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a matter of interpretation. It is an evolution. And the fact that there is fluidity in the structure of the Sino-Soviet bloc has been perfectly evident lately.
There is evidence of considerable split, of disagreement. All of these things are signs of change. And the process of change is not going to stop. It is going to go forward.
The directions it takes, as I say, nobody is wise enough to predict with precision.
WHETHER KHRUSHCHEV'S GOALS ARE MORE PEACEFUL THAN THOSE OF
Senator THURMOND. Of course, what we are interested in is whether or not it is evolving into a peaceful state. Are Khrushchev's goals any different from Stalin's?
Mr. Ball. I think I would hesitate, Mr. Chairman, to comment on this at this point.
Senator STENNIS. All right.
Senator THURMOND. Let me ask you, to be sure you understand the question:
Are Khrushchev's goals any different from Stalin's—his goals of world domination and enslavement?
Now, do you think you need to go into executive session on that?
In accordance with the agreement heretofore reached by the subcommittee, we will now take a recess until 2:30.
(Whereupon, at 12.30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.)
(Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Thurmond, and Bartlett.)
Senator STENNIS. All right. The subcommittee will please come to order.
Mr. Secretary, are you ready to proceed?
RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION ON "EITHER/OR CONCEPT” Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, we were talking this morning about the "either/or concept," and I want to go back to that for a moment. Speech No. 63.
TESTIMONY OF GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. Ball. Yes, I have it, Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. I do not know whether you have on your sheet there the censor's note. Do you or do you not?
Mr. Ball. No, I do not. I think I can get it. I have the full text of the speech, but it does not have marginal notes in it.
Senator THURMOND. I think there can be no question but that the censor's original characterization of such a passage as an “either/or concept” is more descriptive than the "all-or-nothing approach." I just want to read you the note on that, the censor's note on that speech :
This section might well be tempered since it largely rules out any chance of an evolution of the Soviet system.
If you remember, we have had that expression now occurring and recurring about ruling out a chance of an evolution of the Soviet system. Do you recall that?
Mr. Ball. That is right, sir.
Senator THURMOND. Eliminate the “either/or concept” to allow the possibility of evolution of the Soviet system.
Would you care to elaborate any further on that "either/or concept” since this has occurred in any number of these speeches, and just happening at one time? It has been used in any number of them.
Mr. BALL. As I suggested, Senator—this morning, Senator Thurmond—I think no one with a sense of history or with a realization of the massive changes, massive forces, that are at work in the world, can rule out the possibility of very substantial changes within and among the governments of the nation states that formed the Communist bloc, including the Soviet Union. I am certain that changes are already taking place in one form or another.
Now, the extent to which those changes may proceed in a fashion which is in the interest of the United States and of the free world will depend to a considerable extent on the kind of policy which we ourselves pursue.
But I would certainly suppose that, by conducting strong and sensible policies in the free world, we can necessarily have a considerable impact on the shape and form of the systems which may evolve out of the present structure of the bloc states.
We are in an area here where, as I said this morning, no one can predict developments with any great precision.
I think the one thing that one can assume is that change will occur, that things are not going to be static, and that there are great movements in the world. We have already seen quite a lot of movement within the Communist bloc itself.
I think it would be a mistake to form our policy on the hypothesis that changes are necessarily going to take place in the right direction within the Communist bloc, and all we have to do is sit and wait.
But I think, at the same time, it is perfectly reasonable--in fact it seems to me to be essential to form a policy for the free world on the basis that if, in foreign policy, we conduct our own affairs sensibly, if we behave in a responsible manner, if we do not permit our own strength to diminish but, in fact, maintain it and extend it, if the posture of the free world grows stronger, and if, at the same time, there are measures which tend to pen up the closed societies of the Iron Curtain countries that, as a matter of evolution, and as a result of the major movements which are at work in the world today, we can expect at the end of the road that there will be some changes in the structure of the governments and the societies of the bloc coun
tries which will make them easier to live with in this very difficult world.
Now, that seems to me to be a perfectly sensible and, indeed, an essential postulate of a policy for the Western World. I think that is what is suggested here is the question: What are the alternatives that we face?
If we talk in terms of Carthage, then we talk in terms of the wiping out of a whole society, a whole nation, a whole area. This can be done with nuclear weapons. It cannot be done, however, without great damage to the rest of the world, as well, including ourselves.
I think anyone who contemplates a solution by a major nuclear war must realize, as the President himself has said, that this is no solution.
So what do we have to work with ? We have to work with instruments where we do not rule out the necessity of the utilization of nuclear weapons to protect our vital interests; but where, at the same time, we try to pursue policies which prevent the necessity of the kind of confrontation and the development of the kind of situation which makes it necessary to utilize these dreadful weapons.
That means, it seems to me, that we maintain strength in the free world; that we continue to build up the uncommitted nations and make them as independent as possible so that they are as resistant as possible to subversion and the forces that would take them over from the East; that we perfect our alliances with our friends throughout the free world; that we encourage the greatest degree of cooperation among the strong industrialized nations which are necessarily the hard core of defensive strength, and that we pursue policies with the Soviet Union and the bloc countries which makes perfectly clear that we are not going to yield in any way in our determination to protect our vital interests but, at the same time, we permit the forces to work which may over a period of time bring about some form of benign change on their part which makes it easier for us to live together in this world.
That, it seems to me, is the only policy, which makes any sense in a world where we have this kind of brooding omnipresence of nuclear destruction hanging over us and where people have to be very adult and very responsible if they are not going to precipitate the kind of holocaust—the word to which you referred this morning—which could mean the end of every value in which we put the great faith and on which we depend for the maintenance of our own civilization.
DISCUSSION ON COMMUNIST GOAL AND CHANGES IN COMMUNIST BLOC
Senator THURMOND. Is it the aim of the Communists today to dominate the world?
Mr. BALL. I think that has been made clear that-
Senator THURMOND. I understood you to say this morning that you considered it the goal of the Communists to dominate the world.
Mr. Ball. Yes; I quite agree that is the thrust of the international Communist conspiracy.
Senator THURMOND. Is it the aim of Russia today to dominate the world?
Mr. BALL. I think that it certainly is the aim of the Russian state, which is a power center of the Communist conspiracy, to achieve this.
Senator THURMOND. So the goal of domination on the part of Russia and on the part of the international conspiracy is the same today as it has been for many, many years; isn't it?
Mr. BALL. Yes; and I think
Senator THURMOND. That is what we are interested in, how it will affect us. We are not interested in little internal changes in the country, are we? Aren't we interested primarily in their goal of world domination because that affects the United States and the rest of the free world?
Mr. Ball. That is true.
Senator THURMOND. So even if there are changes, you speak about some changes being made in Russia or some of the Communist countries, that doesn't amount to a row of pins so long as their goal is domination of the world, isn't it?
Mr. Ball. Senator, the mere fact that this happens to be the goal of the international conspiracy does not mean they are going to succeed in that goal.
What I am suggesting to you, sir, is that if we pursue sensible policies over a period of time, and as it becomes clear they are not going to succeed in that goal, there will be forces at work within the structure of the bloc which are going to transform a lot of the ideas and motivations of the bloc governments.
I am not certain that this is the case. I am simply suggesting to you that no one who is responsible for policy in this country would rule out this possibility as something which ought to be encouraged, and that our own policy ought to be directed to acting as a catalyst to bring about these changes.
"EITTIER/OR CONCEPTI” AND “ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH” EXPLANATIONS
ON CHANGES IN SCHEWE SPEECII, NO, 32 Senator THURMOND. Now, on the either/or concept, here is one of the deleted passages that I wish to read to you:
On the outcome of the conflict depends the nature of the future world order. Ultimately, either totalitarian communism will prevail or the freedom familiar to the societies of the West will expand.
Now, I find that that falls strictly in the either/or concept classification.
In reexamining it, I, frankly, do not see any all-or-nothing approach about it. The description just does not fit.
Do you see how you can get all or nothing out of this type passage?
Mr. BALL. I would have no particular objection to that passage. As I say, I think that there has been some overzealousness at one time or another in this.
Senator THURMOND. Did your staff ever find where that quote came from, which speech that come from?
Mr. Ball. No, we haven't identified that one.
Senator THURMOND. Since they are unable to find it, I will give them the reference. It is speech No. 32 by Brig. Gen. M. W. Schewe, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, U.S. Army, submitted to State, May 19, returned May 22, delivered May 25.
Now, the all-or-nothing characterization might suggest that the passage referred to was one which advocated a preventive nuclear war. Listen to this passage again :
On the outcome of the conflict depends the nature of the future world order, Ultimately, either totalitarian communism will prevail or the freedom familiar to the societies of the West will expand.
There is no suggestion that we precipitate a nuclear holocaust or incinerate the Northern Hemisphere in that passage, is there?
Mr. Ball. No, I don't see it in that passage. I don't know—was this one of the speeches
Senator THURMOND. Now, the remarks of the State Department on this speech in paragraph 1 said this:
This speech was to be delivered just before the Vienna meeting between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. The stress placed on the all-ornothing character of the conflict by a high military officerhe is a brigadier general, he is not such a high-ranking officer, after all, is he? He is the lowest general that a general can be [continuing]: might have been used to undercut the sincerity of the President's mission.
Mr. BALL. Well, again, this is
Mr. BALL. Again I would simply say that the judgment has to be made whether this language served any particular useful purpose at this time, taking into account the fact that it was just before the Vienna meeting, and it was the kind of thing which could have been blown up for purposes of Soviet propaganda.
I must say that I think that this is one of the marginal instances where, I think, the reviewer could very well have passed this.
I think under present circumstances, with the instructions which we now have, they probably would have.
Senator THURMOND. Well, do you consider that an all-or-nothing approach there, in that particular instance?
Mr. Ball. I think that-well, it is worded to indicate that either totalitarian communism will prevail everywhere or freedom will expand. I think that this is certainly something which must be the objective of our policy; namely, to see that freedom does expand.
I think that, however, it may not be a very good prediction of the way history may develop; you can have the areas in which there can be totalitarian communism, and freedom can prevail over the rest of the world.
I am not saying that this is desirable. I am simply saying that this may be the course of history, and this statement by the general is a pretty flat prediction. But I wouldn't have quarreled particularly with his statement and, if I had seen the speech, I would have passed it. As I say, I think that under present constructions the reviewers in the Department would probably not have objected to it,