Senator THURMOND. As I understand your answer, it was not the accuracy or truthfulness of General Power's statements yesterday but rather that the clear statement of such details was inadvisable at the time when the President of the United States was conferring face-toface with the Soviet Premier, is that correct?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator THURMOND. It seems to be obvious that although we might have overwhelming military capabilities, if those we sought to deter were convinced we would not respond by using such capabilities if they took a particular action, then they would hardly be deterred, regardless of the size of our capabilities, would they?

Mr. BALL. That is quite correct.

EFFECT OF UNITED STATES INTENTION TO RESIST ANY SOVIET AGGRESSION IN BERLIN

Senator THURMOND. I believe that the President stated that one of his primary objectives in meeting with Khrushchev last summer was for the purpose of convincing the Soviet Premier that the United States would, indeed, use its power to respond to any Soviet aggression in Berlin.

The President recognized that it was necessary to prevent a miscalculation by the Communists of our will to resist over Berlin.

Would you not agree that a primary factor in the Soviet failure to force the issue in Berlin last summer was the President's ability to convince the Soviets that we would resist in Berlin?

Mr. BALL. I quite agree, Senator Thurmond.
I think that has definitely been a factor.

U.S. POLICY ON LAOS

Senator THURMOND. Now, the same principle was illustrated in Laos but, of course, in a different manner. In Laos the Communists did not believe we would respond to anything they did, so they were not deterred.

We left no doubt in their minds as to our unwillingenss to resist Communist aggression there.

In a speech prepared for delivery on October 29, 1959, an officer proposed to state:

Laos, an area vital to freedom in southeast Asia

and also to state:

Laos is the key to the control of the whole of southeast Asia.

The State Department deleted this, of course, and the State Department censor noted in the margin beside the deleted material:

Under present circumstances Laos should not be treated as a geopolitical problem but as a small nation whose independence is being threatened.

Through the means of censorship the State Department made sure that no high official misled the Communists by giving the impression that we thought Laos might be worth defending. The statement of Admiral Felt before the House Foreign Affairs Committee was also censored to remove the stress and emphasis on the importance of Laos, which Admiral Felt, as commander in chief, Pacific, thought the circumstances justified.

The Communists were easily able to discern from statements of our high officials that we did not include defense of Laos in our policy just by noticing what our high officials did not say; in fact, what they were not allowed to say.

Our one-voice policy revealed our policy on Laos quite clearly.

Therefore, the Communists could take the offensive in Laos with confidence that there was no risk of U.S. response. We had military forces in being all the way from small units of specialized ground forces to nuclear retaliatory forces but they did not constitute a deterrence because the Communists knew we would not use them.

Quite aside from the merits or demerits of our decision that we should not defend Laos, would you not agree that we nullified the potential deterrent effect of our large military forces in being by revealing to the Communists our policy decision not to use any such forces there?

Mr. BALL. Well, I do not know that we revealed to the Communists any policy decision, nor do I know that at that time, nor since, any such policy decision was made.

I may say that Laos is a very good example, however, of the point which you, sir, were making earlier of the importance of building up a balanced force so that there is conventional deterrent as well as a nuclear deterrent.

The situation in Laos has been a troubled one. It is an interior position from the standpoint of any kind of defense operation, and I would suppose that the best way in which to give a message to a potential aggressor or an aggressor in a country of that kind is by direct communication with him.

I think the point that this illustrates is the question as to whether in the kind of dealings which we may have the kind of confrontation which we may have around the world with aggressors or potential aggressors-what is the best way to make clear an American intention?

HOW UNITED STATES SHOWED ITS INTENTION REGARDING BERLIN

In the case of Berlin we made clear the American intention in, I should say, three ways:

First, in the talk which President Kennedy had with Chairman Khrushchev at Vienna.

Secondly, in the conversations which Secretary Rusk had with Mr. Gromyko and subsequently with Ambassador Dobrynin and the conversations which Ambassador Thompson had with Mr. Gromyko in Moscow.

But these were reinforced by action on our part. The President called for a buildup of conventional forces. This was the greatest demonstration of American will of anything I know.

And I would suppose that the essence of establishing the American determination not to give up our vital interests in Berlin has been by these three means rather than by any speeches that might be made by military officers in various gatherings around the United States.

SOVIET PROPAGANDA USE OF STATEMENTS BY HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS

Now, the problem of the speeches of the military officers-and I do not mean to discourage their making speeches at all-but the problem

with which they are confronted is that a speech by a general, made in an official capacity, made in the course of official business, can be used by the Soviet propaganda machine to indicate that the generals are trying to stir up aggressive action by the United States.

EFFECTIVENESS OF STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ETC.

And this is to our disadvantage, whereas the quiet but very forceful communication of intentions by the President of the United States, by the Secretary of State, by the Secretary of Defense, by all of the officials who were charged with this, can be extremely effective in making the point clear, particularly if it is coupled by actions such as the buildup of forces which we had this last year.

DISCUSSION ON DELETION OF "WARFARE” IN FELT SPEECH, NO. 7

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel it was proper for the statement of Admiral Felt before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to be censored as it was in that case? Was he not entitled to tell the Congress, who plays a big part in this Government, I would assume you would admit-was not the Congress entitled to know Admiral Felt's personal opinion about the importance of Laos?

And that is what he was trying to tell the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and yet it was censored.

Do you think that action was proper?

Mr. BALL. I am not familiar with that exact statement. If you could give me the detail of it, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Speech No. 7, June 13.

Mr. BALL. Was that among the speeches submitted? It was?
Senator THURMOND. Yes, this one was submitted.

Mr. BALL. Yes, I find it now.

Well, this, again, was delivered just before the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna. The specific items which were recommended for deletion were, first of all:

In the Communist's view, all of the free world nations are targets in the warfare being conducted against us.

Now, the substitution that was suggested was that they are targets for their expansion.

There was a feeling that "warfare" was a word which, again, might be distorted to create an unhappy propaganda effect against the U.S. interests.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Ball, do you feel that the Communists, then and now, are conducting total warfare-military, economic, propaganda, diplomatic, local?

Mr. BALL. Well, I would say that they are conducting a form of campaign which is represented by the cold war which in certain instances around the world takes the form of actual military aggression which is the case where the Vietminh are moving into South Vietnam, or the situation in Laos where the Pathet Lao forces have been receiving some support.

But, there, again, there has been a cease-fire in Laos and the question still remains as to whether a political settlement of that situation may be possible.

To say that they are conducting warfare by every means around the world would, I think, be an overstatement. They are not bombing any of the territory of the United States or of the free world.

Senator THURMOND. Is there any question in your mind that at that time that they were conducting warfare against us, or do you feel that this deletion was censored because of the situation existing then? Mr. BALL. Well, it was censored. Obviously, all of these recommended changes were made in the context of the particular events that were then occurring. The fact that this was just before the Vienna meeting, I am sure was a factor of importance.

Nevertheless, the term "warfare" has many meanings, the most common one being military warfare, and I would say that to say that all of the free world nations are targets in the warfare being conducted against us is subject to a good deal of possible misinterpretation. Certainly it is subject to distortion by a propaganda machine that wants to distort it, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Is there any question in your mind that Communist strategy is one of subversion and armed revolution supported from outside a target nation?

Mr. BALL. I think that has been very well established, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Then what was the objection to that statement here by Admiral Felt on June 13 or shortly after that?

I believe it was submitted to the State Department on June the 13th. Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. That is a true statement from what you said.

STATE CHANGE IN FELT STATEMENT ON COMMUNIST STRATEGY ASCRIBED TO OVERZEALOUSNESS

Why was it objectionable for Admiral Felt to tell the Congress of the United States that Communist strategy is one of subversion and armed revolution supported from outside the target nation?

Should not the Congress know that?

Mr. BALL. The only explanation that we could find for this-frankly, I would not have deleted that myself-is the context of the time. I would have been, I think, inclined to say that we have no explanation as to why that particular change was recommended. It represented, I think, an overzealousness.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION FOR U.S. POLICY ON LAOS

Senator THURMOND. As a matter of fact, Mr. Secretary, we insured that we would achieve no deterrent effect in Laos by publicizing the fact that our objective in Laos was a coalition government and that we were willing to go to the extent of cutting off aid to the antiCommunist government in Laos in order to achieve this objective. When even this did not work, we expressly and formally advised the Lao Government we would not support them in the event of a Communist offensive, and we so instructed our country team in Laos. Within 2 weeks, as soon as the Communists could marshal mortars and artillery, and the Chinese and Viet Cong troops could form an assault, the Communist offensive was relaunched and Laos overrun.

Do you not agree that our actions and words in Laos violated the fundamental essentials of the policy of deterrence and, in fact, constituted an open invitation for Communist aggression which they accepted?

Mr. BALL. Senator Thurmond, the situation in Laos, as this administration found it when the inauguration occurred in January of last year, was such that there were only three courses for the United States to follow.

One was the course of abandoning Laos, which we were quite unprepared to do.

The second was the course of committing substantial U.S. forces to Laos in an interior position in a struggle which might have continued for a very long time, with the possibilities of our being bogged down there.

The third was the possibility of trying to seek a political solution. This was indicated as possible; in fact, there was an agreement for a political solution, in the meeting which President Kennedy had with Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna.

ALTERNATIVE ADOPTED IN U.S. POLICY ON LAOS

Now, I think, looking at the interests of the United States, the third possibility was the one which clearly should have been tried and was, in fact, tried by the administration. Negotiations were undertaken at Geneva which lasted a very long time in the 14-nation Conference there.

A solution was reached calling for the creation of a government of national union, and efforts have been made to bring about the kind of agreement which would result in the creation of such a government, with the understanding under the terms reached at Geneva that all outside forces would then be withdrawn.

This meant all Vietminh forces on the one side, and any Communist forces, other than the Pathet Lao troops themselves; and on the other side, everything but the Royal Lao Army.

Unfortunately, up to this point-and we have not given up hope that it will not be achieved-there has been no agreement among the three princes that represent the three different elements in Laos on a government of national union. This has been a matter of serious

concern.

This still is the best solution from the point of view of the U.S. interests if it can be worked out.

We are still hopeful that it can be worked out.

In the meantime, there was a rupture of the cease-fire. Some U.S. troops have moved into Thailand, as you know, as a preventive and a precautionary measure.

DISCUSSION ON SENSITIVE AREAS OF LAOTIAN SITUATION RULED OUT IN OPEN SESSION

Senator THURMOND. Does the State Department agree as to the importance of Laos as expressed by Admiral Felt, when he attempted to speak to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on this subject? Senator STENNIS. Senator, excuse me a minute for the interruption. Just as a Member of the U.S. Senate, my personal opinion is that