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EXPLANATION FOR DELETION OF PHRASE "KOREAN FIASCO" FROM SPEECH
Senator BARTLETT. Why, in speech 83, the third period, do you imagine that the reviewers--and I am not sure whether this came from State or Defense—were not content with the phrase "Korean fiasco," in the speech that was going to be made by a general?
Mr. BALL. Well, I think it raises the whole question as to whether it was a fiasco. In many ways it represented an effort by the United States to stop the aggression of communism. It was successful in stopping it, and I think for us to have diminished the very real achievement of the Korean war in this way would be highly questionable.
Senator BARTLETT. It was felt it was not appropriate for a highranking officer to so denominate it?
Mr. BALL. If the high-ranking officer denominates or refers to the Korean war as a fiasco, he is calling into question the wisdom of our trying to stop communism at that point. He is calling into question the success of our efforts.
It just seems to us that it is not a very useful statement.
DISCUSSION ON REVIEW OF STATEMENTS BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL
Senator BARTLETT. Now, Secretary Ball, I want to return to something that has troubled me in the past during these hearings, namely, speech 7 in group 4. Actually it wasn't a speech at all. It was a statement made by Admiral Felt, commander in chief, Pacific, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the comments do refer to it as a speech, and it was not, obviously.
My question before and my question now is, Why is it necessary to have a review or censorship or call it what you will, of any statement before a congressional committee by any officer of the Government?
Mr. Ball. This was a public hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee; it would be read all over the world and not merely by the committee itself.
I think it was regarded as highly desirable that Admiral Felt have the benefit of comments on matters where more than just the area of his own special competence was involved. I would suppose that it was rather normal to have this speech reviewed or have this statement reviewed in this manner.
Again, if I prepare a statement for a congressional committee, I would give it to my colleagues. If I thought that it involved defense policy I would certainly show it to the Department of Defense. This is normal Government procedure.
Senator BARTLETT. All right. If the committee were to go into executive session would there be any inhibition placed upon you or any other witness of the executive department to have an expression other than one which presented your own personal beliefs in whatever detail the committee might desire ?
Mr. BALL. So far as I am concerned, if the committee were to go into executive session I would try to explain the policies of the State Department as I understand them. If I were asked for my personal vietrs, I would endeavor to help the committee in any way I could. Now, the question as to what Admiral Felt may say in executive session would have been a matter between him, I suppose, and the high command and the Defense Department.
Senator BARTLETT. I understand that this would not be within your jurisdiction or even on the fringe. But the State Department witness coming up to testify before a congressional committee in executive session is not told to be careful of what he says. He can state anything that he knows the committee desires to hear?
Mr. BALL. That is right.
Senator THURMOND (presiding). Senator Symington, you may ask some questions.
NEW PROCEDURES IN SPEECH REVIEW PROCESS
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in an effort to understand these hearings in the future, is it your plan--the plan of the State Department—to be more careful about the editing of these talks?
Mr. Ball. Well, Senator Symington, I explained this morning, in the statement that I made at the beginning of this hearing, that we have over the past few months undertaken some substantial revisions in procedures.
Actually, the basic revisions were undertaken last November and December and, at that time, there was a kind of codification of the procedures and substantial tightening up of the arrangements.
What we have succeeded in doing is to develop much better and closer working relations with the Defense Department, and with a great deal more constant consultation going on.
Now, in the past, one of the problems was that so far as the State Department reviewers were concerned, they made suggested changes with the idea that the Defense Department would consider them, and if it had any questions about them there would be a discussion.
There was a tendency on the part of the Defense Department to regard these as ultimatums, which was not at all the State Department's intention.
In the new procedures we have made this perfectly clear. We have two kinds of suggested corrections or deletions.
One is regarded as purely advisory, which the Department of Defense can reject or not as it sees fit.
The other, when there is a major policy issue involved, is regarded as mandatory.
Actually, the number of mandatory or required alterations and deletions which the State Department is now recommending run around 10 percent.
So what is happening is that the State Department is providing some advice to the Department of Defense; and unless there is a really major and quite clear-cut contravention of policy this is advice that does not in any way impose an obligation on the Department of Defense.
In addition we have, as I pointed out this morning, arranged to have a man brought in to act full time in charge of all this function so it can be tightened up and operated in a very well-disciplined way.
Senator SYMINGTON. To whom will that man report?
Mr. BALL. He will report to Mr. Manning, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
And, in addition, we are having a Defense Department officer assigned to the State Department so that there will be constant consultation with him. When speeches or materials are sent over by the Defense Department there will be a consultation with this officer in the first instance to decide whether the foreign policy question is of sufficient importance to subject it to a serious review. If not, it is simply sent on back.
If it is subject to serious review, then it goes through our shop, and we then pass the changes back either as suggested recommendations or as mandatory changes. I think the new procedure is operating very well.
Senator SYMINGTON. How long has it been in force ?
Mr. BALL. Well, we started tightening up last November, when the reviewers were instructed to not make unnecessary changes, and not to make changes which are merely stylistic or involved questions of taste or matters of that kind.
Last December we codified the procedure, and this tightened it up considerably. Since then we have taken these other steps. We have been having regular meetings with the Defense Department people and our people who are in charge of this, and I really think we have made great improvement.
As I said also in my statement, these hearings which, it seems to me, have been handled in a very responsible manner, have contributed ideas and help to us which we have welcomed.
Senator SÝMINGTON. I think some of the changes made were good changes, but some of them, I thought, were pretty silly; didn't you?
Mr. Ball. I quite agree with you.' I would characterize them in just those terms.
Senator SYMINGTON. And you feel that the new methods that you have put in effect as a result of these hearings and of the interest which has been developed in this activity are going to work to a point where there will be only a small fraction of any problem of this kind in the future, perhaps none at all?
Mr. BALL. I am quite confident that will be so, Senator Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.
BARTLETT'S EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO BALL Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, I only wanted to add this: First, to express the belief that your own style is very elevating and that if I ever review it, and the rule has been changed, I would not suggest any improvement.
Secondly, I want to thank you personally for the candor and helpfulness of your testimony.
Mr. Bali. Thank you, sir.
REVIEWER'S COMMENT ON CHANGE IN TRUDEAU SPEECH CITED AS A VERY
Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, digressing for a moment from the deletion of the "either/or concept” where we left off, let us take a look at another type of censorship action.
In a speech prepared for delivery on March 9, 1961, a military speaker proposed to state, and I quote:
Witness the steady advance of communism for over a century.
Ignoring the anachronism created by the rather unobservant insertion of the term “Sino-Soviet," just plain Soviet communism dates back at the earliest to 1917, which is hardly a century.
Consider the explanation for the insertion which the State Department censor thoughtfully penciled in the margin of the speech. The marginal comment is, and I quote:
It is only the externally aggressive type Sino-Soviet which the United States is committed to check.
Now, we have agreed that communism, if it is communism, is built on the foundation or Messianic promise of a Communist world.
Without a dedication to bring about, by one means or another, a Communist world, there is no real communism.
Does this mean that U.S. policy draws a distinction between those bases of Communist operation or Communist regimes which contain the potential or overt, hardware-type conventional and nuclear wars of aggression, and those with less resource potential who can only work for a Communist world by the more subtle means of political warfare or possibly through support of guerrilla warfare in a neighboring country?
Mr. BALL. Could you give me the reference to the particular speech, Senator Thurmond, please?
Senator THURMOND. Yes, sir. That was a speech by General Trudeau. The date of it was March 9.
Mr. Ball. You don't have the number, do you?
Senator THURMOND. This speech was not in the list that was given us originally, and was submitted subsequently to the committee by the Department of Defense, but I will be glad to hand you this reprint from the Congressional Record which, I think, explains the speech.
Mr. Ball. Thank you.
Senator THURMOND. If you would look at this, and if you want to have me repeat the question
Mr. Ball. No. I think I have it, Senator Thurmond. I can understand the suggested change which the review made. I think that the comment, however, is a little bit foolish.
The insertion of the words "witness the steady advance of SinoSoviet communism for over a century," I think, was intended to create the impression which seemed to us to be rather important: that the danger of communism to the world is a danger which results very largely from the fact that it can draw on the vast resources of the two great centers of power, the Soviet Union and Red China; that the only really significant advances outside of the Soviet Union and Red China which communism has had, with the exception of Cuba, have been advances which have been brought about by the force or threat of the Soviet Army; and that stating clearly the relationship of communism to the Sino-Soviet power centers is rather useful in seeking to avoid the impression that communism, of and by itself, without the support of these power centers, is a force which it is difficult for us to stand up against.
I believe quite sincerely, Senator Thurmond, that communism, as an ideology, is not a very successful ideology when confronted with the forces of freedom. The danger of communism is that it can draw upon these two vast power centers, and to the extent that we couple the success of communism with these power centers we make that idea clear.
I would say that would seem to me to be the justification for that change.
Senator THURMOND. Did you comment on the statement there that, it is only the externally aggressive type-(Sino-Soviet)—which the United States is committed to check.
Mr. BALL. I think that is a very poor explanation for the change, and I have suggested to you what I think could be a sensible explanation. Frankly, I do not understand the State comment in this case.
DETERMINATION OF COMMUNIST REGIMES THAT ARE EXTERNALLY
Senator THURMOND. Since the United States by our policy is committed to check only the externally aggressive type of communism, if you follow the censor's comments, it seems that we should certainly know just what regimes fall within this category, which ones do not, and how we determine whether or not a particular regime falls within the externally aggressive category at a particular time.
Mr. BALL. Well, I can give you some examples of what that may mean. Again let me take the case of Yugoslavia, which is a highly nationalistic communism.
It hasn't shown any indications up to this date of external aggression and, to that extent, hasn't constituted a menace to the United States as communism which calls upon the Sino-Soviet power has done.
Senator THURMOND. Well, then, under our policy are we committed to check Yugoslavia?
Mr. Ball. If it becomes
Senator THURMOND. Since, in your opinion it doesn't fall within the category of externally aggressive?
Mr. BALL. If it becomes externally aggressive we would be called upon to check it. If it stays within the country, then I don't think that we are committed to check it.
This is a matter for the Yugoslavs. As long as they don't try to extend their system through an international conspiracy or through force of arms, it seems to me that this is
to them. Senator THURMOND. Now, the censor in the instance I just mentioned used the term "Sino-Soviet” to denominate these Communist regimes which are externally aggressive.
I feel that this is a rather loose application of semantics and might well contribute to confusion of our own people as well as to the various foreign audiences.
Previously we were advised by you that Cuba was a member of the Sino-Soviet bloc, but Yugoslavia is not.