traditions.

"SOFT SELL" TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR BY CHINESE

Senator THURMOND. Another passage from Mao concerns Communist propaganda against us:

We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of the enemy.

We heard from Colonel Mayer and Lieutenant Thorin that this "soft sell" was prevalent in Chinese prisoner of war camps. Had you heard of this?

Colonel WILSON. Oh, yes, sir.

REPORT OF AMERICAN SERVICEMEN WHO LIED ON ORDERS FROM SUPERIORS

Senator THURMOND. Recently the newspapers carried accounts of two American servicemen who had been prisoners of the Communist Viet Cong and who were recovered. When questioned by the press, the two denied they had brought back Communist propaganda pamphlets, but later it was reported that they lied on orders from superiors. The press reported that Army officials said the pamphlets were being analyzed. Do you have any knowledge of the incident, and could you tell us why our forces there are so poorly trained in dealing with propaganda efforts of the Communists, such as this one which is totally consistent with Mao's manual, that our troops are exposed to the world as deceivers and liars?

Colonel WILSON. I am fully acquainted with the incident, sir. I cannot offer an explanation for the instructions which these two special forces men received.

MILITARY INSTRUCTION ON REVOLUTIONARY ANTIMILITARISM

Senator THURMOND. In what form of educational effort, if any, are our commanders impressed with the Communist doctrine of revolutionary antimilitarism, which, according to Dr. Beerstecher, is the foundation cornerstone of Communist strategy for world domination, and the tactics used by the Communists in implementing this doctrine?

Colonel WILSON. Would you give me the first portion of that again, please?

Senator THURMOND. I would be glad to.

In what form of educational effort, if any, are our commanders impressed with the Communist doctrine of revolutionary antimilitarism, which, according to Mr. Beerstecher, is the foundation cornerstone of Communist strategy for world domination, and the tactics used by the Communists in implementing this doctrine?

Colonel WILSON. To the best of my knowledge, at our lower levels of service schools and colleges, no significant emphasis is placed on this particular facet which you have read to me. I would venture an opinion that at the level of our war colleges, that there no doubt is considerable literature which is listed in the required student reading lists covering this particular problem.

TRAINING OF U.S. SOLDIER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Senator THURMOND. Another revealing passage states:

Guerrillas can gain the initiative if they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories; because he is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of the stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of their own cleverness.

Now from this, it is obvious that the Communist guerrillas are being taught to capitalize on our weaknesses. What effort is being made to train the U.S. soldier on vulnerabilities of the Communists?

Colonel WILSON. This particular problem or series of problems is treated in the counterinsurgency course at Fort Bragg, N.C., at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School. There is one specific answer. In a number of other courses, either already established or being established, I am sure that this concentration on the vulnerabilities of the enemy guerrillas is one of the chief points emphasized in these

courses.

USE OF FILM "BATTLE FOR CHINA"

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mao also teaches:

When the situation is serious the guerrillas must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas.

Do you know to what extent the DA film TF-30-2109, "Battle for China," which teaches these techniques, is used in training of our troops?

Colonel WILSON. Sir, I regret to say I have not seen that particular film, and do not know. I cannot give a satisfactory answer.

USE OF FILM "SOVIET PARTISAN WARFARE”

Senator THURMOND. The Army training film "Soviet Partisan Warfare" Mf 30-8616, which we consider one of the most important instruments to show the young military men what the Communist enemy is all about, was shown at West Point, for example, only twice during the period of September 1960 through March 1961. I cite this example only to indicate how hard-hitting exposure of the real nature of the Communist enemy too often lies dormant in film racks or libraries. Have you seen this film?

Colonel WILSON. If this is a reasonably old film, I think I have. I have seen a number of Soviet films in this area, sir, and am quite familiar with their overall effort in the films.

USE OF WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG IN TEACHING COMMUNIST
MEANING OF "REVOLUTION"

Senator THURMOND. Colonel Wilson, as we know from their own propaganda and profuse doctrinal writings, the Communists consider their movements toward world domination a "revolution." There is little or no evidence that our troops are being educated to understand just what a dirty mess the Communists mean when they refer to "revolution."

The services might well use Mao Tse-tung's writings to reveal what the Communists mean when they use the term revolution. Mao states:

A revolution is not the same as inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing fancy needlework; it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle, or so mild, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another. To right a wrong it is necessary to exceed proper limits, and the wrong cannot be righted without the proper limits being exceeded.

To your knowledge, do we use such words of the Communists to teach either our commanders or our troops the nature of the enemy? Colonel WILSON. Such words?

Senator THURMOND. That's right-as were used in the statement I quoted from.

Colonel WILSON. I know of specific instances in which we have, yes, sir, in terms of, again, instruction given at Fort Bragg, where we cite heavily and use very extensively both this document that you are reading from as well as other documents.

WHETHER SUFFICIENT EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

Senator THURMOND. Colonel Wilson, the laxities and inadequacies of troop and public education, together with the almost exclusive preoccupation with weapons which we find manifest in our military and Government circles today, make us wonder whether we have not lost sight of the very vital truth which Mao Tse-tung recognizes in the statement, and I quote:

Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts.

From this statement, it is obvious that even the Communists, whose whole beliefs are based on materialism, are realists enough to recognize this fundamental principle. We go to great pains to make our hardware, such as missiles, invulnerable to attack. In your opinion, are we taking sufficient measures to insure that the decisive element-the individual soldier-is also made invulnerable?

Colonel WILSON. I do not like to beg the question, sir, at all. I am trying to give an honest answer. I think that that is an area in which you never really do enough. Now, whether we have reached a reasonable level of emphasis on man the individual versus our concentration on hardware I honestly do not know. I personally have some doubts in this area, that we may have swung a little too much in the direction of the machine, forgetting that it is the man behind it who counts.