Senator THURMOND. Judging from the remarks which had to be deleted by the State Department from their speeches, many Department of Defense personnel just do not understand this idea of an evolution of the Soviet system.

In all fairness to them, it should be spelled out by our State Department people who do understand it, being as they are, immersed in the mainstream of policy.

Now, would you please explain just what actions are now engaged in by the Soviets which, if abandoned, would constitute the evolution of the Soviet system which our foreign policy contemplates?

Mr. BALL. Well, I think that it is not a question of specifying actions. It is a question of what the whole intention and purpose of the Soviet-of the Communist hierarchy-may be, and what they are seeking to achieve around the world because they then fit their actions to the achievement of that objective.

of a

I would suppose that what I might see evolve, and as I say, I don't think anybody can be a prophet in this, is a gradual opening up closed society so that new ideas come in; a gradual transference of the aggressive energies of the society, the internationally aggressive energies, to the creation of a national state with a greater level of prosperity for the people, a concentration on domestic affairs, and an abandonment of the attempt to bring about the world supremacy of communism.

All of these things are elements which would enter into an evolution, if it occurs, and I am not saying that it will. I am simply saying that with the forces at work in the world today this is a possibility which one should not rule out.

SOVIET REJECTION OF PROPOSAL TO BAN CERTAIN TYPES OF PROPAGANDA

Senator THURMOND. I notice that recently we tried to reach an agreement with the Soviets to outlaw certain types of propaganda. Would you tell us just what types and themes of propaganda were covered by this proposed agreement?

Mr. BALL. This was simply an agreement, with the idea being to discourage whipping people up into a war of frenzy, and that was all that was involved.

The agreement didn't succeed because the Soviet Union refused to go along with it and, so far as I know, it is a dead issue at the moment. Senator THURMOND. Maybe it is too soon to judge, but I have not perceived any variation in the Communist propaganda peddled all over the world since this agreement was proposed.

Mr. BALL. No.

Senator THURMOND. Has the State Department detected a change. in the Communist propaganda since this proposal and, if so, would you give us some illustration?

Mr. BALL. The line changes in one way or another constantly. This is part of the technique-to keep variations in the line from being hard and being soft. But I would say that nothing that is involved in this agreement has had any effect on the Soviet propaganda effort and, of course, the agreement was never reached. The Soviet Union has rejected the agreement, so we couldn't possibly expect any consequences from it.

Senator THURMOND. Does our policy contemplate that direct or indirect propaganda activities are a type of action which might determine whether a particular Communist regime is externally aggressive?

Mr. BALL. Well, I think that if a particular regime were to engage in a type of propaganda directed against other countries and designed to give support to subversive elements within those societies, then this would be a form of external aggression, and in the normal case when a society, a country, engages in that activity, it also engages in the other elements of subversive conduct, such as the sending of agents, and so on.

Senator THURMOND. How could the State Department determine the origin of particular propaganda themes so that we would know whether the Soviets were keeping their agreement?

Mr. BALL. Well, as I understand this agreement, and Senator, I am not very familiar with the details of it-this agreement was extremely restricted in character. It was simply directed at so-called warlike propaganda, as I recall, and it was a part of a consideration within the framework of the disarmament discussions in Geneva. But it had nothing to do with the question of subversion.

Senator THURMOND. Did you announce how the State Department could determine the origin of particular propaganda themes so that we would know whether the Soviets were keeping their agreement?

Mr. BALL. Well, as I say, we don't have any agreement, so there is really nothing to keep.

Senator THURMOND. Well, supposing we had entered into it? I guess you have hopes of entering into it yet, don't you?

Mr. BALL. No. I would say that I think the agreement is pretty well dead at the moment.

Senator THURMOND. Why?

Mr. BALL. Because I think that there has been a lack of good will on the Soviet side toward an agreement. There is no point in entering into one unless there is a desire on both sides to have it.

Senator THURMOND. Well, the evolution may take place and they may come around.

Mr. BALL. It is possible; it is possible.

UNITED STATES HAS NEVER CONDUCTED WARMONGERING PROPAGANDA

Senator THURMOND. To your knowledge, has the United States ever engaged in propaganda activities of the type covered by the proposed agreement sought to be reached with the Soviets?

Mr. BALL. No, we have not.

Senator THURMOND. It has never been U.S. policy to conduct warmongering or political agitational propaganda, has it?

Mr. BALL. We never conducted warmongering or agitation.

Senator THURMOND. In essence, then, we offered to agree with the Soviets to stop a practice in which only they engage. They refused, of course, to agree to something in which there was no advantage to be gained by them, didn't they?

Mr. BALL. That is right. They refused and, of course, this applied to other nations as well as to the Soviet Union and ourselves. But, as I say, I think the agreement is pretty effectively dead now.

80752-62-pt. 6—19

EITHER/OR CONCEPT AND EVOLUTION OF SOVIET SYSTEM

Senator THURMOND. Now, to get back to the either/or concept, and this idea of an evolution of the Soviet system, I am still not clear as to just what would constitute under the contemplation of our foreign policy such an evolution.

Would the abandonment by the Soviet of the use of overt military means beyond the periphery of the present Communist dominated territories constitute a sufficient evolution of the Soviet system that the United States would no longer be committed by our policy to check the Soviet regime?

Mr. BALL. I would say that the United States is committed to try to check the spread of international communism, and the efforts to take over other countries.

Now, to say that you can draw fine lines between one type of conduct and another is a little difficult in the abstract. You have to look at these things as they evolve.

Senator THURMOND. Well, the question I would like to get an answer to is this: Would the abandonment by the Soviets of the use of overt military means beyond the periphery of the present Communist-dominated territories constitute a sufficient evolution of the Soviet system that the United States would no longer be committed by our policy to check the Soviet regime?

Mr. BALL. Well, I would say that the abandonment of overt means is only part of the story. Obviously, there are many forms of aggression. There are many forms and techniques by which the Soviet Union would propose to try to bring about the dominance of communism. I think we are committed to check any of them that are directed toward that end.

U.S. POSITION ON SOVIET AGGRESSION IN HUNGARY

Senator THURMOND. In the view of our policymakers and implementors, was the Soviet action in Hungary during the uprising there, an act of external aggressiveness?

Mr. BALL. Certainly.

Senator THURMOND. Obviously, judging from our actions at the time, this was not the type of external aggressiveness which the United States is committed to check, was it?

Mr. BALL. Well, I would suppose that it depends on what are the available means to check such activity and what are the consequences of an effort in a particular case.

The problem of the use of means to check aggression in a particular part of the world must be judged in the light of the consequence of a failure to check it; it must be judged in the light of the possibilities of an effort to check it resulting in the "escalation," to use a word we were discussing this morning, into a major nuclear conflict; it must be judged in the light of all the other interests which the United States and the free world have, and a judgment has to be made.

In the case of Hungary, the Eisenhower administration made the judgment that this was not a case where there should be direct military intervention by the United States.

Senator STENNIS. Would you like to-
Senator THURMOND. I will be glad to yield.

Senator STENNIS. I thought maybe a 10-minute recess would be convenient.

Senator THURMOND. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. The subcommittee will take a 10-minute recess

and then we will resume.

(Short recess.)

Senator STENNIS. All right, the subcommittee will come to order. Senator, will you resume?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

DISCUSSION ON U.S. POLICY REGARDING DISTURBANCES BEHIND IRON AND BAMBOO CURTAINS

Mr. Secretary, let me make it clear that I am not at this point making any attempt to pass judgment on our policy, past or present. My purpose at this point is merely to find out what it is so that we can better understand the need for the revisions in these speeches.

We cannot, as a subcommittee, make a sound judgment as to whether the deletions were, in fact, required to achieve consistency with our foreign policy, or whether they were inconsistent and capricious unless we know the policies which are established and with which the proposed statements were allegedly in conflict.

The Hungarian uprising occurred during a previous administration, but I assume that it is still our official policy that we would not intervene in a disturbance behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtain if one should occur now; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. I wouldn't want to make a categorical statement to that effect, Senator Thurmond. I think the United States would have to maintain its freedom of action to decide on the basis of all the circumstances.

Senator THURMOND. There is no definite policy then, on that. that what you mean to say?

Mr. BALL. I don't think it can be made in those very general terms. For example, Berlin is a situation which is, in a sense, behind the Iron Curtain.

I wouldn't want to have on the record a categorical answer.

Senator THURMOND. Excepting Berlin then, would you care to tell

us?

Mr. BALL. Well, there again, Senator Thurmond, I think that since any statement that I might make here might be subject to misinterpretation, I don't think that I should express a categorical view without limiting it to a situation where we know the circumstances and can speak advisedly.

REASONS FOR PREFERENCE OF PHRASE "SINO-SOVIET COMMUNISM" OVER "COMMUNISM"

Senator THURMOND. As I understand it, the written replies of the State Department on the censored items "Sino-Soviet communism" is preferred semantics to the term "communism" because through the use of this phraseology, Yugoslavia is excluded. This is correct, is it not?

Mr. BALL. I think it is really more than that. It is really the desire to pin the responsibility for this movement on the Sino-Soviet

bloc, which is ultimately the danger, because communism, international communism, combined with the resources of these two vast countries is the danger to the United States.

If communism existed without the ability to command these resources, then I don't think that the United States or the free world would be in anything like the same serious danger that it is in because of the fact that, as an ideology, I am sure that without the support of the armed might of the Sino-Soviet bloc that communism would not prevail around the world.

YUGOSLAVIAN BREAK WITH COMMUNIST BLOC

Senator THURMOND. At one time, prior to the insurgency action in Greece, Yugoslavia was considered in the contemplation of our official policy as an externally aggressive Communist regime and a part of the Communist bloc; was it not?

Mr. BALL. It was a part of the Communist bloc in 1946-48, when it broke with the bloc. It was its breaking with the bloc which contributed to the solution of the Greek problem and the ending of that

war.

Senator THURMOND. Since Yugoslavia is not now considered within the context of our foreign policy to be within the Sino-Soviet bloc and, therefore, not externally aggressive, can we assume that the Yugoslav Communist regime underwent an evolution such as is contemplated as a possibility for the Soviet system by our policy?

Mr. BALL. It underwent a change and it broke with the bloc, asserted its own nationalist independence with respect to some of the things that it wanted to do. It has not slavishly followed the bloc in the design of its own economic system.

Now, whether this is the kind of change which may take place in the bloc itself, only time will tell.

I would cite this only as evidence of the fact that here was one country which was a member of the bloc but which is not now a member of the bloc. Where it may go, what it will do we will have to wait and see. But it is an evidence of change, and these changes occur all the time.

Senator THURMOND. Other than just what you have said, what act or specific changes took place in the Yugoslav Communist regime that constituted this evolution?

Mr. BALL. Well, primarily it broke with the bloc in that it no longer took the dictates of its policy from Moscow.

It established and asserted its independence; it has built an economic system which has deviated substantially from the system followed within the Soviet Union, which permits a much larger measure of freedom to the people working within that system and which, incidentally, and very much, I think, to our benefit, has developed the highest standard of living of the Communist countries. Here we have the example, outside the bloc, of a country which has asserted its independence, maintained that independence, and has a better standard of living than the bloc countries. This has been, I am sure, a source of deep and great concern to the people in the Kremlin.