We are giving aid to Poland, so we apparently are not committed to check the Communist regime in Poland. But we have heard no suggestion that Poland is not a part of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Now, Cuba is engaged in trying to export the Communist revolution to all Latin America by every means short of overt hardware-type of war, and is, according to the State Department, a part of the SinoSoviet bloc.

By the censor's definition, therefore, the Communist Cuban regime is externally aggressive.

Now, we have been told by you that Yugoslavia is not a part of the Sino-Soviet bloc, so we must assume that under our foreign policy formula the Communist Yugoslav regime is not externally aggressive.

Previously we were told, however, that Yugoslavia was supporting the export of the Communist Cuban revolution to Latin America, and that Tito was a true Communist who was working for a Communist world.

Now, just what is the distinction, and why is one regime, that in Cuba, externally aggressive and Sino-Soviet, and the other, Yugoslavia, not?

Mr. BALL. Well, I think the regime in Cuba has clearly become a part of the Communist bloc.

The regime in Yugoslavia has had quite a different history. It has maintained an independence from the Communist bloc.

Certainly Mr. Tito is a Communist. The form of communism which he has practiced in Yugoslavia has been a nationalistic communism which has looked toward the development of Yugoslavia.

There have been no instances that I know of where Yugoslavia has been externally aggressive. If it were to be externally aggressive, then I think we would, of course, regard it and treat it as any other kind of communism to the extent that we would feel obliged to try to check its aggression.

But these distinctions seem to me fairly clear. Let me say again that I think that this represents a kind of overzealous editing on the part of the State Department reviewer, and that it is much too subtle. I think that the ideas that are being changed here are not that significant. But I can understand the motivation.

Senator THURMOND. Well, does the determination of whether a Communist regime is externally aggressive depend on the particular regime's potential for military action or on its cooperation with Moscow or Peiping or on the demeanor or words of its dictator?

Mr. BALL. It depends on the way it acts. If it is externally aggressive then it tries to extend its power and authority over other countries. If it minds its own business which, to a considerable extent would appear to be the case with Yugoslavia, then you have a different situation.

TYPES OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

Senator THURMOND. Could it be that our policy commits the United States to check specific types of actions by foreign governments, and that the test of external aggressiveness is applied to specific actions. rather than regimes?

Mr. BALL. Well, if a regime engages in external aggression, then certainly we try to check that aggression. But if a regime lives peace

fully by itself and doesn't appear to engage in any such aggression, then I don't think that it presents any threat to the Western World, to the free world.

Senator THURMOND. For instance, Mr. Secretary, could it be that our Government is committed to check only the type of actions which fit the category of traditional types of aggression, such as the crossing of international boundaries by armed forces?

Mr. BALL. No, sir; certainly not.

As a matter of fact, the whole thrust of our policy in many parts of the world is to try to prevent the conditions from obtaining which make infiltration the effective part of aggression. I would suppose that a great part of our effort is directed toward precisely this.

Senator THURMOND. From the comments supplied by the State Department on the censored items, it appears that our Government does not characterize the Communist activities in Africa as externally aggressive.

Covert political agitation then does not fall into the category of actions which would cause a regime sponsoring such political agitation in another country to be classified as externally aggressive and, therefore, not an activity our policy would commit the United States to check; is this correct?

Mr. BALL. We spend a great deal of time and effort to try to check covert political activities of that kind, and to counter them.

Senator THURMOND. In applying the test of external aggressiveness, would we be correct in assuming that U.S. policy is determined by how a specific action of a Communist regime is classified under the test? Mr. BALL. I don't quite follow that, Senator Thurmond, I am sorry. Senator THURMOND. Let me repeat that.

Mr. BALL. All right.

Senator THURMOND. In applying the test of external aggressiveness, would we be correct in assuming that United States policy is determined by how a specific action of a Communist regime is classified under the test.

Mr. BALL. Well, I suppose that we make no distinction in the types of aggression. We try to stop aggression of any kind where we see it, when it has the purpose of extending the control of communism, and this applies to subversion. It applies to all kinds of guerrilla action and to direct military action.

66

SUBSTITUTION OF "INTERVENTION" FOR 'AGGRESSION" IN DECKER

SPEECH, NO. 100

Senator THURMOND. You might turn to Speech 100. I believe you have it there. That is a speech by General Decker, Army Chief of Staff.

If you will observe there the word “aggression” was deleted and “intervention" was substituted.

Mr. BALL. Well, this is a speech to be made by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The word "aggression" was to be used in contradistinction to the word "subversion" because he would have used them both. That meant that the type of aggression referred to was not subversion but some overt aggression by force. The word "intervention" was substituted with the idea that it was more inclusive than "aggression," and that "aggression" as the word might be interpreted, coming

from a general, would mean the use of armed forces, and there is no evidence of that in Africa, for example. This was a more inclusive term.

(Senator Stennis is now presiding.)

DETERMINATION OF WHAT COMMUNIST REGIMES OR ACTIONS THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO CHECK

Senator THURMOND. Many officers whose speeches were censored have testified that they could not understand the changes in their speeches required or suggested by the State Department.

Of course, they testified they were not cognizant of the details of our foreign policies, and they expressed the opinion that the changes in their speeches reflected inconsistencies.

Now, I realize their confusion and their visions of inconsistencies were a result of their not being immersed in the mainstream of policy, so to speak.

If, however, we can get a good explanation here from the State Department on just what fundamental premises our policy is based, there is a good possibility that our speakers in the Defense Department will be able to adhere more closely to our foreign policy so that less changes in speeches will be required.

This is why I want to get the specific basis for determining just what concepts or ideas are included in our basic foreign policy.

Now, with this in mind, could you explain just how, under our foreign policy, it is determined what Communist regimes or actions the United States is committed to check?

Mr. BALL. The United States is committed to check any actions which would have the effect, or tend to have the effect, of resulting in the extension of the control of Communist power over other countries which are not now under that control.

This attempt to extend power may take many forms. It may take the form of subversion, or as I say, of military action, or of the instigation of guerrilla warfare, in short of a whole variety of techniques which the Communist powers have in their arsenal. It is certainly the policy of the United States to resist and to endeavor to check those forms of aggression wherever they may occur.

DISCUSSION ON BOOK "NEW FABIAN ESSAYS”

Senator THURMOND. Incidentally, Mr. Secretary, in response to Senator Bartlett's questions to you this afternoon, you agreed that socialist movements around the world are, by and large, anti-Communist, and that there is a difference between socialism and communism. Democratic socialism, as the word is loosely defined, is not what our policy defines as externally aggressive, but communism is.

I am afraid if we leave the situation at that, however, we would completely miss the point. One of the best sources for accurate information on the democratic socialist position is the book entitled "New Fabian Essays."

I would think that the writings of R. H. S. Crossman, who edited the book, and who is a member of the Fabian Executive Committee, was a pretty authentic source.

Mr. Crossman, on page 31 of the "New Fabian Essays" makes it clear that the Fabian Societies are opposed to Russian expansion. This is what Mr. Crossman has to say, and I quote:

The task of socialism is neither to accelerate this political revolution nor to oppose it-this would be as futile an opposition as opposition to the industrial revolution a hundred years ago-but to civilize it. To do this we must realize that a victory for either side would be a defeat for socialism.

We are members of the Atlantic Alliance, but this does not mean that we are enemies of every Communist revolution. We are opposed to Russian expansion, but also to American victory. Our object is to keep the cold war cold and, in particular, so to restrain rearmament that it remains at a level which both sides can sustain over a period of years.

It is obvious from this that the fact that elements of democratic socialism are opposed to communism is only half of their position.

As Mr. Crossman states, they are opposed to Russian expansion, but they also are opposed to American victory.

Would you agree that our policymakers should keep both these facets of the Socialist position in mind when shaping and implementing our policy?

Mr. BALL. Well, I think we keep them in mind as data. The exact way they affect policy, however, is something that can only be determined in a particular circumstance.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Crossman also said at page 20 of the "New Fabian Essays," and I quote:

If we construct an anti-Communist ideology or take part in organizing an anti-cominform, we shall merely intensify the cold war and confirm the illusion that the preservation of freedom requires the defeat of communism. In fact, if freedom is to survive it is essential that neither the United States of America nor the Soviet Union should win, and that ideological passion should subside.

What the Western Socialists need today is not a crusading creed but a critical attitude to both ideologies.

Now, would you agree that to merely characterize the Socialists, therefore, as anticommunism is an oversimplification of their position in the cold war struggle?

Mr. BALL. No. I think there are a number of shades of opinion in Socialist circles. You have one type of socialism as represented by Mr. Crossman, who represents a leftwing member of the British Labor Party.

You have another type of socialism represented by some of the continental Socialist Parties which are completely in support of the Atlantic Alliance, very strongly anti-Communist, and very strongly in favor of the United States.

The fact that you call a man Socialist doesn't mean a great deal unless you know precisely what he represents and what his ideas are, and I would suggest that even in the British Labor Party you will get all shades of opinion. You will get many Socialists disagreeing with the formulation that you have read from Mr. Crossman here.

The point is that socialism is not the danger to the United States. The danger to the United States is a communism which is based on an international conspiracy and which commands the resources of great power blocs, great power centers, which can be used aggressively against us and around the world. This is what our policy must be directed toward defeating and controlling, and I don't think we should take our eye from this ball.

I think that otherwise we get very confused if we do.

WHETHER FABIAN SOCIALISM IS A DANGER TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator THURMOND. You don't consider socialism, Fabian socialism about what we are talking, a danger to the United States, when this man Crossman, who is on the executive committee and who has written this book, "New Fabian Essays," and who probably knows as much about it or more than any living man, when he says that: "We are opposed to an American victory?"

Mr. BALL. Well, it isn't very much of a danger to the United States, Senator Thurmond, because it is not an expansionist movement. As a matter of fact, Fabian socialism is the kind of dead end of an intellectual movement which has been going on for a long time, which has a relatively small number of supporters, and which is not the basis for any political party.

In the Labor Party in England, which is a Socialist party, only a fraction of its members will be Fabian Socialists. I don't regard it as a significant danger to the United States or to the values we stand for.

COMPARISON BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Senator THURMOND. We consider Communist propaganda dangerous, I presume, and this is Socialist propaganda; is that not dangerous also?

Mr. BALL. Communist propaganda is supported by a vast apparatus. It is worldwide in character. It has in many parts of the world the support of vast armies and might. I think it is of a quite different order.

ACTIONS OR EVENTS THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET

SYSTEM

Senator THURMOND. Now, let us turn for a moment to the contemplation by our policy that the Soviet system may evolve. I assume that at the present time the Soviet Union is a regime whose actions now fall into the category which would make the regime externally aggressive as viewed by our official policy and, therefore, one that the United States is committed to check; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. I am sorry, I missed the point of that. That the Soviet Union is

Senator THURMOND. I assume at the present time the Soviet Union is a regime whose actions now fall into the category which would make the regime externally aggressive as viewed by our official policy and, therefore, one that the United States is committed to check; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. Yes, I think that is quite clear, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Now, any evolution of the Soviet system which would raise a third alternative and, thereby, invalidate the either/or concept would necessarily have to involve a renunciation of an abstinence from commission of actions which we now officially view as externally aggressive; is this correct?

Mr. BALL. Yes. It would have to involve a departure or renunciation of the international conspiratorial nature of the Communist organization.